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ABSTRACT 
In Turkey, the concept of taşra connotes much more than its immediate spatial 
meaning as those places outside of the city center(s). Its extensive circulation as a trope 
that indicates externality to modernity is inextricably linked to the specific configurations 
of the project of Turkish modernization. In this dissertation, I draw from the insights of 
postcolonial theory and psychoanalysis to develop a novel conceptualization of taşra, 
through which I interpret Turkey’s complicated relationship to modernity and its status 
within the new global order. I argue that a close analysis of the dominant discourses on 
taşra is revealing, for it constitutes one primary site where the predicaments and 
contradictions of Turkish modernization and national identity-constitution are played out, 
where collective anxieties around these issues continue to be projected and managed. In 
my analysis of these discourses, I adopt a deconstructive rather than a corrective 
approach: my objective is not to reveal what taşra “really” is but what work it is made to 
do. 
The contemporary cinematic and literary texts that I engage with in this study are 
the Nobel Laureate Orhan Pamuk’s memoir Istanbul: Memories and the City (2005), 
Turkish-German director Fatih Akın’s documentary Crossing the Bridge: The Sound of 
Istanbul (2005) and three films by the pioneer of the new genre of taşra films in Turkey, 
Nuri Bilge Ceylan—namely Climates (2006), Three Monkeys (2008) and Once Upon a 
Time in Anatolia (2011). Through close readings of these texts, I illustrate how each 
complicates, affirms and/or expands received understandings of taşra that celebrate 
and/or denounce it as being culturally, spatially and temporally external to modernity.   
iii 
 
DEDICATION 
To my father Mehmet Erdinç Özselçuk (1936-2015) who waited enough to see me 
through. 
    
  
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The completion of this dissertation would not be possible if it were not for the 
continued support and encouragement of many people. My supervisor, Monique 
Tschofen, has been an amazing mentor. Frankly, I cannot find adequate words to describe 
her formative contributions, over many years, to my intellectual and professional 
development. I am inspired by her commitment to rigorous thinking and sharp analysis, 
by her ability to offer guidance and support with such incredible precision and 
promptness. Her sustained faith in my work, her care and generosity are true gifts for 
which I will continue to be grateful. I want to thank Sedef Arat-Koç not only for her 
thoughtful comments and careful interventions into the project, but also for the vigorous 
conversations I had with her about Turkish politics, films, TV shows, books and about 
life in general. I am thankful to Paul Antze for his insightful questions about the project 
at each and every committee meeting. Nima Naghibi extended her support during the 
early stages of the project. I also want to thank Angelica Fenner and Amila Buturovic for 
graciously agreeing to serve as members of my defense committee.  
Outside of my committee, I also would like to thank Jody Berland and Nalini 
Persram in whose seminars I first started to formulate the main ideas of this dissertation. I 
am grateful to Anne MacLennan for supporting my proposal for a senior seminar that 
drew from my dissertation research and for making it possible for me to teach it at York 
in 2012-2013. Special thanks to Diane Jenner and Stephanie Margetts who made sure, all 
through my M.A. and Ph.D. in the Communication and Culture Program at York, that no 
administrative question I had remained unresolved.  
v 
 
I am indebted to my interlocutors Greg Flemming, Matt Flisfeder and Concetta 
Principe in the weekly reading group through 2008-2010. Sheila Koenig, Sarah Sharma, 
Craig Medows, Kara Peet and Paul Telford are friends and intellectual comrades who 
sustained me during my graduate studies and made life fulfilling and less difficult with 
their love, care, and ideas. I am thankful also to friends in Istanbul, especially to Seda 
Kalem, Enis Rıza, Ebru Şeremetli, Bahriye Kabadayı Dal, Nalân Sakızlı and İlker Ataç. 
My deepest thanks go to my confidant Erkan Erçel for his continuous collegiality and for 
cheering me on in my endeavors. I would also like to thank friends in my new home in 
Columbia, South Carolina: Susan Courtney, Bob Bohl, Rebecca Stern, Nina Levine, 
Catherine Keyser, Paul Famolari, Agnes Mueller and Nicholas Vazsonyi.  
My sister Ceren Özselçuk enriches my life with her intellectual dynamism and 
marvelous wit. I cannot thank her enough for all her intellectual, emotional and financial 
support that has kept me sane through my graduate studies. I am grateful to my parents 
İnci and Erdinç Özselçuk. They have shown much patience and understanding all along 
this long process.  
Finally, I want to express my immeasurable gratitude to Greg Forter without whose 
love, support and encouragement this dissertation would not have materialized. He 
listened without complaint to my ramblings and helped me find my way through knotted 
ideas. Each time my writing felt like closing down on itself, he led me towards whole 
new paths. Scrupulously, he read and commented on every page of every draft. But above 
all else, with his sheer presence in my life, he has imbued all experience with a touch of 
glory.  
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Abstract             ii 
Dedication           iii  
Acknowledgements           iv 
Table of Contents           vi 
Introduction           1 
I. Concepts and Frameworks: Taşra from Modernization    13 
to Globalization 
I.1. Taşra and Modernization       13 
I.2. Between the Abject and the Authentic:      22  
The Production of Taşra as Supplement in Modern Turkey 
I.3. The “internally-excluded”: Taşra as Supplement     31 
in Global Capitalism 
II. Taşra, Belatedness and Melancholy in Orhan Pamuk’s Istanbul   40 
II.1. Mourning and Melancholic Grieving:      51 
A Theoretical Discussion  
II.2. Belatedness, Melancholy and the City as Taşra    62 
II.3. Melancholic Speech and Sublimation in Istanbul    78 
 
vii 
 
III. Taşra and the Failure of Liberal Hybridity      88 
in Fatih Akın’s Crossing The Bridge 
III.1. From Hybridity to “Authenticity”      95 
III.2. The Metaphor of the Bridge and Its Discontents   112 
IV. Provincializing the Metropolitan Center:      124 
Taşra in the Late Work of Nuri Bilge Ceylan 
IV.1. Climates: Taşra within the Subject     135 
IV.2. Three Monkeys: Taşra within the City    155 
IV.3. Once Upon a Time in Anatolia: Taşra and Modernity  170 
IV.3.a. Sight and Smell      178 
Afterword         190 
Works Cited         196 
  
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It is difficult to think seriously about modern Turkey without invoking the concept 
of taşra. It has been the object of state policies and a domain of struggle for political 
power; it has intrigued numerous novelists, poets and filmmakers; it has been the explicit 
subject and/or the constitutive background of popular songs and hit TV series; it has 
served as a condescending shorthand to indicate a particular kind of cultural difference 
coded as unmodern or anti-modern. And yet, this oversaturated concept with conflicting 
significations has a relatively short history. It was only at the end of the nineteenth 
century that taşra, a term used to describe administrative regions outside the centers—a 
term that indicated provinces—started to connote much more than this immediate 
meaning. Notably, the term’s transformation coincides with the beginning of a process of 
reformation and modernization in the Ottoman Empire, which at the time was trying to 
resist the threat of European colonialism (Laçiner, 2005; Alkan, 2005). In this sense, the 
making of taşra is inextricably linked to the specific configuration of modernity and 
modernization in Turkey.1 It is precisely in this respect that a close analysis of the 
discourses on taşra is revealing, for it constitutes one primary site where dilemmas and 
predicaments of Turkish modernization and national identity-constitution are played out, 
where collective anxieties around these issues continue to be projected and managed. 
My dissertation is an extended reflection on contemporary cinematic and literary 
engagements with this concept. My primary texts are the Nobel Laureate Orhan Pamuk’s 
                                                          
1 Here is perhaps the place to note that the term “taşra” was not always equally central to defining 
the distinction between center and periphery. For earlier conceptions, see especially Hanioğlu (2008); 
Barkey (2008); Quataert (2000). 
2 
 
memoir Istanbul: Memories and the City (2005 [2003]), Turkish-German director Fatih 
Akın’s documentary Crossing the Bridge: The Sound of Istanbul (2005) and three films 
by the pioneer of the new genre of taşra films in Turkey, Nuri Bilge Ceylan—namely 
Climates (2006), Three Monkeys (2008) and Once Upon a Time in Anatolia (2011). 
Through close readings of these texts, I illustrate how each complicates, affirms and/or 
expands received understandings of taşra that cherish and/or denounce it as being 
culturally, spatially and temporally external to modernity.  
This is a project that is inspired by and builds upon some recent intellectual 
deliberations in Turkey that take a poststructuralist approach to thinking about taşra. My 
reflections have been shaped particularly by the articles that appeared in 2005 in the 
edited volume Taşraya Bakmak (“Looking at Taşra”). Representing a variety of 
disciplinary perspectives, from political science to women’s studies, from history to 
literature, what these articles seemed to me to have shared is a consistent occupation with 
problematizing the dominant narratives that construct taşra rather than taşra itself. By 
shifting the focus in this manner onto the constitution of the dominant narratives, the 
articles have enabled also an epistemological shift, a new way of “looking at” taşra, that 
sees in it not a pure outside—not the provinces as the binary opposite of the center—but 
how the center produces taşra in this way in the first place to procure its integral unity 
and facilitate domination of what it produces as “margin.” The insights from this edited 
volume allowed me to conceive that the particular construction and narrativization of 
taşra as external are indications of the center’s own discontinuity with itself; that they 
point at the center’s attempts at covering over and disavowing internal disarray and 
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disruption through exteriorization (Chakrabarty 2000). Pursuing these lines of thinking, 
in turn, aided me in conceptualizing taşra in this dissertation, especially in my readings 
of Ceylan’s films in Chapter Four, as a constitutive outside in the fashion of the 
Derridean supplement.  
Literary critic Nurdan Gürbilek’s (1995) influential essay on what she called “taşra 
gloom” (“taşra sıkıntısı”) has been instructive in the formulation of some other 
fundamental ideas in the dissertation. In this compelling essay, the influence of which is 
also palpable in different ways in most of the articles collected in the volume I referenced 
above, Gürbilek elaborates on the affective tones of the Turkish novelist Yusuf Atılgan’s 
work. Amongst them, she singles out a pervasive gloom that is associated with a kind of 
“privation” that “burns and shrivels the subject from the inside” (53-55, my translation). 
While for Gürbilek “the most naked and visible expression” of such gloom is embodied 
in taşra, she also renders the affect more proximate and familiar by relating it to a much 
more diffuse existential experience of “confinement” and “internal narrowing” (55-56, 
my translation). This experience, she explains, is occasioned by the knowledge of an 
other, better, fuller, more gratifying course of existence (i.e., the center) from which one 
feels insurmountably excluded. Such knowledge itself is shaped as much by socially-
informed fantasy as by the center’s dominating presence. Gürbilek discerns the gloom 
that saturates this experience, in the predicament of a woman, for example, who is 
“obliged to always sleep in the same bed with an undesired husband” (55, my 
translation); or she detects it, in another essay, in the kind of disappointment that 
“urbanites would recognize” on those Sunday afternoons which start to feel “protracted” 
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upon the realization that the weekend is coming to a close “without having delivered the 
difference it was anticipated to provide” (1998: 69, my translation).  
These insights have been enormously valuable in framing my interpretations, 
especially those which entail delinking taşra from a specific locale and thinking of it 
more in terms of a widely distributed and differentiated affective geography (see 
Chapters Two and Four). Gürbilek’s essay also points attention to something that remains 
unaddressed in her considerations, and this has to do with the relationship between the 
affective connotations of taşra and the particular dynamics of the Turkish modernization 
project of which taşra itself is an effect. With this in mind, in my analyses I have sought 
to make sense of and expand further on the affective dimensions of taşra that Gürbilek 
invokes in relation to the particular, highly contradictory and ambivalence-ridden history 
of Turkish modernization. I especially explore the ways in which these dimensions of 
taşra are bound up with a quality of “belatedness”—a quality that the process of 
modernization has unwittingly installed in the experiences of modernity and national 
identity in Turkey (Gürbilek, 2003; Koçak, 1996). I delve into this issue particularly in 
Chapter Two in my reading of Pamuk’s memoir, where I examine how the concept of 
taşra and its extended affective connotations figure in the text’s construing of the 
relationship between the (induced and assumed) sense of “belatedness” and national 
identity. 
Thinking together the concept of taşra with modernization and national identity-
formation allows me to situate my research within a larger historical framework that 
focuses on the predicaments of the project of modernity at large. My engagements with 
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postcolonial theory are crucial in this respect, especially in consideration of the curious 
silence in the field of postcolonial studies on the case of Turkey. Sociologist Meltem 
Ahıska (2003; 2010), who deploys conceptual tools of postcolonial theory in her own 
work on Turkey, sees Turkey’s peculiar history as one significant reason behind this 
silence. On the one hand, Turkey has an imperial past under the rule of the Ottoman 
Empire, which up until the eighteenth century dominated over large territories in the 
Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe and the Balkans as well as over parts of 
Russia. On the other hand, even though the Ottoman Empire did not end up as a 
European colony as such, by the end of the nineteenth century European interference and 
influence in its political, financial, social and cultural structures and institutions had 
become profound.2 The encounter with European colonialism is not limited to this 
instance in the late history of the Ottoman Empire. At the moment of independence and 
during the post-independence period, the nationalist movement was very much 
“conditioned by colonialism and Orientalist hegemony” in the ways it internalized and 
reproduced the epistemological assumptions and structures of colonialism (Yeğenoğlu, 
                                                          
2 The Ottoman Empire was occupied only for a brief period after World War I by Britain, France, 
Italy and Greece. The occupation came to end in 1922 when the emergent national movement won what is 
known as the “Turkish Independence War” against the occupiers and overthrew the Ottoman rule as well. 
While the Empire was never colonized in the sense that it avoided “direct territorial appropriation” and 
“forthright exploitation of its resources and labor” (McClintock, 1992: 88) as Ahıska explains: 
 
Western capital infiltrated the Ottoman social, economical, and political life starting in the 
nineteenth century. The low tariff rates in trade [...] led to a flood of imported European goods, 
which dealt a blow to small craft industries. Economic capitulations given to Western powers and 
the treaties that endowed European merchants with economic privileges reduced the [Ottoman] 
government to the status of the gendarmes of foreign capital. In addition to economic colonization, 
the social life was also colonized due to factors such as the constitution of Western schools and 
organizations, the invasion of Western technologies and ideas, and the political power enjoyed by 
Western embassies (2003: 375).  
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1998: 140). Indeed, European hegemony had largely determined the shape of the 
modernization process as Westernization. While following the Western blueprint, the 
nationalist movement inscribed within its discourse the essentialist binaries of colonial 
domination (the East/West distinction, for instance) and kept these binaries intact even as 
it reversed them to claim a distinct, authentic, essential national culture and identity 
(Chatterjee, 1986; Yeğenoğlu, 1998). Thus, even though “Turkey does not neatly fit into 
the colonialist or postcolonialist scheme of the colonizer and the colonized,” it 
nevertheless had a constitutive encounter with European colonialism which reorganized 
the society economically, institutionally, culturally and linguistically and restructured in a 
profound manner the ways of living and being (Ahıska, 2010: 47).  
In this context, I find Stuart Hall’s (1996) understanding of colonialism and 
postcolonialism particularly illuminating. He considers colonization to be “referenc[ing] 
the whole process of expansion, exploration […] and imperial hegemonization which 
constituted the ‘outer face,’ the constitutive outside, of European and then Western 
capitalist modernity.” Postcolonial studies, then, designates an intellectual inquiry into 
the uneven power dynamics of this process that investigates not only the continuing 
“effects of colonization, but at the same time their displacement from the 
colonizer/colonized axis to their internalization within the decolonized society itself” 
(248-49). Within such framing, Turkey constitutes not only a pertinent but a largely 
uncharted case for the field. In my analyses in this dissertation, on the one hand, I draw 
from the insights of postcolonial inquiry—from its conceptualizations of postcolonial 
temporality; from its critiques of Eurocentric narratives of History and modernity, of 
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Orientalism and postcolonial/post-independence nationalisms; from its explorations into 
the psychic dimensions of the postcolonial condition—to develop a novel 
conceptualization of taşra through which I interpret Turkey’s complicated relationship to 
modernity and its status within the new global order. On the other hand, in doing so, I 
also open up a rich and underexplored archive for postcolonial research and expand its 
geographical consciousness.3  
While all the chapters in this dissertation are connected through the overarching 
theme of taşra, each can also be read as an independent piece on its own. In this regard, 
the dissertation does not follow a linear, progressive narrative. The texts I focus on are 
clearly not the only ones addressing the subject of taşra. Indeed, none of them, with the 
exception of Ceylan’s Once upon a Time in Anatolia is explicitly “about” taşra at all. It 
would thus be possible to write about this issue by focusing on a different canon of 
works, one that approaches taşra more directly and depicts it in more recognizable terms: 
the early-twentieth century fiction of Halide Edip Adıvar and Yakup Kadri 
Karaosmanoğlu, for example; or more recently, the cinema of Semih Kaplanoğlu. 
Yet in all of the texts on which I focus, the concept of taşra makes itself felt 
through a legible set of associations and allusions. All insist that, without thinking about 
taşra, thinking about modernity or identity in contemporary Turkey will be severly 
hamstrung. The ambivalent, layered and complex ways in which these works take up the 
concept, the political interventions they make, or the ones they enable, make them 
                                                          
3 Such an intervention has already been made in the last decade by a number of scholars whose 
research, even though it covers different fields than mine, has been extremely influential for my thinking. 
These scholars include Meyda Yeğenoğlu (1998) in feminist studies, Meltem Ahıska in sociology and 
media studies (2003; 2010), and Erkan Erçel (2014) in Ottoman historiography.      
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especially compelling for the present study, which seeks less to repeat dominant 
understandings than to explore alternative visions of taşra. But my selection is not only 
based on the texts’ illuminating and novel insights. These are also works that have 
enabled significant cultural issues pertaining to Turkey to enter into and become part of a 
global conversation. Orhan Pamuk’s Nobel Prize in 2006, Nuri Bilge Ceylan’s several 
awards at Cannes (including a Palme d’Or in 2014 with his latest film Winter Sleep), 
Fatih Akın’s winning of the Golden Bear at the Berlin Film Festival all contributed to the 
formation of a global audience and widened both popular and scholarly interest in 
cultural work from Turkey. My aim in this dissertation is also to engage with and expand 
further on this developing global discussion. It is in this vein that at the beginning of each 
chapter I introduce relevant national and global debates about the work and/or its creator 
and hence contextualize my interventions.  
The first chapter lays out the project’s historical and theoretical framework. I start 
by tracing the emergence of the concept of taşra in its modern form with special attention 
to the contradictions in that conception, such as its production as simultaneously abject 
and authentic, corrupt and innocent, stagnated and blissful. I read these contradictions as 
indicative of an ambivalent encounter with a western model of modernization and as 
local effects of the “‘first in Europe, then elsewhere’ structure of global historical time” 
and of modernity (Chakrabarty, 2000: 7). In disclosing the contradictory logic of 
dominant discourses about taşra, I adopt a deconstructive rather than a corrective 
approach where my objective is not to reveal what taşra “really” is but what work it is 
made to do. In the last section of  the chapter I consider how taşra’s inclusion and 
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exclusion get re-negotiated in the last decades of the twentieth century, with Turkey’s 
insertion into the world markets, and under contemporary conditions of global capitalism. 
In my second chapter, on Orhan Pamuk, I show how in his Istanbul: Memories and 
the City the author imagines taşra as the element within Turkish identity which 
experiences itself as constitutively inadequate, worthless and always-already belated with 
respect to the ideal of European modernization. Through a psychoanalytically-informed 
approach and in light of the recent debates in collective memory and trauma studies 
around the grieving processes of mourning and melancholia, I regard this experience as 
the manifestation of a melancholic self-constitution. The modernization movement, in the 
ways it failed to adequately acknowledge the collective losses occasioned by the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and prohibited their public expression and/or 
discussion, has contributed to the mystification of the sources of these losses. Such 
mystification, in turn, has worked to displace foreclosed, unworked-through grief and 
anger onto the self and led to the experience of loss as some essential self-deficiency 
which is further fortified by an induced inferiority—by always having to fall short of the 
instituted ideal of Europe (Forter 2003; Moglen 2007). While Pamuk’s memoir renders 
visible the constitution of this melancholic national subject and even indulges in the 
debilitating effects of melancholic self-constitution, I argue in the second half of this 
chapter that through its formal strategies, the text also enacts a sublimation of melancholy 
that opens up alternative ways of constructing both taşra and modern national identity in 
Turkey.  
Chapter Three examines Fatih Akın’s documentary Crossing the Bridge: The Sound 
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of Istanbul—a film that focuses on the contemporary music scene in the city—while 
expanding the discussion of taşra in a trans-national direction. Here, I shift the focus to 
the structural affinities between the dynamics of Turkey’s relationship to Europe and that 
of the national center(s) to taşra. My aim in this is to elucidate the constitutive part the 
European gaze plays in the imaginings of taşra in Turkey. I argue that through its 
narrative structure and narrator’s voice, the documentary latently reproduces 
Orientalizing assumptions and frameworks and ends up undermining an understanding  
of hybridity that it purportedly promotes and celebrates as a process of “boundary-
blurring transculturation” (Ang, 2001: 198). Unlike Pamuk’s text, which sustains a 
continuous tension with Orientalizing discourses that the author sometimes shows 
himself to be repeating, Crossing the Bridge appears unaware of its own colonial 
reinscriptions. While Pamuk’s narrative effectively indicates the sources of its 
melancholic projections onto the city, Akın’s documentary attaches a sense of longing 
and sorrow to Istanbul without attempting to qualify such a gesture, despite the 
participants’ own narration of their experiences of the city that clearly oppose such a 
representation. Conspicuously, the documentary’s liberal-pluralist interpretation of the 
bridge in Istanbul as a metaphor for harmonious amalgamation and/or transculturation 
also collapses halfway through the film. The bridge, instead, transforms into a boundary-
marking device which, as it renders Turkey Europe’s taşra, at the same time promises the 
European subject an imaginary voyage over space and time that enables his access to an 
“authenticity” construed in terms of a reified cultural difference untouched by modernity. 
I conclude this chapter by analyzing the accounts of two specific participants in the 
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documentary. These accounts are significant because they reveal the limits of the 
established significations of the bridge as a metaphor for Turkish identity and culture—
significations that are affirmed and circulated in both liberal-pluralist and nationalist 
discourses—by pointing at what has to be excluded and disavowed to make the metaphor 
work.  
The fourth and last chapter of the dissertation is on three films by Nuri Bilge 
Ceylan, each of which draws on and complicates different elements of the stereotypical 
constructions of both taşra and the center to which it is conventionally opposed. Overall, 
Ceylan’s taşras blur the neat boundaries between the inside and outside, self and other, 
intimate and foreign. As such they are particularly helpful to understanding the complex, 
more mobile and fluid, but nevertheless deeply inequitable, forms of inclusion, exclusion 
and border-making. While in each film taşra gets materialized in a different way, all 
three films imagine it essentially as an internal alterity that destabilizes the “center” that it 
inhabits. In Climates, this center is embodied in a particular, urbanized, educated male 
subject of the post-coup, capitalism-integrated Turkey, who is shown to “contain” the 
undesirable qualities ordinarily projected onto taşra—qualities associated with 
stagnation, changeless repetition, isolation, and lack of vigor. In Three Monkeys, taşra 
indicates a frontier within the urban space and gets incarnated in the underclass migrant 
family in the metropolitan city, who can neither be fully included nor excluded but is 
instead relegated to “form a periphery at the very center” of contemporary Turkey 
(Balibar, 2007: 48). Finally, in Once upon a Time in Anatolia, taşra, ordinarily 
constructed as the “pre-modern” provinces, is presented not only as cohabiting the same 
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present with the “modern” center, but also as a life-world that scientific modernity fails to 
“metabolize.” (Forter, 2015; Chakrabarty 2000). Precisely in this capacity, through its 
status as an inassimilable alien inside, taşra appears in the film as a site that reveals the 
limits of modernity.  
  
  
13 
 
CHAPTER I 
CONCEPTS AND FRAMEWORKS:   
TAŞRA FROM MODERNIZATION TO GLOBALIZATION 
I.1 Taşra and Modernization 
The Redhouse Turkish/Ottoman-English dictionary offers three distinct translations 
for the word taşra: (1) “the outside;” (2) “out, outwards;” (3) “province.” While these 
definitions of the word seem neutral, Ömer Laçiner draws attention to the cloaked power 
relations taşra suggests in Turkish history. According to Laçiner (2005), taşra evokes a 
“hierarchical and strained relationship” which became particularly palpable in the late 
Ottoman period between the center, Istanbul, where the Ottoman Palace was located, and 
the peripheries (14, my translation). Taşra, which was left to its own devices up until the 
period of reformation in the mid-nineteenth century, turned into a troubling and 
troublesome geography in the face of the bureaucratic reforms necessitated by a more 
centralized administration of the empire. Cultural critic Şükrü Argın (2005) maintains 
that taşra’s relative isolation and its wariness towards the center before the introduction 
of reforms was in part a strategy of survival. According to Argın, keeping a distance from 
the center was a way to evade and even manipulate centralized control and create room 
for independent social, political and economic activity. Thus, the implementation of the 
modernization reforms created tension between the center and the subjects in taşra who 
grew increasingly apprehensive about losing their relative autonomy (Durakbaşa, 2010).  
With the establishment of the Republic, the attempts at “integrating” taşra into the 
modernization project intensified. They included the relocation of the new capital in 
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Ankara, away from the old imperial capital of Istanbul into the center of Anatolia; efforts  
to create a native industry, hence the creation of a new, state-supported, national working 
class and bourgeoisie; the establishment of People’s Houses (Halkevleri) in central and 
eastern regions which provided formal education to adults as well as access and exposure 
to arts, sports and social services; the establishment of Village Institutes (Köy Enstitüleri) 
that granted free training in farming, agriculture, arts and crafts, and the hard sciences to 
successful students in rural areas, who subsequently became “teachers” in their own 
communities; and the institution of military officers’ clubs, trade associations and 
community centers in small towns and villages. All of these efforts at modernization 
functioned towards enculturating and “civilizing” taşra along the lines of the dominant, 
official ideology of modernization. In fact, as Laçiner points out, these “islands of 
civilization” were installed in taşra as agents and embodiments of modernity and 
purported Enlightenment against earlier, more traditional forms of authority, such as the 
village imam or the landowners (Laçiner, 2005: 21; Türkeş, 2005).4  
                                                          
4 In mid-1950s Village Institutes and People’s Houses were closed down by the new conservative 
government under the Democrat Party (DP). One of the decisive factors behind their closure was DP’s 
conviction that these institutions propagated communism and socialism. As an advocate of private 
enterprise and ownership, the DP government was particularly wary of the Village Institutes which actively 
encouraged producers to form cooperatives. Given the general post-war anti-communist sentiment around 
the world, the DP government did not have much difficulty forming alliances with the local taşra 
bourgeoisie, comprised mainly of large land-owners and small merchants to crack down on the perceived 
threat of communism. Such economic alliances also had ideological implications that manifested 
themselves in the formation and support of nationalist groups in taşra that functioned as buffers against 
communism. However, under the pretext of anti-communism, these groups also attacked basic democratic 
rights and practices. The discourse of anti-communism also coalesced with discourses that were critical of 
modernization and westernization in general. The latter were deemed “degenerate” and held responsible for 
the erosion of “authentic” traditional values and beliefs (Laçiner, 2005). While conservatism fused with 
Turkish nationalism with strong religious undertones became a dominant ideology in taşra post-1950s, 
there were also exceptions to this trend, particularly in the Kurdish and/or Alevi towns.  
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In this context, Argın (2005) also suggests that the particular manner in which the 
Republican modernizers tried to incorporate taşra had the paradoxical effect of 
sharpening the divide between it and the metropolitan center. Rather than an agent or a 
partaker in this process, taşra was constructed mainly, or merely, as its addressee. It was 
a domain to be developed and regulated. People of taşra were to be educated, refined and 
brought into maturity/modernity as citizens of a modern state. In this sense, one can see 
the modernization of taşra as part of a self-colonizing process. As historian Halil Berktay 
elaborates:  
[The local modernizing elite] adopted the “white men’s mission” and imposed 
this mission on the people, on the subjects of a traditional empire and on its 
infrastructure with all the possible Eurocentric, Orientalist implications such a 
mission could involve. This meant not only restructuring the society according to 
the model of Western modernity, but attempting to rethink, map out and represent 
that society in terms of the categories of Western modernity, in terms of its 
specific forms of inclusion/exclusion (2005: 187, my translation).  
I find it crucial to indicate here that during this process of homogenization through 
modernization and social engineering, there was some significant realignment in the 
designation of center and periphery, at least within the parameters of the official 
ideology. In this period, Istanbul’s status as the center of economic and cultural activity 
was fundamentally challenged. This city was not only too evocative of the Ottoman 
heritage that the nationalist modernizers sought to disengage from, but also had a multi-
ethnic population. Rums (ethnically Greek citizens or residents of Turkey), Jews and 
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Armenians of Istanbul made up a large section of the traders, skilled workers, and 
craftsmen who controlled a significant portion of economic activity. As such the new 
regime perceived these groups as a threat and impediment not only to the emergence of a 
homogenous nation but also to the spawning of a “native” working class and bourgeoisie. 
Ankara, on the other hand, located at the inner hinterland of the new Turkey, was deemed 
“uncontaminated” and was presented as the new center of the new nation. Hence, during 
the heyday of the nationalist modernization project between 1923 and 1950, most of the 
economic and cultural investments were channelled into Ankara. In this new 
structuralization, the state basically abandoned Istanbul. Left to its own devices, the city 
shrank in population and dwindled radically until after the 1950s when it started 
receiving massive flows of people from taşra due to the mechanization of agriculture and 
hence increased redundancy rates in agricultural employment, developments in the 
infrastructure and technologies of transportation, and also due to the failings of the 
economic policies of the modernization project in the peripheries. It was only in the 
1970s that Istanbul started to surge again as a center albeit in the grip of unplanned 
development that led to an uncontrollable urban sprawl in years to come. Yet, decades of 
homogenization and nationalization policies and practices unsoldered the cosmopolitan 
texture of the city and by this time Istanbul was almost entirely Turkified (Keyder, 2000; 
Kuyucu, 2005).5  
                                                          
5 In 1942, a Wealth Tax was levied on “wealthy citizens” in the aims to curb profits from speculative 
economic activities that took advantage of the war-time conditions. Although in theory the tax was to be 
imposed on every citizen above a certain income level, in practice non-Muslim citizens were taxed at much 
higher—and arbitrarily established—rates than their Muslim counterparts. As a result of taxation, many 
non-Muslim merchants and industrialists had to claim bankruptcy and close down their businesses. Those 
who were unable to pay such exorbitant dues were forced to settle their debt through manual labour in 
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Such shifts and fluctuations in the determination and configuration of the center(s) 
and peripheries are indicative of the dynamic, discontinuous, unstable character of these 
constructions. In this sense, it is more appropriate to think of these constructions in terms 
of relations rather than objective, fixed, and generalizable categories in themselves. The 
meaning and designation of center and taşra, as well as what is included and excluded in 
these definitions, are not only contingent upon the particular political, social, economic 
and cultural conditions of a period, but also determined by power relations. The concepts 
of taşra and center cannot really be thought as autonomous and meaningful entities in 
and of themselves, since it is only through their relation to each other that they gain their 
meanings.  
In this context, as Nurdan Gürbilek (1995) suggests, in order for taşra to acquire a 
meaning, in order for it to be identified and identify itself as taşra, there has to be a center 
                                                                                                                                                                             
labour camps established in Aşkale, a town in the Eastern part of Turkey, under particularly harsh winter 
conditions. There were not any Muslim citizens sent to these camps. As a result of taxation about 50,000 
non-Muslim citizens, most of whom were residing in Istanbul, left Turkey (Bali, 2006; Kuyucu, 2005).  
Also see Ayhan Aktar (2000) for a detailed analysis of the conditions and implications of the Wealth Tax. 
On September 6-7, 1955 non-Muslim neighbourhoods and businesses in Istanbul were attacked, 
pillaged, and burned down by mobs organized and supported by the government and Turkish Intelligence 
Service. The events which originated from the growing tension between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus 
and fortified by the economic crisis in Turkey, quickly escalated into violent riots. The target of attacks 
shifted from Rums only to include Armenians and Jews, while the mobs were joined by an enraged public 
stirred with the nationalist rhetoric of the media and the government. Between 1955 and 1960, 
approximately 20,000 Rums emigrated from Turkey (Kuyucu, 2005).  
In 1964, the antagonism between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus peaked once again. The 
government of Turkey unilaterally annulled the treaty of residence, free movement of persons, and goods 
with Greece and issued a law that cancelled the resident permits of Rums with Greek passports. 
Approximately 40,000 were deported and/or forced to leave Turkey because of the pervasive culture of 
ethno-religious discrimination, harassment and intimidation (Keyder, 2000; Kuyucu, 2005).   
I cite these three particular events because they are connected to the broader ethno-national 
homogenization policies and practices of the Turkish state and governments which aimed to construct a 
unitary nation out of the multi-ethnic population inherited from the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, 
these policies and practices worked towards dismantling/dispossessing the non-Muslim bourgeois class and 
substituting it with a Turkish-Muslim bourgeoisie who appropriated the capital of the former (Bali, 2006). 
As a result of these policies and practices and in conjunction with the popular support for ethnocentric 
Turkish-nationalism, anti-minoritism, and xenophobia, the non-Muslim population of Turkey has now 
dwindled to miniscule numbers. 
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that marginalizes and fixes it as subordinate and lacking in comparison to that center. The 
center not only constitutes itself as wholesome and superior through this marginalization 
but also establishes itself as the standard against which taşra is propelled continuously to 
measure itself:  
In order for taşra to distinguish itself as taşra, it has to discern that there is 
another course of existence from which it is withheld; that there is a center 
towards whose margins it is pushed out. [Taşra] has to perceive itself through the 
eyes of this center before which it feels lacking and deprived. The horizon of 
taşra is always the big city. It is the big city that both extends and constricts 
taşra’s horizon and renders it taşra. It is only through the formation of such 
perception that taşra begins to appear so narrow and suffocating to those who 
reside in it (Gürbilek, 1995: 57, my translation). 
Following upon Argın’s (2005) observations, I contend that it was particularly with the 
commencement of the modernization project that taşra emerged as such a space and as a 
form of existence defined predominantly in pejorative terms:  
With the establishment of Republic, taşra became the home not only of poverty 
but also of deprivation. Besides the poor, the rich of the taşra also received their 
share from this feeling of destitution. [...] Gradually, the serenity of being in place 
was replaced by a feeling of being somewhat in the ‘wrong-place’” (Argın, 2005: 
277, my translation).  
Through what Argın defines as “a process of radical intervention,” and imposition, the 
modernization project in a way forced taşra to recognize the domination of the center as 
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the original model to be followed. Yet, while the center was introduced as a model, taşra 
was also never allowed to become more than an inadequate copy. No matter how hard 
taşra tried to catch up with and emulate, so to speak, the center, these attempts never 
seemed “good enough” since in a paradoxical way, in the post-republican period, the 
center was endowed with qualifications that taşra could not by definition acquire (Argın, 
2005: 280-281).  
The problem here lies not so much with taşra’s “failure” in accomplishing the tasks 
set out for it, in its “inability” to duplicate the model of the center or with some inherent 
disposition it has against modernity and modernization, as some essentialist and 
culturalist accounts have claimed, but with the very logic that underlies the configuration 
of center/taşra, model/copy dichotomies. In this logic, while difference of the latter term 
is for the most part subsumed under some kind of absence, failure and lack, this is 
overlain and justified by the assumption of an insurmountable temporal difference 
between the two domains. This notion of insurmountable temporal difference is in its turn 
constitutive of the ideology of progress implicit in the project of Enlightenment. 
Narratives of modernization, development, and transition, or those of belated modernities 
and uneven development, are informed to various degrees by such an ideology and 
sustained by unquestioned investments in the idea of a single, universal, homogenous 
unfolding of historical time identified with the “constantly onward-moving chronological 
sequence of the West” (Ahıska, 2003: 354; Chakrabarty, 2000; Mitchell, 2000). In these 
historicist accounts, modernity is assumed to have already taken place in particular 
center(s). Invariably Europe is designated as the “primary habitus of the modern” even 
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though the specific locations of centers within Europe vary and are often multiple 
(Chakrabarty, 2000: 43). This historicist, Eurocentric understanding, by positing Europe 
as the “original stage” of modernity, assigns all non-European experiences of modernity a 
quality of belatedness, derivation, second-handedness. Such a positing produces a rift in 
the temporal coordinates of Europe and non-Europe. Prefigured as the followers of the 
former, the latter are in a way arrested in the temporality of eternal pastness—they are 
always already late, lagging/lacking in relation to Europe where “real” time unstoppably 
unfolds towards the future (Ahıska, 2003). In this structural “denial of coevalness” 
Europe’s present is produced as non-Europe’s future, whereas the latter’s present 
corresponds to Europe’s past (Fabian qtd. in Chakrabarty, 2000: 8).  
Dipesh Chakrabarty undertakes a project of decentering such narratives in his 
Provincializing Europe (2000). He associates this perpetual time-lag with the space of the 
“waiting-room.” 6 Non-European peoples and nations are suspended in the interval of this 
room, where they need to first wait to develop and “ripen,” get prepared (so to speak) to 
take their place in the stage of modernity (249). Yet, given the presumption that Europe is 
the center, the single space where History is enacted, all other histories cannot but remain 
lagging in the waiting-room, since in the unitary, homogenous progression of historicist 
time, “catching up” becomes structurally impossible.  
                                                          
6 In Chakrabarty’s elaborations on this idea of the “waiting-room” one can detect the presence of 
Walter Benjamin as an invisible interlocutor. In his deliberations in “On the Concept of History,” where he 
criticizes historicist projections of the past, Benjamin points out a problem in the philosophy of the Social 
Democratic party which adheres to an “additive” and developmentalist movement of history and 
“[transforms] the empty and homogenous time into an anteroom” where, it is assumed that, “one can wait 
for the emergence of the revolutionary consciousness with more or less equanimity” (2003[1940]: 402, 
emphasis is mine).     
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From within this framework, I want to propose that taşra emerges as the sign of the 
“waiting-room” in the dominant narratives of Turkey’s modernization project. As I 
indicated before, in these narratives, taşra is defined in terms of lack or absence in 
relation to the center, but its construction as such follows from and is rationalized by a 
prior assumption that regards taşra as always(-already) lagging behind the center. What I 
want to emphasize here is that the nationalist modernizers, in a paradoxical move, 
adopted and reinscribed the Eurocentric, historicist temporal paradigm locally in their 
approach to taşra. As Chakrabarty argues in the context of the relations between Europe 
and non-Europe, the modernizers in Turkey also “posited historical time as a measure of 
the cultural distance assumed to exist” between the center and taşra (2000: 7). Indeed, the 
center-taşra relationship is haunted by Turkey’s relationship to Europe, under whose 
gaze it stands as one other site of “belated modernity” and hence bears the mark of lack, 
inadequacy or incompleteness. As Argın (2005) suggests, in Turkey, the center’s gaze on 
taşra always implies a second gaze, an internalized Western gaze, which judges, defines, 
fixes taşra through Western eyes. As the center looks on at taşra, it is also at the same 
time being looked at by the Western gaze incorporated within. The lack, inadequacy, 
“underdevelopment” that the center locates in taşra is an index of how the center 
imagines itself to be seen by Europe. In this sense, it is apt to say that the center projects 
onto taşra what has been projected onto Turkey through the Eurocentric, colonizing and 
orientalizing logic that regulates the single, universal, and homogeneous constructions of 
modernity.   
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I.2. Between the Abject and the Authentic: The Production of Taşra as Supplement 
in Modern Turkey 
 
In his article on the construction of taşra in Turkish novels from the 1920s to the 
2000s, literary critic Ömer Türkeş (2005) draws attention to the recurrent nature of the 
descriptions and metaphors that are used to mark taşra as an outside: “Dusty roads, dirty 
hotels, dilapidated houses, perishingly cold or oppressively hot weather conditions, 
desolate train stations, dark towns” are but some of the sustained terms in which taşra 
was produced in these novels (161, my translation). Time seems to have stopped in these 
arid, stagnant spaces which do not seem to show much diversity regardless of one’s 
specific geographic location. People that reside in taşra are like the “living dead” who 
have lost their vigour, who live without any future prospects or hopes (172). Figured as 
unsophisticated and inarticulate, they are devoid of the ability to shape their own lives 
and unable to undertake and perform the responsibilities of adulthood. They are either 
oblivious about culture or blindly driven by it to such an extent that their lives are 
perceived to be organized by unbounded and unregulated cultural beliefs.  
Stuck in a state of permanent childhood, taşra “natives” are also depicted as having 
a mutilated relationship with sexuality. As a taboo subject, sexuality is repressed in taşra 
more fiercely than in any other place. It is something that is either assumed not to exist or 
takes the form of excess. While marriage comprises the only legitimate access to sexual 
experience, it certainly does not guarantee a loving relationship between equals. Forced 
or arranged marriages, rape and abuse are rampant in this imaginary construction and 
affect both men and women. Yet, women live perhaps the most downtrodden existences 
in taşra. In the novels discussed by Türkeş, there is a special emphasis on the oppressed 
23 
 
state of taşra women under conservative and firmly entrenched patriarchal conditions. 
Since the mobility of women is highly restricted compared to men—some of whom can 
actually leave taşra for work or study, or simply out of a restlessness to escape the dreary 
circumstances—taşra women are depicted as doomed to live their lives there, changing 
hands amongst men. Deprived of any real agency, these women are caught between 
possessive safeguarding and outright cruelty in the hands of fathers, brothers, husbands 
and under the deeply seated male chauvinism that pervades taşra (Çur, 2005; Suner, 
2005; Türkeş, 2005).  
Change is introduced into this ominous place only from the outside. Since taşra is 
figured as a space moored in the past and as ineluctably arrested in repetition, any sort of 
dynamism or future-orientation is initiated through institutions that are representatives of 
modernity (community centers, schools, clubs, theatres, etc.), or through the arrival of an 
“ideal, modern citizen”—an educated, cultured figure whose profession marks him (or 
much less frequently,“her”) as a stand-in for such institutions (teacher, doctor, military 
officer, mayor, journalist).  
As both Türkeş (2005) and Argın (2005) intimate these repeated narratives about 
taşra which manifest themselves in dominant political and economic policies as well as 
in literature, are permeated with an orientalizing logic. This logic is discernable in the 
ways that taşra is abjected as some ontologically, spatially and temporally yonder 
domain and (re)produced monolithically as immutable, vulgar, small-minded and 
primitive. It is also important to note here that, particularly in the case of literature, most 
of what came to define taşra was written by “outsiders,” i.e., middle/upper-middle class, 
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urbanized intellectuals and authors based in the centers, Istanbul or Ankara, some of 
whom had not even been to the places they so meticulously described, but relied instead 
on already existing expositions. In this sense literary works on taşra have a derivative 
quality about them; this accounts for the recurrence of certain descriptors, metaphors and 
figures of speech in the novels that Türkeş (2005) maps out in his article. These authors 
approached taşra in their writings much as an Orientalist traveler or scholar approached 
“the Orient” as “a topic of learning and discovery,” from the perspective of a detached 
onlooker who tries to analyze, figure out and domesticate the Orient’s foreignness (Said, 
1994: 73).  
Alongside such production of taşra as negation of modernity, however, there also 
exists a glorification of taşra as a source of authenticity. In this articulation, taşra comes 
to signify the authentic inner kernel, the unadulterated native self. Historically speaking, 
what can be called a romantic idealization of taşra was in fact part and parcel of the 
Kemalist modernization discourse from the beginning, as one of the means to establish 
the cultural difference and autonomy of the newly emerging nation-state from the West 
and to claim cultural authenticity. In the 1950s, with the consolidation of political 
conservatism and the rise of populist-ethnocentric Turkish nationalism, the sanctification 
of taşra as a space of authentic identity intensified (Laçiner, 2005). While the “othering” 
of taşra persisted, alongside it there emerged a populist romanticization of taşra as the 
“repository of folk wisdom,” of unsullied indigenous culture and identity (Kandiyoti, 
1997: 122). In this discourse, people of taşra depicted as benevolent, forbearing and 
dignified were often pitted against the over-westernized, self-centered, inauthentic 
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urbanites. Infused with nostalgia and mystification, this discourse helped to congeal taşra 
as some sort of a living memorial to a presumed authenticity prior to modernization 
(Bora, 2005; Argın, 2005).  
In her analysis of what she calls “popular nostalgia films” of contemporary Turkish 
cinema, Asuman Suner (2005, 2010) explores this ambivalent construction of taşra as a 
space of both felicity and deprivation. Drawing on Gaston Bachelard’s ([1958] 1994) 
articulation of the “house” as a space of protection, affection and childhood bliss, Suner 
argues that in these popular films taşra is produced as a similar space, associated with 
notions of belonging, safety, sincerity, intimacy and inclusion. Here, taşra is conceived 
as a zone of recovered bliss. It is imagined, once again, as a space outside of and 
untainted by modernity and its values. Yet, this time, these characteristics are framed as 
merits rather than defects. This is a closed, fantasy space of harmony; a familiar and 
familial space of community where people know and trust each other. In these narratives, 
the harmony is consistently shown to be shattered with the intrusion of an element from 
the outside. In other words, contact with the outside seems always to beget some kind of 
disaster. As a result, communal ties irreparably disintegrate; innocence is tarnished and 
tragedy descends on unsuspecting victims (Suner, 2005; 2010).  
Despite their apparent celebration of taşra, I see these narratives as sharing a 
common motif with those that abject taşra, one that reveals a deeper structural 
complementarity. This motif has to do with how the celebratory narratives infantilize 
taşra dwellers. In the face of adversities that strike them, taşra “natives” are rendered 
naive and utterly helpless. They are easily manipulable, incapable of dealing with life’s 
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contingencies, managing problems or making firm decisions. In this sense, they are 
depicted as simply submitting to what fate metes out to them. Here, the articulation of 
notions of childhood, innocence and purity to the concept of taşra is quite symptomatic 
in the way it implicitly subscribes to the developmentalist temporal paradigm of 
modernization that I analyzed earlier. As Suner notes, taşra is idealized as a space and 
time of some dreamy childhood bliss, a lost yet longed-for “period of collective 
childhood” (2010: 41). She further states that even when the narratives take place in the 
present time, taşra is still represented as a space frozen in the past, tied up with affects 
and behaviour patterns that are associated with conventional conceptualizations of 
childhood. However, contrary to the narratives that marginalize taşra as a state of 
permanent childhood to insinuate backwardness, underdevelopment or stagnation, these 
nostalgic fetishizations now celebrate this state as the token of an imagined harmonious 
past that is aggrieved by inexorable and invariably-destructive forces of modernity. What 
remains constant in both narratives is the inscription of taşra’s juvenility, either as 
something to be protected and cherished or as a state to be surmounted. Put differently, 
both these narratives try to assign taşra a particular place and a particular task in the 
attempts to constitute and legitimize the integrity of the nationalist modernization project 
on the one hand, and to cover over its contradictions, on the other. These discursive 
manoeuvres try to appropriate taşra either as an emblem of the pre-/non-modern that 
needs rehabilitation or as a sign of some inner, overarching authentic identity. Taşra itself 
becomes in the process an elusive and protean concept. It takes shape according to the 
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provisional demands and needs of dominant discourses of modernization and national 
identity to constitute and project themselves as complete, coherent and consistent.  
In this regard, I discern a structural resemblance between taşra as concept and the 
Derridean notion of the supplement. In his essay “...That Dangerous Supplement...,” 
Derrida (1997) speaks about two different meanings of the word “supplement” which he 
subsequently argues to be based in a shared logic. In the first meaning, the supplement 
suggests an “addition;” “it is a surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude [...] It 
cumulates and accumulates presence” (144). By common logic, then, the supplement is 
assigned a quality of exteriority. To be added on, the supplement must be figured as 
exterior to that which it is appended to (Culler, 1986). In the second meaning, Derrida 
continues, “the supplement supplements”: it acts as a substitute, “it adds only to replace” 
(145). By virtue of it being a substitute, the supplement, here too, is produced as being 
outside of the entity it is substituting for; “in order to [replace something, the substitute] 
must be other than it” (145). What Derrida deems as the “strange” and “dangerous 
economy of the supplement” proceeds from the shared presumption underlying both 
meanings of the supplement that posits it as being external to the entity being 
supplemented. For if an entity necessitates cumulation and/or substitution to assert its 
presence and fullness, then it cannot be full, complete, present prior to this process. The 
condition of possibility for the constitution of internal coherence and fullness is the 
supplement. Put differently, the supplement adds or replaces “in order to complete, to 
compensate for a lack in what was supposed to be complete in itself” (Culler, 1986: 103).  
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In this precise sense, the supplement is a precarious term. It is both necessary—for 
the constitution of coherence, fullness, presence—and formidable, because even as it aids 
in securing fullness, the supplement sabotages this process by marking the lack it is 
filling and hence heralding the impossibility of originary fullness (Derrida, 1997). Hence 
the supplement is “called upon and repelled at the same time” (Yeğenoğlu, 1998: 78). 
The strange, dangerous and paradoxical status of the supplement resides in its concurrent 
capacities “to infect and to cure” (Culler, 1986: 142).   
Furthermore, this dual capacity makes it untenable to think of the supplement as 
purely exterior to the positivity it assists in procuring. Neither, though, can it be fully 
assimilated into the interior, since it plagues the positivity from the inside by indexing the 
lack that precludes unity, consistency and fullness. Simultaneously intimate and foreign, 
the supplement in fact throws into crisis the neat distinctions between the inside and the 
outside. Situated at a peculiar and inarticulable place where interiority converges with 
exteriority, the supplement remains elusive and opaque. Elaborating on this cryptic logic 
of the supplement, Derrida writes:     
Something promises itself as it escapes, gives itself as it moves away, and strictly 
speaking it cannot even be called presence. Such is the constraint of the 
supplement, such, exceeding all the language of metaphysics, is the structure 
“almost inconceivable to reason.” Almost inconceivable: simple irrationality, the 
opposite of reason, are less irritating and waylaying for classical logic. The 
supplement is maddening because it is neither presence nor absence (1997: 154).  
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In light of this passage, let me try and tease out more clearly my reasoning behind 
conceptualizing taşra as supplement. As I indicated, in the dominant discourses of 
modernization and national identity-constitution, or what one might describe as the 
Kemalist project of modernization and nation-building, taşra is assigned two significant 
yet seemingly conflicting positions. On the one hand, it is constructed as the Other of 
modernity, imbued with qualifications and essences that are antithetical to the modern 
identity defined by the modernizing elites. On the other hand, it is produced as one of the 
sources of authenticity that differentiates the nation from the West, more precisely from 
Europe. However, I do not consider these two discourses as divergent as they may seem 
at first glance. Rather, I consider them as attempts—within the limits of available 
discursive constructions—to contain, domesticate and make sense out of the obscurity 
that taşra, as a concept, introduces into the established systems of meaning. Having said 
that, I also want to emphasize that taşra is not an autonomous element that intervenes 
from the outside and instigates this destabilization of meaning on the inside. On the 
contrary, taşra is an effect, a surplus, generated by the very system of meaning that it 
undermines.  
As I have demonstrated, within one vein of the dominant, Kemalist modernization 
discourses taşra represents an essential other, that which one cannot and should not be if 
one is to sustain a consistent, unified modern identity—however “illusionary,” temporary 
and partial this sense of stability might be. As the essentialized other, taşra is pushed to 
the margins; it is subordinated, segregated in/as an exteriority. But it is also not possible 
for the modern identity that the elites are seeking to establish to constitute itself without 
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referencing taşra in some way as the non-self/non-modern or as an additional element, a 
plenitude, that enhances and validates identity. Without taşra, the modern (in Turkey) 
cannot exist. Despite its construction as peripheral, marginal or extrinsic, and, in fact, 
precisely on account of this process of exclusion, taşra takes part in constituting and 
sustaining the internal consistency and unity of dominant Kemalist modernization 
discourses and the modern identity they create. The ambivalence towards taşra that is 
conveyed through its exclusion as abject and inclusion as authentic, the repulsion and 
sympathy that accompanies these processes, comes from the amorphous dimension that 
taşra embodies and enacts as supplement.   
It is therefore not surprising to see that, in Turkey, some recent and sophisticated 
deliberations on taşra draw considerable attention to its vagueness and obscurity as a 
concept. Even a quick scrutiny of these discussions reveals the constant slipperiness one 
confronts with every attempt to speak about taşra, regardless of the perspective or 
approach adopted. For instance, in his article Argın (2005) talks of taşra as a word with 
“nomadic” connotations. He writes: “Even though taşra points at a place, in itself it is a 
homeless word. It is a nomadic word, so to speak. It points at, marks and flees” (273, my 
translation). Similarly, in his article on the predicaments of producing literary work from 
taşra, poet and cultural critic Ahmet Bozkurt (2004) refers to taşra as “subsisting in an 
exilic dimension” (76, my translation). According to Bozkurt, “taşra always stands in the 
threshold” (76). In Asuman Suner’s study of contemporary Turkish cinema, to which I 
referred earlier, taşra is defined as being “neither this nor that” —neither the big city nor 
the village, neither outside nor inside—but a state of in-betweenness (2005: 55). 
31 
 
Certainly these analyses have been insightful and inspirational for the debates and ideas 
that I take up in this dissertation. Yet I also detect a crucial drawback in them: they do not 
pursue the implications of their own perceptive arguments to the end. While these 
articulations constitute valuable contributions to more nuanced and complex 
understandings of taşra, they fall short at explaining how, in the first place, taşra comes 
to signify the liminality that they all seem to suggest. In other words, these articulations 
do not quite address or explicate the production of taşra as liminality. Without an 
engagement with production, the qualities and capacities that are attributed to taşra carry 
the risk of essentialism. That is to say, without a reference to their production these 
qualities seem as if they are innate and pre-given. Such conceptions are also prone to 
inadvertent romanticizations and valorizations of taşra per se, as a locus of resistance.  In 
this context, my earlier engagements with critiques of Eurocentric, historicist, 
developmentalist theories of modernity, as well as my discussion of deconstructionist 
theory, are attempts at addressing this oversight in the emerging critical literature on 
taşra.  
 
 
I.3. The “internally-excluded”: Taşra as Supplement in Global Capitalism 
The new social, political and economic conditions that emerged in the 1980s in 
Turkey have particular significance for understanding the shifts in the meaning of taşra 
that concern me in the chapters to follow. In this period, the implementation of economic 
structural adjustment programs and Turkey’s transformation from a state-directed, closed 
economy to an open market economy prompted a range of modifications in the 
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relationship between taşra and the center. The economic liberalization program put into 
place was accompanied by some limited and highly-monitored social, political and 
cultural liberalization processes. Yet, despite the repressive climate that the military coup 
of 1980 generated, the political arena that had so far been dominated by a left-right 
polarization has slowly come to be claimed by hitherto socially-invisible and excluded 
groups like women, Kurds, Islamists, environmentalists, and LGBTs. For this reason, the 
end of the 1980s and the 1990s, a period of complex political, social, economic and 
cultural transformation ridden with contradictions, is considered by some as the period of 
emergence and establishment of an oppositional civil society. These groups focused 
particularly on the paternalistic authoritarianism of Kemalist ideology and its 
modernization project. Thus, a process has commenced whereby previously clogged 
channels of public debate around what had so far been deemed rather “touchy” issues, 
such as the definition and principles of secularism, Turkey’s ethnic composition, human 
rights, minority rights, definitions of citizenship, were at least partially opened (Keyder, 
2006; Suner, 2005: 20-22). 
This period also witnessed a fundamental restructuring of the political and 
economic bodies of power. The military coup and the implementation of new neoliberal 
economic policies contributed to the rise of a new class of elites. One of the significant 
and common features that differentiated this new generation of entrepreneurs and 
political figures from the former was their close ties to taşra (Taşkın, 2008). In contrast 
to the previous generations of elites who defined themselves primarily as Kemalist, 
militantly-secular, and established urbanites, the new elites, who brought together 
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conservative and Islamic values with capitalist ambition and neo-liberal ethics, were not 
only from taşra, but represented their connections to taşra as an indispensible constituent 
of their identities (Erder, 2000). The latter also publicly voiced their criticisms of 
Kemalism, especially with regards to its strict and monolithic interpretation of 
secularism, its statism and authoritarian tendencies. The new wave of liberalism and 
pluralism, which enabled the expression of previously repressed particularisms—such as 
ethnic and/or religious attachments—has also assisted the new elite’s openly reactionary 
and “unapologetic” embrace of an often taşra-embedded identity.     
From the perspective of the Kemalist elites and the urbanized, Westernized, 
middle/upper-middle classes that identify with Kemalism, this new configuration was 
interpreted as a threat and an audacious assault on established values and principles. The 
issue was not only and simply about sharing power with and/or relaying power to another 
body, but perhaps more significantly about who this body was. While the displaced elite 
responded in anger and resentment to the substantial loss they experienced in their socio-
economic and political power and privileges, they pointed these energies specifically at 
what was perceived as a “virus-like” spawning of “taşra culture” in the heart of centers, 
particularly in the grand-center of Istanbul. In the eyes of the displaced elite, the 
“culprits” of this culture were not just the new elites who symbolically and financially 
supported it, but also domestic migrants who transported the “culture” and “aesthetic” of 
taşra to the center.7 The latter were not complete strangers to the city dwellers; flows of 
                                                          
7 I find it important to note that there also existed the possibility of articulating and crystallizing this 
anger and resentment towards a systematic, political questioning of the neo-liberal restructuralization 
programmes which were/are responsible for the gradual abrasion of the middle-class, increasing disparities 
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migration from small towns and villages had already begun in the 1950s, largely due to 
the failings of the economic policies to respond to the needs and demands in these areas. 
Yet, internal migrations considerably intensified in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly 
from the Eastern, predominantly Kurdish provinces. Violent clashes between the Kurdish 
resistance movement and Turkish armed forces as well as the systematic repressive 
practices on Kurdish citizens were the main reasons of this migration. In this regard, the 
intensification of migration flows became one other basis for the justification of the 
hostility in the big cities, especially in the metropolis of Istanbul, against migrants from 
taşra.   
We can summarize these transformations by saying that, since the 1980s, Turkey 
has undergone a fundamental dislocation of political power structures, a tension-ridden 
changeover of capital, massive translocations of people, and a disarticulation and 
rearrangement of hegemonic social and cultural parameters. The relationship between 
center and taşra was directly implicated in such seismic transformation. As Laçiner 
(2005) notes: 
The period when center and taşra referred to distinct geographies, distinct socio-
economic and political formations, and denoted the hierarchical relationship 
between them, is now over. This is a new period where, the tension that was 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in the distribution of wealth, precarization of labour, etc. However, such a possibility was not realized in 
Turkey in the 1980s. I’d argue that the mutilation of the political left during and in the aftermath of the 
1980-coup contributed to this inability to form organized and articulate resistances. In the absence of such 
alternative imaginaries, the anger and resentment, especially of the politically, culturally, economically 
dislocated middle classes, were more readily displaced on the somewhat easy scapegoats, on the 
immediate, already-existing receptacles of otherness. 
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construed and experienced within this old configuration has now moved into the 
centers and permeated into the face of the whole country (36, my translation).     
Accordingly, under conditions of high mobility and fluidity, sustaining and managing 
previous forms of inclusion and exclusion, which attempt neatly to demarcate and seal 
self and otherness into bounded spaces of interiority and exteriority, becomes more 
difficult. These older forms are neither effective nor flexible enough to regulate an 
otherness that steps out of its assigned place in the dominant order and transgresses 
previously established boundaries of inside and outside.8 This is not to suggest that older 
forms of inclusion and exclusion were suddenly and entirely superseded. Rather, I want 
to emphasize the fact that the new conditions called for new, more malleable ways of 
marking interiority and exteriority to arrange, move and/or fix bodies whenever 
necessary.    
According to Étienne Balibar (2002; 2005; 2007) globalization, which has created 
similar destabilizations of borders and boundaries around the world, occasioned the 
proliferation of “internal exclusion” as a powerful instrument to mark and manage 
otherness. Balibar articulates this category as a specific form of inclusion which becomes 
“inverted and [reaches] the point of excluding those who, from inside, are deemed to be 
impossible or unnecessary to include, or in the end whose exclusion is deemed necessary 
for the inclusion of all others to take place and become effective” (2005: 32).9 While 
Balibar highlights that internal exclusion is invoked as “a common structural feature of 
                                                          
8 Here, when I speak of “stepping out” or “transgression,” I do not assign a necessary intentionality 
to these acts.  
9 I want to draw particular attention here to the structural affinities between the paradoxical logic of 
supplementarity that I talked about in the previous section and the equally paradoxical logic of internal 
exclusion.   
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all traditional forms of racism,” he argues that conditions of globalization have not only 
rendered its application all the more regular and frequent but in this process also induced 
“various forms of new racism” (2005: 31). Globalization, particularly through the 
capitalist market, blurs the distinctions between proximity and distance, native and 
foreign, inside and outside. This blurring demands a shift in the structures of exclusion 
since, as Balibar notes, “in such a global space you cannot have external spaces for 
Otherness, you can only have ubiquitous ‘limbos’ where those who are neither 
assimilated and integrated nor immediately eliminated, are forced to remain” (2005: 31). 
In this regard, internal exclusion emerges as a means of “regulating toleration and 
aversion,” enabling “discrimination, stigmatization of groups and preferential violence” 
in culturally mixed societies where diverse populations live together (Balibar, 2005: 31; 
Brown, 2006).  
I wish to interpret what has transpired in post-1980 Turkey in regards to the taşra-center 
relations within such a theoretical framework, the framework that calls attention to the 
category of internal exclusion. Ayşe Öncü (2000) demonstrates the effects of these 
discourses and practices through her study of the media representations in the 1980s and 
1990s of otherness10 in urban contexts. According to Öncü, while these representations 
covertly and anxiously recognize the impossibility of allocating taşra an exteriority—in 
the sense that it could no longer be reduced to a specific social or economic class or a 
specific location but has permeated into every facet of society—there are still some 
sustained ways in which it is imagined. Figures of taşra, which include middle- or 
                                                          
10 I read Öncü’s article to be largely signalling at taşra while discussing otherness, although she 
herself does not name it as such.   
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underclass migrants and new elites, are fundamentally construed in some relation to 
elitist and rigidly defined notions of authenticity/purity and inauthenticity/impurity. For 
instance, middle-class migrants are perceived as having lost their presumed “traditional 
[taşra] innocence, purity and authenticity” as they adopt a “vulgar, mercantilist 
greediness” in the city (Öncü, 2000: 128, my translation). Similarly the new elite, 
consistently framed in states of parvenuism, are depicted to be shamelessly insatiable. 
They use and abuse religiosity for their own interests; and hence they cannot be even the 
genuine Muslims they claim to be. The underclass migrants, particularly men, are 
represented as dangerous, sexually-driven “yahoos” who “contaminate the environment 
they enter” (Öncü, 2000: 136, my translation). The common denominator that is thought 
to bring together all these and other diverse manifestations of taşra is the “grotesque,” 
“kitschy cultural melange,” “a polluted and contaminated culture of hybridization” that 
they have come to produce and sustain in the center (Öncü, 2000: 128; 1997: 69). 
However, I detect one of the most illustrative ways in which taşra has come to be 
defined post-1980s in the term “maganda” that Öncü brings up in her article.  Connoting 
a wretched form of existence that combines ideas of savagery, obscenity, and filthiness 
all at once, “maganda,” as Öncü (2000) tells us, was coined by cartoonists in the 1990s as 
a slang word and quickly appropriated into daily use by the public. In an almost 
manifesto-like passage that Öncü quotes from the widely-read, national daily newspaper 
Hürriyet “maganda” is described by a group of cartoonists as: 
[...] an assault on emotions, they are an aesthetic aberration. They correspond to 
ignorance, to vulgarism, to nouveau riche, to pretension. They are the freakish 
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response to all the lost and disrupted values. We created them. They are the 
animal within us. They are potential danger. They are a health hazard. They are 
the AIDS virus. We allowed them to grow. They are a stain that is inerasable. 
They are like plastic bottles—nondegradable and imperishable.  
Maganda can be from any gender, race or class. They are contagious, they 
infect. They kill; make life miserable; cause allergies. Maganda is (unfortunately) 
universal (2000: 136, my translation).  
As disturbing as it is in its explicit use of xenophobic terminology and metaphors, this 
passage contains some inconsistency with regards to the way it sets up and manages 
“maganda” as otherness. On the one hand, it speaks of “maganda” as an indelible 
otherness within. It cannot be assimilated or destroyed (i.e., “nondegradable” and 
“imperishable”). It cannot be neatly segregated and shut away—not because it simply is 
within but because there is no outside proper to which one might consign it. “Maganda” 
(or taşra, which this term implies and circles around) is everywhere, it “infects” 
everything;  it can be embodied by anyone. The passage also implies that this otherness is 
created by the very interiority that it has now come to disturb. How is this otherness, 
then, to be controlled if it cannot be contained or assimilated? This is where the 
inconsistency in the text emerges, as the authors shift to talking about this otherness as if 
it came from the outside—like a virus or parasite.11 It is precisely this inconsistency that 
reveals the paradoxical logic of internal exclusion. While this logic has to include 
                                                          
11 As Royle points out, Derrida talks of the supplement as if it were a virus. He writes of the 
“virulence of the concept;” which makes the supplement “impossible to arrest,” “to domesticate” or “to 
tame” (2003: 50). 
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otherness, it should also at the same time always contain within it the possibility and 
conditions of imminent exclusion. In post-1980s Turkey, then, the blurred distance 
between taşra and center has come to be negotiated predominantly through such a logic 
of internal exclusion. The center has in a way become obliged to accept and “tolerate” 
taşra but only by reserving to itself the right to revoke this inclusion as it sees fit.  
In this regard, the increasing malleability of the borders between taşra and center in 
post-1980s Turkey does not generate a more just or equitable system of inclusion 
compared to that of the modernization project. Indeed, as I tried to explicate, the 
conditions of “partial” inclusion in this period are extremely precarious and no less 
discriminatory or brutal than conditions of exclusion. I will return to the elaboration of 
this point in my discussion of Ceylan’s Three Monkeys in Chapter Four.  
Now, however, I want to turn my attention to Orhan Pamuk’s Istanbul: Memories 
and the City in order to expand on the insights of the theoretical frameworks presented in 
this chapter. Particularly, I want to consider how this text invokes taşra to explore and 
complicate the belatedness problematic and its psychic effects on national identity-
formation.  
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CHAPTER II 
TAŞRA, BELATEDNESS AND MELANCHOLY 
IN ORHAN PAMUK’S ISTANBUL 
[In a literary work,] answers that are derived from the rules and regulations of the real 
world will drag us into “sociology”: something that a down-to-earth author would hate 
to do.  
(Orhan Pamuk, Cumhuriyet, 1990, my translation)  
  
 [None of the Turkish novelists, from whom I learned a lot, such as Halit Ziya Uşaklıgil, 
Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Kemal Tahir, Yusuf Atılgan, Oğuz Atay,] ever attempted to shoot 
back literary answers to the political issues of their time. They never fell into such 
imprudence and lack of foresight.  
(Orhan Pamuk, Varlık, 1995, my translation) 
 
I wrote for beauty. And while entire generations of Turkish writers were modeling their 
work on John Steinbeck or Maxim Gorky—and destroying the essence of their talent by 
allowing it to serve something that supposedly transcended them all—I was reading 
Nabokov and dreaming on. Twenty-five years have passed, and I know now that if I had 
made the mistake of writing political novels, I would have been destroyed; the system 
would have annihilated me.  
(Orhan Pamuk, Columbia Magazine, 2007) 
 
On numerous occasions in his literary career, Orhan Pamuk has highlighted that he 
does not want to engage with politics directly in his novels. His primary aim as a novelist, 
he maintained, is to write a “beautiful novel.” Whether Pamuk is a politically-engaged 
author or not has indeed been an ongoing debate in Turkey where a tradition that 
perceives the novel—and literature more generally—as a means to guide, educate, and 
mobilize the people along the lines of dominant ideologies has been an influential one in 
the history of modern Turkish literature. Pamuk’s repeated claims on the issue cannot be 
understood independent of this tradition, from which Pamuk has strived to distance his 
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work. I want to start this chapter by describing this tradition in some detail and placing 
Pamuk’s work within it. For though the text on which I focus is a memoir rather than a 
novel, it partakes of the particular kind of “anti-political” aesthetic guiding Pamuk’s 
fictional works. My larger argument is that this hostility to the political allows me to 
conceptualize a different kind of political engagement (different, that is, from the overtly 
or didactically political and from Pamuk’s own understanding of the term)—one within 
which I propose to analyze the exploration of taşra, the project of modernization, and the 
relation of both to loss and grief in Istanbul: Memories and the City. 
The first novels in Western style, which appeared during the Tanzimat 
(Reformation) period of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, dealt in a very 
straightforward fashion with the ills and benefits of modernization and Westernization, 
the transformations of social and cultural life that these processes entailed, and the tense 
power dynamics between “the East” and “the West.” These novels, written typically in a 
realist mode, contained undisguised and somewhat didactic articulations of social and 
political critique (Moran, 1983). Indeed, as literary critics Yıldız Ecevit (2004) and 
Ahmet Evin (2006) both point out, the realist novel was adopted from the West as part of 
the westernization/ modernization process. In this context, it was considered to be a 
literary form that is befitting of a modern and civilized culture. Realism was not only 
embraced as the dominant style of novel-writing but was also attributed a higher artistic 
and moralistic value than fantastic folk tales or romantic novels, for instance.  
The dominant tendency to favour realist novels over other styles of creative writing 
intensified in the Republican era where the modernization/westernization process 
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involved more radical and immediate reforms. The preference for realist artistic products 
makes particular sense in this context, since such preference signals congruency with 
some of the foundational principles of the Enlightenment such as rationality, determinism 
and positivism, that the modernizing elite in the republican period cherished and 
religiously followed as building blocks of a modern society (Ecevit, 2004). As Ecevit 
notes, literary figures in this era, the majority of whom were supporters of the new 
regime and the reforms, also regarded realist style as “a necessary component of 
westernization” in the field of literature and the arts (2004: 29, my translation).  
Starting from the 1910s and increasingly after the establishment of the Republic in 
1923, novelists were represented and represented themselves as enlightened educators 
and mentors (Türkeş, 2005). They were not simply fiction writers, but frequently inserted 
comments in their novels as if they were anthropologists, sociologists or social 
psychologists, analyzing the pressing social issues of the time such as poverty, identity, 
“excessive westernization” and authenticity, secularization and religious investments, 
reactionism and traditionalism.  
In the 1950s, the focus on questions and effects of modernization and 
westernization broadened from their cultural and social aspects to include economic ones 
as well. The “village novel,” or the “Anatolian novel,” emerged as a new genre partly as 
a response to the new conditions brought on by the intensification of industrialization that 
started to gradually break down rural economies and ways of living (Evin, 2006; Moran, 
1990). These novels centered mainly on class antagonisms, feudal and capitalist 
exploitation, internal and/or seasonal migration. Characteristically, they told the stories of 
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the plight of the underclass who were exploited by landowners in the village and 
capitalist factory owners in the city. Written in what is referred as “social realist” style, 
some of these novels also contained pointed criticisms of the state and government(s), 
drawing attention to their incompetence in responding to the needs and demands of 
exploited classes who made up the majority of the population. Although in terms of 
content, the social realist novels diverged from the themes of earlier novels and 
questioned, to a certain extent, official and dominant narratives on development and 
modernization, stylistically and in terms of the pedagogical role they attributed to the 
novelist and novel-writing in general, they remained loyal to the conventional 
understanding. 
When literature is perceived as an educational tool, as a subsidiary to political 
processes through which existing social, cultural, economic problems are attempted to be 
resolved, aesthetic concerns are usually forced to take the back seat. As Ecevit (2004) and 
Evin (2006) maintain, up until the 1970s, experimentations in style and form that diverted 
from realism were not esteemed by mainstream critics nor readers. Novels that did not 
engage directly and realistically with existing social, political, cultural issues were treated 
as second-rate literature. As such, these experimental works remained marginal (Moran, 
1994). 12 
                                                          
12 In this context, also see Erdağ Göknar’s (2008) article “The Novel in Turkish: Narrative Tradition 
to Nobel Prize” which surveys Turkish literature from the mid-19th century to the present. Göknar 
periodizes the Turkish narrative tradition of the last 125 years under seven epochs and highlights dominant 
worldviews and cultural trends as well as significant political and social changes that influenced literary 
production in each period.   
44 
 
Within this framework, we can now interpret Pamuk’s unwavering position about 
the apolitical nature of his work—which he sometimes articulated rather provocatively13 
—as a gesture to detach his work, to a certain extent, from one dominant tradition of 
(social) realist novel-writing that perceives the novel as a pedagogical and ideological 
tool and the novelist as some sort of a beacon. As a matter of fact, one can perhaps even 
infer that Pamuk’s work as a whole constitutes a critical encounter with this very 
narrowly and rigidly defined social realist tradition not only in its literary and aesthetic 
manifestations, but also in its social and political symptoms. As Ecevit (2004) states, in a 
society where literature, and indeed any form of creative practice, is produced first and 
foremost as an exercise in the formation of some political consciousness and where 
novelists are presumed to be enlightened educators who are, categorically, supposed to 
know more and better than the general populace and who are expected to offer their 
insight into the solutions of existing social, political and cultural problems, Orhan 
Pamuk’s refusal to perform this role created as much antagonism as anxiety. His critics in 
Turkey referred to him as a formalist, and his novels were deemed incoherent, difficult to 
follow, boring, unoriginal and without depth. He was even denounced as a “paparazzi-
style novelist” and an intellectual fraud by some Kemalist/nationalist commentators. 
Pamuk’s domestic and international success has been explained as just another 
contingent, ephemeral fad that culture industries produce if not linked to his family’s 
                                                          
13 In one interview, Pamuk even declared that he is “an author who lives in the Ivory Tower” to 
resist political appropriations of his work. His remarks have of course created a controversy and he was 
subsequently attacked as an elitist, a pseudo-intellectual who is indifferent to the realities of his society 
(Pamuk qtd. in Ecevit, 2004: 239, my translation).  
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financial and cultural capital, which is speculated to have provided him access to the 
media and to influential figures and institutions in literary circles.  
In recounting such criticisms and attacks I do not intend to subsequently try and 
debunk them so as to defend and exonerate Pamuk and his work. Rather, I want to 
entertain the idea that there is a significant connection between the chronic efforts to 
discredit Pamuk’s work and Pamuk’s literary endeavours to break away from the social 
realist tradition. Indeed, I want to further suggest that this is precisely the site where, 
despite his self-identifying as being apolitical, Pamuk’s work becomes political. To 
elaborate, I seek to argue that it is precisely because Orhan Pamuk’s literary work 
touches on certain sore spots in the hegemonic national imaginary in Turkey that 
intolerant and belligerent comments against Pamuk have become rather commonplace, 
particularly in the last 5 years, in mainstream media, amongst Kemalist bureaucratic elite 
as well as in those segments of the civil society that align themselves with Kemalism, 
Kemalist nationalism and ultra nationalism.  
The escalation of the “Orhan Pamuk debate” in Turkey was certainly contingent 
upon a series of recent events. In 2005 when Pamuk stated in an interview with the Swiss 
newspaper Tages Anzeiger that “thirty thousand Kurds have been killed here, and a 
million Armenians. And almost nobody dares to speak but me,” he was prosecuted under 
the infamous Article 301 of the Turkish penal code six months after his return to the 
country (qtd. in Matossian, 2005).14 Although Pamuk was acquitted, he was in a way 
                                                          
14 Article 301 makes punishable by imprisonment up to three years any public declaration that 
“denigrates the Turkish nation, the Republic of Turkey, or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.” Given 
the apparent vagueness and broad scope of what can be considered as “denigration” under this article, over 
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forced into a voluntary exile because of continuous death threats.15 Shortly after Pamuk’s 
court case, his nomination for the 2006 Nobel Prize in Literature was announced. The 
announcement was received largely in dismay in Turkey where some columnists, critics 
and even some of the representatives of the government and the state described the Nobel 
Academy’s nomination as a “political move” designed to celebrate an author who “hangs 
out the national laundry” in inappropriate places (Hansen, 2009). The nomination was 
depicted as a scheme to shame Turkey on the international arena. It was even argued that 
this was a calculated attempt to put in distress the ongoing membership negotiations with 
the European Union. When Pamuk received the prize in 2006, the frustration and 
disappointment deepened to such an extent that the Turkish president at the time, Ahmet 
Necdet Sezer, refused to congratulate Pamuk publicly.  
I would argue that, during this process, the already existing scepticism about 
Pamuk’s literary inclinations got tagged onto the annoyance felt towards his personal 
political choices. The criticism of his work was conflated with the criticism of his 
political position. The former was used as a means to support and verify the latter and 
vice versa. Yet, most of these criticisms that appeared in mainstream media remained on 
a superficial level and lacked (perhaps even refused) serious engagement with Pamuk’s 
                                                                                                                                                                             
100 people, mostly authors, journalists, publishers, scholars, human rights activists and intellectuals have 
so far been prosecuted. Charges were pressed predominantly against those who have taken oppositional and 
critical positions against the official, nationalist metanarratives around the Kurdish issue and the Armenian 
Genocide. In this sense, it is clear that the Article was drafted as an attempt by the State, the military and 
the judicio-bureaucratic elite to contain, intimidate and censor political dissent through the use of arbitrary 
power. Although most of the cases were either dismissed or resulted in acquittal, about a dozen people were 
convicted. Among these convicted was Hrant Dink, a prolific journalist, editor, thinker and a citizen of 
Turkey with Armenian descent, who shortly after his conviction was assassinated in 2007. 
15 Despite an earlier acquittal in criminal court, in 2009 the Supreme Court of Appeals’ General Law 
Council overturned the lower court’s decision and in March 2011 Pamuk was sentenced to pay 6000 YTL. 
in compensation to six plaintiffs who claimed that their personal rights have been attacked by Pamuk’s 
statements to the Swiss newspaper. Pamuk still retains his rights to appeal the decision.  
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work. This whole debate was also a rather curious exercise since in his novels, Pamuk 
tries to steer clear of any obvious support for or disapproval of any particular political 
position. As a matter of fact, I read this as a significant gesture he makes towards 
unplugging from the dominant social-realist tradition. Pamuk’s questioning of the 
Turkish novel’s political vocation resides in a refusal of stable political “sides.” Rather 
than blatantly choosing one position or the other, in my reading, Pamuk’s works try to 
make sense of or simply reveal the contradictions, ambivalences or ambiguities that dwell 
in any position that try to constitute itself in terms of certainty, totality, and coherence. In 
this sense, Pamuk’s work is reflective of a significant rupture in the tradition of novel-
writing in Turkey.16 Whether it is the early novels of the 1900s or the village novels of 
post-1950s, binary structures such as East/West, civilized/primitive, modern/traditional, 
oppressor/ oppressed, city/village, victim/rebel, innocence/immorality seem to frame the 
organization and development of the narratives. In her eloquently articulated paper on 
Orhan Pamuk and the literary canon in Turkey, literary scholar and critic Jale Parla also 
calls attention to this point which demarcates Pamuk’s work from the earlier tradition: 
Since its emergence, our novel has been a novel of black and white. As our 
novelists write about black, that is about death, evil, betrayal, they know about 
                                                          
16 I am not claiming that Pamuk is the one and only representative of this trend in Turkish literature. 
As Moran (1993) and Evin (2006) indicate there was a palpable shift in the post-1980 novel in Turkey in 
terms of both content and style. The economic and socio-cultural transformation ensuing the 1980 military 
coup, which prompted a period of coercion and liberalization at the same time, also produced a new vision 
in literature. Along with the effects of the postmodern turn on literary production, this new vision 
culminated in a diversion from social realism and a focus on the individual. There also emerged an interest 
in narrative experimentation that included nonlinear storylines, inconsistent character developments, 
erasure of the omniscient narrator, intertextuality and self-reflexivity. Authors such as Latife Tekin, Bilge 
Karasu, Nazlı Eray, Buket Uzuner, Pınar Kür, Murathan Mungan, İhsan Oktay Anar, Elif Şafak are 
amongst the representatives of this new movement in novel-writing. Also see Göknar (2008: 496-503) for a 
more comprehensive list of authors and description of major literary themes and trends in this period.    
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white; and they let us know that they know through various narrative strategies. 
Even though they take us through the darkest tunnels, we know that the torch that 
will illuminate the tunnel is in their hands. In Orhan Pamuk’s narratives, however, 
there is no such thing. There, the colors are pale; they are the colors of dusk 
(2006: 41, my translation). 
Hence, epistemologically speaking, the public debate that took place on a very literalist 
and monochromatic reading of Pamuk’s work seems to me to have either missed its crux 
or avoided a serious encounter with it because that could have led to the opening of 
Pandora’s box. Within this framework, I locate in this debate not only some antagonism 
towards Pamuk himself, but also a fervent intolerance of ambivalence, ambiguity and 
uncertainty. The intolerance is towards what Pamuk has come to embody, namely all 
those critical interventions that reveal not only the workings but, perhaps more 
significantly, the failures, ambivalences and internal contradictions of the Kemalist 
project of modernity and the nationalist ideology it is enveloped in.  
In what follows, I offer a reading of Pamuk’s, Istanbul: Memories and The City 
(2005 [2003]) which disputes both the mainstream critics’ and Pamuk’s own rendering of 
the political meanings of this text. I chart the political significance of Istanbul along two 
intersecting lines. One pertains to the dissertation’s overarching theme of taşra—which, 
as the discussions in the previous chapter reveal, is a deeply marked concept in the 
culturo-political topography of Turkey—and involves exploring its expanded meanings 
in the work under consideration here. Bringing together this very urban text on Istanbul 
with the concept of taşra may seem strange at first sight since in its received articulations 
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taşra connotes the opposite of the urban. However, one compelling and politically-
charged feature of this book, I argue, is the ways in which it undermines the dichotomous 
imaginations of urban/provincial by inserting taşra into the heart of the city as an 
affective dimension. Still, the political gesture performed by the text is not just limited to 
the blurring of the boundaries between city and taşra, inside and outside, self and other 
(which is characteristic of all Pamuk’s works). It is also couched in the linking of the 
affective geography of taşra to the experience and dilemmas of postcoloniality or 
“belated modernity.” To put it more precisely, Istanbul is revelatory in its treatment of 
taşra in two ways. First, it invokes taşra as a metaphorical site of an internal/national 
splitting (between the authentic and the inauthentic, native and foreign, traditional and 
modern, “Eastern” and “Western,” the urban and the provincial, the past and the 
present/future) wrought by Turkey’s ambivalent encounter with a western model of 
modernization. Second, it alludes to taşra as the terrain of “belatedness,” “peripherality,” 
“provinciality,” and “third-worldliness” that Turkey occupies on the global level in the 
Eurocentric understandings of modernity. This expanded articulation names taşra no 
longer simply as an actual locale, but a mode of existence that can be experienced even at 
the center of a buzzing metropolis. From within such an interpretive framework, taşra in 
this work appears as a motif with a rich connotative field that musters experiences of loss, 
sorrow, inadequacy, resentment, disappointment, stuckness and suspension, which I 
examine under the category of melancholic grief.  
This brings me to the second line along which I examine the political significance 
of Pamuk’s text. My conceptualization of taşra in this chapter rests mainly on its 
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association with melancholy and as such I approach the text essentially as a poignant 
narrative of grief that takes the idea of loss and the gruelling processes of coming to 
terms with it (or not being able to do so) as its central concern. Through an engagement 
with the recent theoretical debates on mourning and melancholia, I analyze the varying 
and conflicting forms of melancholic response to loss that the text embodies and 
deliberate on the political implications of these forms. In revealing how in Pamuk’s 
narrative melancholy emerges as something that both “[blocks] the unfolding of [the 
subject’s] potential in the present” through a fixation on loss and provides a potentiating 
force of creativity and transformation, I infer that Istanbul complicates the assumptions 
of both of the two main theoretical positions regarding mourning and melancholia (Ruti 
2005: 650). In its detailed and powerful depiction of the dark and grim aspects of 
melancholy, this narrative does not easily yield itself for a reading that promotes 
melancholy as the properly ethical manner of relating to loss. Yet, in its capacity to 
weave into the story of melancholic grief enabling and creative ways of dealing with loss, 
it also frustrates a reading that approaches melancholy as a pathology, as a “regressive” 
and paralytic form of grieving that needs to be rehabilitated and transformed into the 
empowering labours of mourning. As a matter of fact, what makes Istanbul a 
sophisticated and compelling example of elegiac literature is the way it demonstrates, and  
impels us to reflect upon, the complexities of grieving—in all its confusions and turmoil, 
tensions and ambivalence—some of which remain too hazy and perhaps even 
impenetrable to other forms of knowledge. Istanbul’s intimation of taşra as an affective 
state intimately bound up with melancholy offers us an other way of “knowing” Turkey. 
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Put differently, taşra/melancholy becomes an analytic to probe into the belatedness 
problematic. It is in this particular sense, too, that this text is deeply political because as a 
specific regime of articulation, as literary expression, it reveals what remains hidden or 
obscure in theory. In other words, it is “as literature” that Istanbul introduces a 
disturbance into the established systems of meaning and “intervenes in [the] carving up 
of space and time, the visible and invisible, speech and noise” (Rancière, 2004: 63; 2011: 
4).17  
 
II. 1. Mourning and Melancholic Grieving: A Theoretical Discussion 
Two main contesting positions seem to have emerged in the debates around 
mourning and melancholia, which draw largely from psychoanalytical theory. The 
longer-standing position institutes mourning as the desirable, politically progressive and 
emancipatory mode of relating to loss, where arduous labours of working-through are 
taken on. This process entails a slow recollection of memories that bound the mourning 
subject to the lost object. This highly paradoxical and repetitious memory-work allows 
the subject to “hypercathect” the memories that bind him/her to the lost object and hence 
bring the object to consciousness in all the different ways it has been registered. 
Simultaneously, though, in each act of remembering the grieving subject also slowly 
starts to withdraw (“decathect”) his/her libidinal attachments from the lost object. 
                                                          
17 My understanding of the political draws largely from the work of Jacques Rancière who 
articulates the political as that which introduces a rupture into the governing symbolic order that functions 
as the “implicit law” organizing and regulating what can or cannot be said, seen, heard, thought, or done  
(2004: 63, 85). In this regard, Rancière defines political activity as something that “makes visible what had 
no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse where once there was only a place for noise” (1999: 
29-30). 
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Through this process, the subject recognizes that a substantial loss took place that has 
effectuated a change in the ways in which s/he constituted him/herself. The psychic 
labours of working-through impel the grieving subject to establish a distance from the 
lost object, which in turn enables him/her to acknowledge the separateness, the 
difference, of the lost object. Indeed, the loss has been consequential in the sense that it 
requires the subject to revise and alter the previous narratives of him/herself, but the 
possibility of such alteration becomes viable only with the acknowledgment that the lost 
love object was a separate entity. In this sense, “mourning has to do with agreeing to 
undergo a transformation (perhaps one should say submitting to a transformation) the full 
result of which one cannot know in advance” (Butler: 2004: 21).   
In contradistinction to mourning in which the bereaved subject comes to “convert 
haunting presences into honored dead” and finds a way to make loss a part of his/her life, 
in melancholia the subject develops a fixation on loss (LaCapra, 1998: 204). The subject 
cannot “get over” the loss mostly because the lost love object had been “drawn into the 
field of […] narcissism” (Leader, 2008: 135, Santner, 1990). That is to say, the subject is 
unable to distinguish between the lost object and his/her own ego. This is also why s/he 
resists relinquishing the lost object, since this would also mean losing one’s self. In this 
regard, Santner argues that in melancholy the fundamental resistance is actually not so 
much to the letting go of a particular lost love object, but to the letting go of a “fantasy of 
omnipotence”:  
The melancholic grieves not so much for the loss of the other as for the fact of 
otherness and all that that entails. Melancholy [...] is the rehearsal of the shattering 
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of fragmentation of one’s primitive narcissism, an event that predates the capacity 
to feel any real mourning for a lost object, since for the narcissist other objects do 
not really exist (1990: 3).   
Unable to acknowledge the boundaries between “‘I’ and ‘thou,’ ‘here’ and ‘there,’ ‘now’ 
and ‘then’” in the process of grieving, the melancholic is stuck in a mourning without end 
(Santner, 1990: 6). S/he is absorbed in loss, regenerating and reliving the pain and angst 
of loss with a sense of perpetual immediacy. In the absence of flexibility and tolerance 
towards reorganization and reconfiguration of the self in response to loss, a sense of 
helplessness and paralysis pervades. The melancholic is “locked in compulsive repetition, 
possessed by the past, faces a future of impasses and remains narcissistically identified 
with the lost object” (LaCapra, 1999: 713).   
Within this framework, the position that finds in mourning politically-potentiating 
grieving practices emphasizes its proclivity to transformation and receptivity to 
difference and otherness (Moglen, 2007). In particular, the memory-work involved in 
mourning, which facilitates accessing loss from different angles and registering it in its 
various representations, is conceived as a work of interpretation where unconscious 
resistance and ambivalence around the lost object are worked-through or worked-out 
(Leader, 2008; Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973). On a collective level, these practices are 
deemed critical to “[invent] a society that remembers, rather than unconsciously repeats” 
the injuries that lie at its heart (Forter, 2003: 135).18  
                                                          
18 Labours of mourning also help disengaging from a politics of victimhood and resentment that are 
constructed upon a fetishistic attachment to past injury and loss. Drawing on Nietzsche, Brown (1995) 
elaborates on the politics of ressentiment in the context of contemporary identity politics which she 
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The other dominant position in the scholarly debates around mourning and 
melancholia undertakes a work of de-pathologizing melancholia. Resisting a generalized, 
categorical disparagement of melancholia, it tries to make visible its critical, creative and 
unpredictable political aspects (Eng and Kazanjian, 2002). Drawing mostly from 
Benjamin, scholars who focus on melancholia as a productive affect claim that a 
sustained dwelling on loss need not signify only and simply a narcissistic engagement 
with the past. Instead, it can indicate a way of keeping an “active and open relationship 
with history” (Eng and Kazanjian, 2002: 1). As a mode of “intensified reflection” on loss 
and ruins, melancholy in the Benjaminian sense, rather than being fixated on loss and the 
past, maintains a productive tension between the past and the present. Although a 
profound sadness proceeds from recognizing the irreversibility of the past and what is 
lost, the melancholic is at the same time “exceedingly aware of, angry about, and 
interested in the losses one has suffered” (Flatley, 2008: 6). Besides being simply 
                                                                                                                                                                             
associates with a resistance to letting go of past marginalization, subordination or exclusion. According to 
Brown, because in identity politics past experiences of injury and loss are construed as defining 
constituents of present identity and as the ultimate basis upon which various political demands are made, 
the conditions of such exclusion, quite paradoxically, need to be perpetually reproduced and reaffirmed 
rather than surmounted or transformed. This is needed in order to continue to make political claims and, 
above all, to constitute identity and demand its recognition. Consequently, this obsessive investment in past 
suffering inhibits processes of healing in a rather “perverted” manner. As she further explains, in the 
particular relation the subject of ressentiment formulates with the past s/he constitutes him/herself as 
“stricken by history. [S/he] cannot ‘will backwards,’ [...] cannot exert power over the past—either as a 
specific set of events or as time itself” (Brown, 1995: 72). This creates frustration, anger and resentment 
which, in the face of claimed powerlessness, are then displaced upon “sites of blame,” scapegoats who are 
figured to be responsible for the “subject’s powerlessness over its past” (74). Brown suggests that this cycle 
is bound to be repeated until the subject agrees to a giving up of the “wounded attachment” to the past 
which defines present identity: “[The] past cannot be redeemed unless the identity ceases to be invested in 
it, and it cannot cease to be invested in it without giving up its identity as such, thus giving up its economy 
of avenging and at the same time perpetuating its hurt” (73). I read Brown to be saying that the interruption 
of this cycle of insistent pain and resentment necessitates a loosening of the narcissistic identification with 
loss when she talks about “learning to speak and read ‘I am’ [...] as potentially in motion, as temporal, as 
not-I, as deconstructable according to a geneology of want rather than as fixed interests or experiences” 
(75).  
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depressed, the melancholic is also highly dissatisfied with the current state of affairs. 
Such dissatisfaction, in turn, can lead to a search “for fresh air, for an opening that would 
break the unbearable constraint” (Žižek, 2000a: 88). Within this framework, “melancholy 
proper” for Žižek, who defines it once again with reference to Benjamin, “designates the 
attitude of those who, although still in a closed universe, already possess a vague 
premonition of another dimension which is just out of their reach” (2000a: 88). As 
Pensky elaborates in his analysis of Benjamin’s “melancholy dialectics” (“a dialectic of 
loss and recovery”), dissatisfaction and a ubiquitous sense that something substantial is 
missing—or, the constant awareness that harmony and completion are absent—can 
become “forces that drive the contemplative mind onward” and incite the imagination of 
a different, transformed world (1993: 17, 28; Flatley, 2008).19 It is in this particular sense 
that Benjamin who, despite being resolutely critical of a cynical, paralytic form of 
melancholia, still identified a “revolutionary kernel” within it (Flatley, 2008: 74; Pensky, 
1993).  
Apart from drawing attention to this latent potential in melancholia à la Benjamin, 
scholars from different disciplines have also forged poignant criticisms of Freud’s 
conceptualization of mourning. In their reading of Freud, Eng and Kazanjian (2002) for 
instance, associate mourning with a process at the end of which the past ultimately gets 
resolved and is declared dead. Melancholia, for them, signifies a “sustained form of 
mourning” where instead of “abandoning,” forgetting or finding substitutes for the lost 
                                                          
19 This is precisely why Žižek claims that “melancholy is the beginning of philosophy” because it 
indicates a state of mind which is “[disappointed] at all positive, observable objects none of which can 
satisfy our desire” (2000b: 662).   
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object, the melancholic remains committed to it in his/her refusal to let go (4). For Eng 
and Kazanjian, such form of grieving indicate “an adamant refusal of closure” which 
implies a “continued and open relation to the past,” enabling one not only to incorporate 
loss into present identity but also to configure new and shifting understandings of the past 
and losses (3-4). In a similar vein, Ruti (2005) argues that unlike mourning, melancholia 
“hold[s] the past open and unresolved” and as such it “facilitates a different type of 
rewriting [the past]—one that does not seek to surmount but merely to revisit and 
reassess the past since melancholia [...] retains the past as an active ingredient of the 
present” (646). Likewise, deliberating on the collective effects of melancholic grieving in 
his exploration of specific postcolonial literary texts as narratives of “interminable 
mourning,” Durrant argues:  
For the individual mourning [seems] to be a process of learning how to bury the 
dead, how to attain [...] ‘symbolic closure.’ For the collective [...] the possibility of 
a just future lies in our ability [...] to conjure the dead rather than bury them. 
[...] At the level of the individual, the melancholic’s refusal to recognize an end to 
the time of mourning seems to preclude the possibility of the future. For the 
collective, the commitment never to forget seems precisely to be a way of looking 
to the future, a way of ensuring that history does not repeat itself (2004: 8-9).20 
I present these re-conceptualizations of melancholia not to suggest that those who favour 
mourning on account of its political implications have uncritically embraced Freud’s 
                                                          
20 Durrant’s astute analysis draws from a Derridean understanding of mourning. Derrida’s notion of 
“interminable” or “inconsolable” mourning refuses the distinction between mourning and melancholia. See 
Derrida, 2001; especially the section entitled “By Force of Mourning,” 142-164.   
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model of mourning and melancholia. In fact, there are a significant number of scholars 
who put forward sophisticated reinterpretations of Freud’s influential essay that 
complicate the dichotomous rigidity of his model at the same time as they dissociate 
mourning from a notion of abandonment and forgetting of the past and/or the lost object 
(Forter, 2003; LaCapra, 1998, 1999; Moglen, 2007; Ricciardi, 2003; Santner, 1990). In 
this sense, it is somewhat puzzling that advocates of melancholic grieving have engaged 
little if at all with these more nuanced articulations of mourning and continue to point at 
Freud’s essay as the locus of their criticism. Having said that, the positions which 
espouse mourning have also not adequately dealt with the more creative and potentiating 
aspects of melancholy. Regardless of their recognition of complexities of grieving and 
mindfulness of Freud’s normativization of mourning, they seem to be bound to the idea 
that, ultimately, melancholy is something to be rehabilitated and surmounted. At best, it 
is conceived to be an “intermediary” or “transitional” step which may be necessary to 
move on to the labours of mourning (LaCapra, 1999). Such a conceptualization implicitly 
pre-installs the primacy of mourning over melancholia, elevating the former to the status 
of a “proper,” universal norm. Mourning then gets easily attached to moralizing 
discourses which can be imposing if not patronizing in the way they dismiss and try to 
convert diverse forms in which people experience and process their losses.       
In the context of this theoretically intricate and apparently irreconcilable debate, I 
find Darian Leader’s (2008) particular conceptualization of melancholy perspective-
shifting. For Leader recognizes the debilitating effects of melancholia at the same time as 
he accommodates the critiques raised against mourning. Leader’s main point is that 
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melancholy constitutes a structurally different psychic mechanism than mourning. That is 
to say, it does not designate a failed, arrested or blocked form of mourning, but entails a 
separate psychic category of its own. This is an intriguing theory because on the one hand 
it avoids the risk of falling into developmentalist theories of melancholy and mourning 
which follow from the presumption that mourning is the goal to be achieved, the ideal 
way of grieving, by insisting on the inconvertibility of melancholia into mourning. On the 
other hand, in doing this, it does not promote a view of melancholy as an insurmountable 
experience of grief where the subject gets trapped in a debilitating cycle of repetition. It 
makes space for a remedy that entails not the transformation of melancholia into 
mourning but one that emerges out of the very workings of melancholia.  
Leader’s main claim is that that unlike the mourner—who succeeds in “killing the 
dead a second time” through symbolization and hence once again becomes able to make 
investments in new objects—the melancholic continues to live with the dead or dies an 
“artificial death” as s/he withdraws from the midst of life (Leader, 2008: 116-17; Santner, 
2001). The melancholic’s inability to let go of the lost object stems from a particular 
psychic structure in which the subject conflates the lost object with “the place it has 
occupied for us,” the place from which we constitute an image of ourselves as recognized 
and loved by the Other (Leader, 2008: 131-32). Because the loved object is not separated 
from the place it occupies, once it is lost the subject is faced with a horrifying, 
“unbearable hole which threatens to engulf [him] at all times.” This hole, this lack, 
cannot be filled with any other object because “[the lost object] has become completely 
identified with it” (193). That is to say, in melancholy loss is experienced as lack: “the 
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lost loved [object] becomes a hole, an ever-present void which the melancholic cannot 
give up his attachment to” (199). Although grieving for particular losses may occasion 
situations where one is exposed to the structural dimension of lack that is constitutive of 
subjectivity, for the melancholic the distinction between lack and loss is missing from the 
get-go. This is also what lies behind the melancholic’s refusal to forgo the lost object 
since, even though empirically dead or gone, it still provides him/her with a fundamental 
reference point to “situate himself in relation to the Other” (186). The attachment to this 
lost object cannot be withdrawn, because this would effectively mean a degradation if not 
a disintegration of one’s sense of selfhood as well as the collapse of symbolic reality. As 
Leader cogently puts it, “the dead cannot be relinquished because without them one 
would be left at the mercy of something even more terrible [and reduced to the state of] a 
pure object open to every attack of an unloving and hostile world” (186). In this regard, 
in melancholy losing loss effectively amounts to losing all.21  
The refusal to let go of the loss is what confines the melancholic in a suspended 
space and temporality, in a limbo, between the past and the present, between the world of 
the living and the world of the dead. It is as if the melancholic subject dies with the lost 
loved object in the sense that s/he “disappears from life” even though biologically still 
                                                          
21 It is, I think, in this precise sense that Žižek conceptualizes melancholy “not simply [as] the 
attachment to the lost object but [as] the attachment to the very original gesture of its loss” (2000b: 660, 
my emphasis). Similar to Leader’s assertions, Žižek also posits that one primary characteristic of 
melancholy is the confusion of loss with lack, that is the conflation of particular, historical loss with a 
structural one: “melancholy interprets lack as a loss. [...] this deceitful translation of lack into loss enables 
us to assert our possession of the object [...] so the melancholic, in his unconditional fixation on the lost 
object, in a way possesses it in its very loss” (660). This is, indeed, a fundamental paradox of melancholic 
grieving – preserving and possessing the lost loved object is possible insofar as it remains lost. The fantasy 
of full possession of the object, its integration into the self can still be sustained even after the object is 
gone/lost through an obsessive, fetishizing attachment to its loss. For if the object is now lost, one can 
claim that it was once theirs to have.   
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alive (Leader, 2008: 179). As Leader elaborates: “the ‘real world’ inhabited by the 
melancholic involves such terrifying motifs as endless purgatory, minutes that last 
centuries, unutterable pain and angst and the call of the dead” (181). One of the most 
distressing and incapacitating aspects of melancholia has to do with this experience of 
being in the limbo where the melancholic subject feels not only trapped but also unable to 
articulate his/her state of being. In a split existence, the melancholic is caught “between 
two apparently contradictory realities [...] How can he describe where he is if he inhabits 
two places at once? From which place should he speak?” (187) According to Leader, this 
is indeed an ontological impasse, an impossible situation where language fails to express 
the experience of the melancholic’s very being. In this context, it is informative that 
Butler also comments on the particular speech of the melancholic as being “neither 
verdictive nor declarative (assertoric), but inevitably indirect and circuitous. What cannot 
be declared by the melancholic is nevertheless what governs melancholic speech—an 
unspeakability that organizes the field of the speakable” (1997: 186).22  
Such conceptualization of melancholy generates a series of questions pertaining to 
the recuperation of the condition. If melancholy is characterized by an impossibility of 
representing/symbolizing loss, then are there ways in which such blockage can be 
removed? How could the cycle of suffering be interrupted in a manner that overcomes the 
paralyzing sense of suspension and stuckness between two contradictory realities to 
enable the refashioning of a “vitalized” existence and future? While this would involve 
                                                          
22 In a similar fashion, Kristeva (1989) describes melancholy in terms of a “devitalized existence” 
and “living death.” She expounds the melancholic’s experience of grief as “noncommunicable” and 
“inexorable” which she later on associates with being a witness to “the signifier’s flimsiness and the living 
being’s precariousness,” in other words, with being a witness to the ultimate failure of each and every 
representation (3-4; 20). 
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taking into consideration and working through the particular conditions that bear on the 
formation of melancholy—conditions that have to do with the subject, the lost object and 
the symbolic system that girds them—it also seems critical that attempts at amelioration 
should address in some way the fundamental difficulty around symbolization. But if 
melancholy involves a structural confusion of loss and lack that renders the subject 
unable to translate the experience of his/her being into words—what Leader (2008), 
following Freud, calls a blockage in the passage from “thing-presentations” to “word-
presentations”—then does this leave the melancholic in an immutable situation?  
Leader suggests that since melancholy is not a blocked, arrested or failed form of 
mourning but a structurally different category on its own, the healing process must follow 
a different path than that of the work of mourning. In other words, he suggests that the 
remedy lies not so much in the attempts to transform melancholy into mourning, but in 
“finding [ways] to designate [...] the impossibility of [the melancholic’s] own position 
inhabiting two worlds” (191). In more concrete terms this would mean discovering 
creative ways to express how words (or symbolization, in more general terms) fail instead 
of searching for the right words that correspond to and delineate the melancholic’s 
situation. Within this framework, what I ultimately argue is that in Istanbul Pamuk enacts 
melancholic speech in the very form of the text and does so in a way that reveals the 
creative vein in melancholy. First, however, we need to understand what melancholy 
actually means in Istanbul. 
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II.2. Belatedness, Melancholy and the City as Taşra  
Since the English translation of Istanbul, Pamuk’s name has become inseparably 
attached to melancholy. The Swedish Academy’s Nobel Prize statement praised Pamuk 
as an author “who in the quest for the melancholic soul of his native city has discovered 
new symbols for the clash and interlacing of cultures.” The book was celebrated as a 
refined piece of elegiac literature in the West, as “an irresistibly seductive book” that 
“tells of an invisible melancholy” which “stems not from the ruins of a civilization but 
from the heartache that comes from living everyday amid those ruins” (Morris, 2005;  de 
Bellaigue, 2005;  Roy, 2005).  
Istanbul is essentially a pseudo-autobiography that weaves together Pamuk’s 
memories of his childhood and the city’s multi-layered history. Accompanied by black-
and-white pictures from the author’s family archives and famous Armenian-Turkish 
photographer Ara Güler’s signature shots of the city, Pamuk’s narrative intertwines 
individual and collective history, aligning his family’s dysfunctions and deteriorating 
wealth with what he sees as the city’s gradual impoverishment and ruin following the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In this sense, Istanbul is a narrative that tries to intimate 
what is lost or had to be given up both individually and collectively, in the process of 
modernization. Pertinently, the dominant affective tones of the text are those of longing, 
sadness, disappointment, frustration, and self-reproach. As a matter of fact “hüzün,” 
which Pamuk considerably elaborates upon as a collective sense of melancholy and 
longing and as an intentional withdrawal in the face of life, acts as the binding concept of 
this multifarious text (102-104). For Pamuk, hüzün defines the mood of the city and is 
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fostered by the “pain of destruction, loss and poverty” (102). It is not experienced only as 
an effect of loss, but is also a signifier of dignity—from the lens of hüzün, failure and 
poverty are not perceived as consequences of social, economic, historical forces; rather 
they are claimed as preordained facts of life that one carries with honour. In other words, 
in Pamuk’s articulation hüzün is inherently paradoxical. It implies both an “erosion of the 
will,” something that feeds into resignation and passivity, yet also a sense of boastful 
acceptance of failure, defeat and poverty as if these were consciously chosen. As he 
writes, “hüzün does not just paralyse the inhabitants of Istanbul; it also gives them poetic 
licence to be paralysed” (trans. Freely, 2005: 92-93).23       
In the chapter devoted to the exploration of the meanings of hüzün, Pamuk draws 
from a diverse literature to formulate his thoughts. He first delves into Sufi mysticism 
and Islamic philosophy to elucidate the affirmative understanding of hüzün, which 
maintain that the feelings of inadequacy and lack that lie at its root are reputable feelings 
that signify a sense of spiritual depth. Suffering and feeling hüzün indicate an awareness 
that one can never be close enough to Allah. In this sense, it is rather the inability to feel 
hüzün that becomes problematic in a certain practice of Sufism. Pamuk later brings some 
Western articulations of melancholy into conversation with this particular Islamic 
tradition (i.e., Richard Burton’s The Anatomy of Melancholy and the deliberations of the 
Romantics and the Decadents). Yet, none of these traditions seem to provide Pamuk with 
a satisfactory explanation to Istanbul’s particular hüzün. The real key, he claims, is the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the marks this has left on the landscapes, scenic 
                                                          
23 Unless otherwise noted, all translations used in this chapter from Istanbul: Memories and the City 
belong to the book’s translator Maureen Freely.  
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textures and colors of the city, as well as on the ways of living and being of its 
inhabitants. As Pamuk indicates early on in the book, Istanbul’s hüzün/melancholy is 
bound up with the particular history and experience of modernization and westernization 
in Turkey:  
[...] the melancholy of this dying culture [Ottoman] was all around us. Great as the 
desire to Westernize and modernize may have been, the more desperate wish, it 
seemed, was to be rid of all the bitter memories of the fallen empire: rather as a 
spurned lover throws away his lost beloved’s clothes, possessions and photographs. 
But as nothing, Western or local came to fill the void, the great drive to Westernize 
amounted mostly to the erasure of the past; the effect on culture was reductive and 
stunting [...] That which I would later know as pervasive melancholy and mystery, I 
felt in childhood as boredom and gloom (27).   
In this sense, hüzün for Pamuk designates a collective psychic response to the loss of the 
Ottoman Empire. However, as Almond suggests in a different context, in his analysis of 
postcolonial melancholy in Amitav Ghosh’s The Shadow Lines, this is “not a sadness at 
the demise of imperialism, but rather a sad perplexity at the cessation of one identity 
without a satisfactory, ‘true’ one being able to take its place” (2004: 98). It also indicates 
at least ambivalence towards, if not a disguised criticism of the “narrow, bullying 
hegemony of an artificially created nationalism” that, at its inception in Turkey, strived to 
sever the ties with the Ottoman past (Almond, 2004: 90).       
To understand the sources and effects of this collective melancholy, it seems 
necessary here to consider at some length the particulars of the modernization process in 
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Turkey. A “severe shifting of models” took place with modernization/westernization 
which dates back to the Tanzimat (Reformation) period of the Ottoman Empire in the 
mid- nineteenth century (Koçak, 1996: 99, my translation). It was indeed both the threat 
of European colonization together and an urge to differentiate themselves from Europe’s 
other “others” that initially drove the Ottomans to modernize/Westernize (Berktay, 2005). 
This was indeed a moment of significant shift in the arrangement of power relations 
when, as a waning Empire, the Ottomans “encountered [their] postcolonial condition,” as 
they “felt the ‘need’ to take the West seriously as a cultural ‘sparring partner’” and 
instituted Europe as an ideal to be followed in order to be able to cope with it (Kusno, 
2006: 16). Such a shift involved a fundamental dislocation in the perception of the world 
as well as that of the self; it entailed a slide from a “self-confident isolation to an 
increasingly self-conscious concern for what others may have had to say about them 
[Ottomans]” (Eldem 2007: 217). This also meant an acceptance of the “superiority” of 
Europe and a subscription to its particular conceptualization of modernity. In this context, 
Koçak (1996) suggests that what was named as “westernization” virtually meant an 
admission of “belatedness,” the admission of a position of lag and deficiency vis-à-vis 
Europe. 
Following the partition of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the 
Independence War was waged against the Allies by the newly-formed National 
Movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. Started as a resistance movement 
against the occupying powers, the National Movement also aimed at the abolition of the 
Ottoman Sultanate and Caliphate, creating in its stead a secular, republican state based on 
66 
 
national sovereignty. When the republic was established in 1923, the new regime 
undertook a series of reforms towards westernization/modernization. These reforms, 
although much more radical and intrusive in character, dovetailed with those that were 
commenced under the Ottoman rule. However, the republican modernizers strove hard to 
distance themselves and the new national identity from the Ottoman Empire which they 
associated with traditions, values and non-secular norms that were deemed intrinsically 
non-Western (Gülalp, 2003).24 
In this sense, the republican modernizers, like their Ottoman predecessors, 
embraced a Eurocentric and Orientalist understanding of modernity, but they also 
emphatically defined being/becoming modern in terms of cutting ties with the Ottoman 
past. In championing what Stokes describes as a “resolutely forward-looking nationalist 
modernism,” the new leadership did not acknowledge the collective sense of grief 
occasioned by the loss of previous identiterian attachments and sudden removal of vital 
reference points (2000: 239-40). On the contrary, under the modernizing gaze, attachment 
to the Ottoman past—a past that was constructed largely in pejorative terms—signified 
an aberration if not a traitorous unwillingness to follow the progressionist ideals of 
                                                          
24 In the early years of the republic the reforms permeated into virtually every aspect of life including 
political administration, legislation, economy, education, dress codes, religion, sports, and arts. However, 
probably one of the most consequential and devastating in its effects was the alphabet and language reform 
which by banning the Ottoman alphabet and introducing the Latin alphabet in its place not only 
immediately and precipitously rendered large numbers of literate people illiterate but also brought about a 
radical rupture with the past. Although its effect on spoken language was not immediate, the reform made 
anything written before the 1930s incomprehensible for new generations. It basically turned Ottoman 
language, a combination of Turkish, Arabic and Persian which was much more nuanced and extensive in its 
vocabulary than the “new,” “purified” Turkish proposed by the modernizers, into a dead language by the 
middle of the 20th century. Furthermore, through the language reform, the Ottoman archive, Ottoman 
literature and historiography were rendered inaccessible to generations of ordinary citizens and relegated to 
the hands of experts, i.e., literary scholars, historians, linguists, etc. In this sense, the language reform 
epitomizes the desire of the modernizers to break away from the Ottoman past.   
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modernity. In its own Eurocentric and Orientalist account, Kemalist ideology defined the 
Ottoman past “in terms of a lack: the absence of technology, the absence of rationality, 
the absence of civil society, the absence of modernity” (Sayyid, 1994: 271).  With this 
gesture, Kemalism constituted a division between what is considered modern (read 
Western) and traditional (read Islamic/Eastern). As Sayyid (1994) pointedly argues, this 
was in fact a constitutive paradox of Kemalism, which has constructed itself on the 
promise of the resolution of this very binary between “the East” and “the West.” 
A series of unresolved tensions and ambivalences pertaining to identity-constitution 
proceed from this particular understanding and implementation of modernization. For 
one, the new regime failed to grasp, or at least to address adequately, the fact that the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire induced an unravelling of the assured, unified sense of 
self and identity. The gradual descent from the status of a world-dominating power to a 
fragile semi-colony had already laid the grounds of a tremendous narcissistic injury. 
Without publicly recognizing and marking in some way this loss and dislocation, the 
republican modernizers precipitately moved on to establishing new ideals, new objects of 
identification, for the people. Moreover, these new ideals for collective identification 
further troubled rather than mend the injured identity since they were appropriated from 
Europe, the center of power which was in large measure blamed by the people for the 
destruction of the Ottoman Empire. In this respect, the call for identification with these 
ideals was met with ambivalence which, under the state’s aggressive measures to crush 
down any questioning of the official stance, could not be consciously and productively 
worked out.  
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The modernizing elite themselves also displayed a rather ambivalent attitude 
towards both the imperial, Islamic, Ottoman past and towards the desired future imagined 
in terms of the achievement of “Western level of civilization.” On the one hand, they 
claimed a radical rupture from the Ottoman past. At the same time, however, the 
construction and justification of the new national identity necessitated affirmation of 
cultural roots to mark the autonomy and uniqueness of a Turkish identity in relation to 
Europe. In the attempts to resolve this dilemma, the elite employed shifting strategies of 
repression and opportunistic and selective appropriation of this past. They also produced 
“a new reading of ‘Turkish’ history with an emphasis on pre-Islamic elements that 
culminated in the notorious, pseudo-mythical and quite racist “Turkish History Thesis” 
(Kandiyoti, 1991: 40).25 They encountered a similar dilemma with regards to the 
appropriation of foreign (European) ideals in the sense that such appropriation was 
deemed necessary for the achievement of “progress” at the same time as it was conceived 
as a threat to “authenticity” (Kandiyoti, 1994).26 Thus, the identity that was offered as a 
                                                          
25 On a detailed historical and theoretical analysis and political implications of the “Turkish History 
Thesis” see Ersanlı (1992), on how this Thesis was incorporated into the curriculum of compulsory 
education see Copeaux’s (1998) discourse analysis of Turkish history textbooks from early 1930s to 1990s.   
 
26 According to Chatterjee this is in fact a fundamental contradiction of nationalist thought in 
postcolonial contexts: “Nationalist thought, in agreeing to become ‘modern’, accepts the claim to 
universality of this [post-Enlightenment, European] ‘modern’ framework of knowledge. Yet it also asserts 
the autonomous identity of a national culture. It thus simultaneously rejects and accepts the dominance, 
both epistemic and moral, of an alien culture” (1986:11). To conceal this dilemma, nationalist modernizers 
first construct a distinction between the “material” and “spiritual/moral” spheres of culture only then to 
assert that the appropriation of Western institutions and ideals are confined to the “material” sphere without 
“contaminating” the spiritual one. This binary of material and spiritual spheres is also enveloped in a 
certain economy of value where the ascendancy of Western materiality (technology, science, etc.) is 
supposed to be balanced with or outdone by the claim of the spiritual and moral supremacy of the national 
culture (Chatterjee, 1986; Radhakrishnan, 1992; Yeğenoğlu, 1998). In this sense, postcolonial nationalism 
cannot fully disengage from the colonialist schemes of thought. Even though “political decolonization” is 
achieved, “epistemological decolonization” is not since rather than problematizing the universal claims of 
Western modernity and its Eurocentric assumptions, postcolonial nationalist thought internalizes them, 
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substitute to the old one—that is, the new “Turkish” national identity that people were 
called upon to internalize—was founded on very delicate balancing acts, which was 
practically unachievable for the line that differentiated “too much western” from 
“adequately western” was a constantly shifting one. Furthermore, this invited perpetual 
doubts about one’s being, his/her sufficiency in relation to the ideal. For in the name of 
preserving authenticity, one could be judged as being too local and provincial, shallow 
and narrow-minded, while too close and eager enactment of Western ideals would 
provoke allegations of being artificial, a mere copy and imitation (Gürbilek, 2003).   
Following Gürbilek, what I want to suggest is that this process “[reduced] the ‘local 
ego’” to ‘‘a state of infant-like helplessness before the foreign ideal’’ in its constant 
“pointing out [of] the persistent lack, the irremovable deficiency, the unyielding 
inadequacy” of the local self in comparison to the “original” (2003: 509, 602; Koçak, 
1996). Europe functioned both as an ideal model to be followed and as the projection of a 
“super-ego-like critical agent” through whose gaze the failure to meet the ideal was 
judged. The ambivalence produced by this process on the one hand found expression as 
resentment and paranoia in narratives of scapegoating and plotting enemies.27 On the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
sustaining and reproducing the “baleful legacies of Eurocentrism and Orientalism” (Chaterjee, 1986; 
Radhakrishnan, 1992: 86). 
27 The top-down reforms undoubtedly generated resistance among the people despite these measures. 
Still, the opposition found indirect ways to voice its discontent. Literature, for example, was one channel 
through which concerns with “excessive Westernization” and “loss of authenticity” as well as a growing 
feeling of “Europhobia” were articulated (Berktay, 2005; Canefe and Bora, 2002; Yeğenoğlu, 1998). 
According to these criticisms, the modernizing elite: 
forgot their own culture while running after someone else’s civilization. [They] were regarded as 
deserters of their own culture, heritage and religion in their attempts for achieving similitude with 
the West through servitude to it. 
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other hand, it manifested itself as aggression turned inward, as aggression directed at the 
self.  
Now let me return to Istanbul and see this process at work and how it relates to the 
concept of taşra. Istanbul starts with a chapter in which Pamuk informs his readers about 
a particular fantasy that has continued to define his sense of being since his early 
childhood—the fantasy that in a different apartment in Istanbul lived a different, second 
Orhan who led his life “otherwise,” free from all the familial turbulence and gloom of his 
childhood. In Pamuk’s memories, the image of this second Orhan is identified with the 
“kitschy” picture of a boy which was bought from Europe and hung on the wall of the 
home of his aunt and uncle, where the 5-year-old Orhan was sent during one of the many 
episodes of his parents’ marital strife. When Pamuk’s aunt and uncle jokingly suggested 
that he was the boy in the picture—“Look, that’s you!”—Pamuk recalls being confused 
as the experience of his being did not quite correspond to the position he was so explicitly 
interpellated into. Despite the resemblance, he recounts, he knew he was not quite like 
this jovial-looking boy in the picture. While the fantasy was reassuring because at times 
of instability and sadness it provided him with an escape and a prospect of happiness, 
Pamuk also suggests that this fantasy was somewhat unnerving, in fact, “nightmarish” (4-
5). This split-off double, the (European) second Orhan, endowed with a quality of 
fullness and harmony, acts as a constant reminder of all that is missing from Orhan’s real 
life. This seemingly incidental early-childhood memory that Pamuk mentions on the very 
                                                                                                                                                                             
[...] Furthermore, they were pitied as being incapable of discerning the hidden desires of the 
Turkish people and the incessant plans for its abuse, believed to have been devised by ‘old and 
calculating Europe’ (Canefe and Bora, 2002: 138-140). 
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first pages of the book is indeed one of the first inklings of the split position that he 
occupies as the narrator throughout the book.  
In fact, as Pamuk’s memoir unfolds, his reflections around the gap between the 
ideal he was expected to identify with (Western, modern, European, etc.) and the actual 
experience of his being (inadequate, pretentious, inauthentic, etc.) proliferate. What 
Pamuk refers to as a “ghostly” double, whose moment of emergence he cannot clearly 
remember but that he speculatively embeds in “a web of rumours, misunderstandings, 
illusions and fears,” does not cease to haunt him for the rest of his life (3). He describes 
in gripping detail the sudden and disturbing eruption of this second Orhan in his years of 
adolescence as a gaze of ruthless judgement and criticism:  
[...] while joking around with a friend, waiting alone in a cinema queue in Beyoğlu, 
holding the hand of a beautiful girl I’d just met [a] great eye would swing out of 
nowhere to hang in the air before me and – like some sort of security camera – 
subject whatever I was doing and whatever banal, insincere idiocy I was uttering 
[...] to merciless scrutiny. I’d be at once my film’s director and its star, in the thick 
of things but also watching from a mocking distance. Once I’d caught myself in the 
act, I could maintain a ‘normal’ demeanour for only a few seconds, after which I’d 
plunge into a deep and confused anguish—I’d feel ashamed, afraid, terrorized, and 
terrified of being marked as alien. It was as if someone was folding my soul over 
and over on itself like a piece of paper, and as my depression deepened, I could feel 
my insides beginning to sway (278). 
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What Pamuk describes here is evocative of the psychic state W. E. B DuBois termed 
“double consciousness”: “[the] sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of 
others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt 
and pity” (1998: 125). This is a self that is split into two where one piece is constantly 
surveilled and judged from the disdainful perspective of the other. In this sense, it does 
not entail simple self-objectification, looking at one’s self from a third person’s point of 
view, but requires that such observation and inspection be carried out from the 
perspective of an internalized ideal in relation to which the self always seems to fall 
short. The difference Pamuk experiences between the image he has of himself and the 
image he perceives from the point of view of the ideal is anxiety-provoking. From the 
perspective of the ideal, he appears inferior—“banal,” “insincere,” and unrefined. Besides 
the shame, terror, pain and depression that the failure to meet the ideal creates, Pamuk 
also voices the self-disparagement generated by this persistent sense of deficiency:  
Sometimes, even when I hadn’t done anything false, I would suddenly see I was a 
fake. [...] I’d see myself in the mirror on the opposite wall, and I’d think my 
reflection too real, too crude to bear. These moments were so excruciating I’d want 
to die [...] The reflection was a memento of my crimes and sins, confirmation that I 
was a loathsome toad (278-79). 
Unlike fleeting moments of disappointment, sadness and self-beratement, what Pamuk 
describes here is an abiding affective structure, a structure that suggests a much more 
profound sense of inadequacy that actually renders the experience of his being 
unbearable. Finding himself in this condition of debilitating self-hatred and shame and 
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tormented by notions of being somehow “flawed,” out-of-place, and “worthless,” Pamuk 
states that all he could bring himself to do was to “go into a room and lock the door 
behind me” or “hide in a corner” (279, 289). 
Indeed Istanbul seethes with Pamuk’s unrelenting expressions of dissatisfaction and 
dejection about himself. However, what saves the autobiography from turning into a mere 
narcissistic self-indulgence in despair is the way Pamuk suggestively entwines the 
personal with the collective. His melancholy is intimately bound up with what he 
describes as the melancholy of the city:   
[…] with its muddy parks and desolate open spaces, its electricity poles and the 
billboards plastered over its squares and its concrete monstrosities, this city, like 
my soul, is fast becoming an empty—a very empty—place. The filth of the side 
streets, the foul smells from open rubbish bins, the ups, downs and holes in the 
pavements, all this disorder and chaos, the pushing and shoving that make it the 
sort of city it is—I am left wondering if the city is punishing me for adding to the 
squalor, for being here at all. When its melancholy begins to seep into me and from 
me into it, I begin to think there’s nothing I can do: like the city, I belong to the 
living dead, I am a corpse that still breathes, a wretch condemned to walk the 
streets and pavements that can only remind me of my filth and my defeat  (286). 
But what is it that renders the city for Pamuk “empty” and suspended in that liminal zone 
of the “living dead”; that subjects the inhabitants of Istanbul to “a kind of eternal 
poverty” which “slowly putrefies the city from the inside” like “an incurable disease” 
(38, 43, translation modified)? In one account Pamuk suggests that the fall of the Empire 
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and the “new concept of Turkishness” forged by the nationalist modernization movement 
stagnated the city, as these transformed “the polyglot, multicultural Istanbul” into a 
“monotonous, monolingual town in black and white” (215, my emphasis). Yet it is not 
only and simply this diminution from imperial diversity to small town monochrome that 
lends the city a melancholic aura. In view of the previous discussions, I maintain that it is 
also the shattering burden of “belatedness,” produced by the institution of European 
modernity as the ideal, original model of development, that saturates Pamuk’s experience 
of both his being and of the city with melancholy. Istanbul appears like a small town, as 
taşra—“as a child I had no sense of living in a great world capital but rather in a poor 
provincial city,” Pamuk writes—only from within a comparative framework that is 
indeed constitutive to the experience of “belatedness” (221). To Pamuk, “everything” in 
this city looks “half-formed, inadequate and defective” (288, translation modified).  
Istanbul can neither fully become the Western city it aspires to be nor “honor the 
traditions implied by its mosques, its minarets, its call to prayer, its history.” Instead, it 
appears as a “hybrid hell,” as an in-between elsewhere of the “living dead” (288). Such a 
perception can be formed only under the gaze of the internalized European ideal that 
casts a shadow of incompleteness, second-handedness or artificiality on local realities.  
This perception has both a temporal and a spatial component. It entails, that is, an 
experience of time which, measured against a European standard of meaningful time, is 
found empty and wanting. It also involves an experience of urban space as provincial, 
shoddy and contracted in comparison to the Western city. Let me elaborate further on this 
point with reference to a passage, which in my view is particularly demonstrative of how 
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the experience of belatedness colors perception of time and space in the context of 
Istanbul: 
 I was doomed to live a long, boring, utterly unremarkable life – a vast stretch of 
time that was already dying before my eyes, even as I endured it. 
Happy people in Europe and America could lead lives as beautiful and 
meaningful as the ones I’d just seen in a Hollywood film, as for the rest of the 
world, myself included, we were condemned to live out our time in places that were 
shabby, broken-down, featureless, badly painted, dilapidated and cheap; we were 
doomed to unimportant, second-class, neglected existences, never to do anything 
that anyone in the outside world might think worthy of notice: this was the fate for 
which I was slowly and painfully preparing myself (278-79). 
At first sight, this passage looks like yet another instance of self-depreciation rather than 
an exposition on belatedness. However, the comparison to Europe and America is 
critical. It is with this move that Pamuk marks these sites as ideals where real, meaningful 
time is unfolding, rendering the experience of time in the “periphery”/taşra—“the rest of 
the world” outside these “centers”—empty and “boring.” With respect to Europe and 
America, temporality in the peripheries acquires a quality of suspension. Time, in other 
words, does not seem to move forward but is halted and bloated in the sense that the 
present feels like time immemorial as well as an everlasting, eternal waiting—it is a 
“vast,” “boring” “stretch” that is “endured” rather than lived. In light of this passage, the 
metaphor of the “living dead” Pamuk uses to describe the city and his experience of 
being also becomes more poignant. The metaphor unambiguously speaks to the state of 
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being suspended in time and space. In the temporality of belatedness, one is like the 
living dead, stuck in a spatial limbo between life and death where the very idea of the 
future is foreclosed. One is held-up in the limbo, waiting in uncertainty for a life to come 
which never seems to arrive—“the destination” perpetually “recedes” leaving one 
“trapped,” “suffocated,” “hopeless,” indeed “condemned” to live in monotony, in a time 
of repetition of the same (310).  
This conception of time as repetitive, dull, always-already wasted is inscribed into 
the space of the city in its re-articulation as taşra. As I outlined in the previous chapter, in 
one dominant conceptualization of modernity in Turkey taşra is produced as the domain 
of the non-/pre-modern. In its spatio-temporal qualities, it signifies lack and lag in 
relation to the city/center. In opposition to the dynamic, luminous, distinctive, and 
prosperous modern urban space, taşra is easily forgettable in its insipidity. The 
imagination of taşra as such under this dominant understanding of modernity indeed 
resonates with the way Pamuk describes Istanbul: a “shabby, broken-down, featureless, 
badly painted, dilapidated and cheap” place that nobody “out” in the modern world would 
care about. On the one hand, then, Pamuk troubles the center-taşra binary as it is 
constructed in the national Turkish imaginary by writing taşra into the city. The spatial 
and temporal distance/difference between the modern urban city and taşra is blurred to 
the extent that Istanbul, the grand metropolis of modern Turkey, is experienced as taşra. 
On the other hand, though, Pamuk cannot disengage fully from the dominant discourses 
of modernity in the sense that he continues to imagine taşra as negative space/time, as 
some outside “wasteland,” defined against some fullness and positivity that is supposed 
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to exist somewhere out there in the world—more specifically in the West. This is a deep-
seated effect of “belatedness” which translates the incongruity, the difference, between 
the European model and local reality into a structural, immutable deficiency and therefore 
institutes a fundamental sense of lack. As Gürbilek observes, “In the modern world being 
belated is imagining oneself peripheral, provincial, underdeveloped, and inadequate” 
(2003: 621).  
What we see in Istanbul then is that under the grip of the affective dimension of 
“belatedness,” taşra, as an external space of destitution, stagnation, and futurelessness is 
inverted into the self. In other words, the internal world, one’s own self, is experienced as 
taşra insofar as this connotes a marginalized, impoverished, isolated existence. This inner 
experience is then projected back out onto the city which, mirroring the experience of the 
internal world, appears provincial (taşralaşmış)—emptied out, flawed, ugly, deprived, 
truncated, dull, filthy, wretched and without a future. The self-hatred occasioned by the 
continuous sense of inadequacy is also externalized as aversion to the city. Yet, while the 
text is powerful and moving in its illustration of the workings of the melancholic 
structure that “belatedness” has generated in Turkey, it leaves the very concept of 
“belatedness” unproblematized. It does not quite see how “belatedness” itself is a 
production of Western modernity that aids in constructing and sustaining its universal 
hegemony by displacing the failure of its own promises and ideals, its own 
incompleteness, onto the problematic of “belatedness”—onto those heterogeneous 
elements that in some way need to be marginalized and excluded so that the internal 
consistency of the project of modernity is secured (Mitchell, 2000).  
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II.3. Melancholic Speech and Sublimation in Istanbul 
In light of the arguments made so far, I want now to suggest that Istanbul offers an 
amelioration of melancholy that resembles the process described by Leader. Pamuk’s text 
enacts less a recovery of the Turkish subject’s wholeness and speech than a creative 
depiction of the failure of these. This is visible in the text’s commitment to 
fragmentation, and especially in the contradictions and uncertainties that surround the 
concept of hüzün. 
At first, Pamuk asserts that the hüzün of Istanbul is distinct from what Lévi-Strauss 
referred to as tristesse, since this latter is an affect engendered in the outsider Western 
subject:  
as he surveys those vast poverty-stricken cities of the tropics, as he contemplates 
the huddled masses and their wretched lives. But he does not see the city through 
their eyes. Tristesse implies a guilt-ridden Westerner who seeks to assuage his pain 
by refusing to let cliché and prejudice color his impressions. Hüzün, on the other 
hand, is not a feeling that belongs to the outside observer. To varying degrees, 
classical Ottoman music, Turkish popular music, especially the arabesque that 
became popular during the 1980s, are all expressions of this emotion, which [is felt] 
as something between physical pain and grief. And Westerners coming to the city 
often fail to notice it (103-104).  
Thus, as Işın also points out, in this passage, Pamuk clearly identifies hüzün as “an 
indigenous mood” (2010: 39). It is a collective, “authentic” affect that emanates from a 
particular history of loss whose traces are embedded in the urban landscape, in the ruins 
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scattered around the city, in the dilapidated old Ottoman mansions, in the poor back 
streets. Pamuk goes on to “discover” this affect in practically all of the city’s details: in 
“women peeking through the curtains as they wait for their husbands who never manage 
to come home until late at night,” in “the tens of thousands of identical apartment-house 
entrances,” in “the crowds of men fishing from the sides of the Galata Bridge,” in “the 
cold reading rooms of the libraries,” in “the smell of exhaled breath in the cinemas,” in 
“buses packed with passengers,” in “the holy messages spelt out in lights between the 
minarets of mosques on holidays that are missing letters where the bulbs have burned 
out,” in “the history books in which children read about the victories of the Ottoman 
Empire and [in] in beatings these same children receive at home,” in “beggars who accost 
you in the least likely places and those who stand in the same spot uttering the same 
appeal day after day,” in “that corner of Gülhane Park that calls itself a zoo but houses 
only two goats and three bored cats languishing in cages,” in “storks flying south from 
the Balkans and northern and western Europe as autumn nears,” in “the crowds of men 
smoking cigarettes after the national football matches, which during my childhood never 
failed to end in abject defeat” (84-89).            
Following this chapter, Pamuk shifts his exploration of hüzün to the works of the 
“four melancholic authors” of Turkish literature: Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Yahya Kemal 
Beyatlı, Reşat Ekrem Koçu and Abdülhak Şinasi Hisar. What makes these authors 
extraordinary for Pamuk is their ability to participate in the collective experience of 
hüzün at the same time as they succeed in distancing themselves from this communal 
affect so as to gaze at the city from the outside. Pamuk maintains that it is this ambiguous 
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position between the inside and the outside, between “the East” and “the West,” that 
provided them with a “unique” perspective on the city (162). Thus, Pamuk seems to make 
the point that although hüzün is an indigenous affect rising out of the city itself, and it is 
something that remains largely inconspicuous to the gaze of the outsider (Westerner), it 
still takes a degree of distancing/estrangement to appreciate how hüzün infiltrates into 
every facet of the city.  
To make matters even more complicated, about a hundred pages later in a chapter 
that comments on the travel accounts of Nerval and Gautier, Pamuk explicitly writes that 
“what I have been trying to explain is that the roots of our hüzün are European: the 
concept was first explored, expressed and poeticized in French (by Gautier, under the 
influence of his friend Nerval)” (210). How are we to make sense of this contradiction 
that pertains to the roots of hüzün? How is it that Pamuk first assuredly and persuasively 
establishes hüzün as a particular, home-grown sensibility and then attributes its 
origination to a highly Orientalizing, Western gaze on the city? Is hüzün, then, as Işın 
deduces from these contradictions, a product of “the Orientalist gaze turned into the soul 
of a city?” (2010: 40). And if we take this latter assertion to be true, then the credibility of 
Pamuk’s assertion about hüzün being distinctly separate from tristesse also becomes 
questionable for, as Pamuk argued, the latter implies the gaze of an outsider while the 
former connotes a native mood that foreigners to the city, in Pamuk’s words, “fail to 
notice” (104). 
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I suspect that this discrepancy around the origins of hüzün has also to a certain 
extent invited the accusations of Orientalism with regards to Pamuk’s text.28 This is 
partly because the text eludes a stable position from which to obtain a clear, coherent and 
definitive insight into the exact source of hüzün. Instead, it constantly oscillates between 
the insider’s and outsider’s position, or what can be construed as nativist and Orientalist 
positions, at the same time as it undermines both of these.29 For instance, in formulating 
his narrative, besides relying on personal memories of the city from his childhood, 
Pamuk also makes use of the engravings of Melling from the eighteenth century, 
                                                          
28 In the mainstream media, Pamuk was harshly criticized for wittingly appealing to Orientalist 
sentiments as a means to allure international audiences and reap the financial and professional benefits of 
such (self-)Orientalization. One of Pamuk’s ardent critics, Hilmi Yavuz, for instance, who dedicated a 
series of columns to “unmask Pamuk,” argued that Pamuk positioned himself as a “colonial intellectual” 
who “unconditionally submits his authorial skills to the order of Orientalism” (Yavuz, April 24, 2005;  
October 29, 2006, my translation). In a much more sophisticated and thoughtful analysis of Pamuk’s 
Istanbul, Engin Işın also admits to “realiz[ing] how much Pamuk was caught ‘under western eyes’ 
worrying about what ‘foreigners and strangers’ think about Istanbul” (2010: 37). He states that, particularly 
after reading the book in English, he noticed how it “reorient[ed] Istanbul for outsiders. Istanbul: Memories 
and the City addressed a non-Turkish speaking audience and summoned an outsider’s gaze upon Istanbul 
yet again” (36). I agree with Işın’s assessment of the difference between the Turkish and English 
translations of Istanbul and also recognize that the English version, more so than the Turkish, is soliciting 
an Orientalizing gaze. Reading Istanbul in both Turkish and English, one notices significant differences. In 
the English version, certain passages are completely eliminated. Some sentence structures are modified in a 
way that erases Pamuk’s subjective inclusion in them so as to create an effect of “objectivity.” There are 
also serious mistranslations that completely transform the original meaning. In some cases, the English 
translation actually states the complete opposite of the original in Turkish. While every translation entails a 
new interpretation and creates new meanings, in this case it just seems to venture a bit too far out from the 
meaning in Turkish. However, I do not think we can assuredly deduce from this, as Işın does, that this is 
due to Pamuk having been “caught under the Western gaze.” As matter of fact, this is a shared shortcoming 
of Işın and the other critics I cited above. It seems, despite the varying levels of sophistication between 
them, they are all suggesting the same thing: that whether intentional or not Pamuk reproduces 
Orientalizing narratives.  
Having said that, I do not wish to suggest that the reception of Istanbul in the West is not enmeshed 
in Orientalist fantasies. This is traceable in the language and tropes used in the Swedish Academy’s 
announcement and in various reviews of the book, i.e., the readiness with which melancholy as an affect is 
attached to “the East,” and the latent ways in which the so-called essence, the “soul”, of the city of Istanbul 
is defined in terms of inscrutability, invisibility, depth and seduction. Neither do I want to deny that the text 
itself conjures up and mobilizes Orientalist imageries of Istanbul. However, as I elaborate later on, this not 
the only thing the text does. 
 
29 Since I wrote this chapter, Göknar (2013) published a book on Pamuk’s oeuvre, where he also 
draws attention to the unstable position of the narrator (Pamuk) in Istanbul and elaborates on how such 
instability “unwittingly exposes […] the Republican divided self” (232). 
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memoirs and travel accounts of authors such as Nerval, Gautier and Flaubert, which are 
saturated with Orientalist sensibilities, to mark what no longer exists in the modern city. 
Yet these passages are almost always accompanied by a narrative voice that swings 
between a sober, critical evaluation of the Orientalist tendencies of these Western 
“outsiders” (comments scattered around the text about the “dubious” nature of their 
observations, about their tendency to “exoticize,” about the derivative and repetitive 
manner of their descriptions, etc.) and an almost unbridled enthusiasm to identify with 
the fantasy images evoked by their work. Indeed, in a chapter towards the end of the 
book, tellingly entitled “Under Western Eyes,” Pamuk openly concedes that “like some 
other Istanbulites, my relationship to what Western eyes see in the city is troubled and, 
similar to other authors who fixed their eyes on the West, I also sometimes get confused 
about these matters” (221).  
The same “confusion” and ambivalence saturates this entire section on Turkish 
authors. While Pamuk admires the way that Tanpınar, Beyatlı, Koçu and Hisar “praise 
Istanbul with an excessive and lyrical exuberance,” which allows them to notice 
particular, unique features of the city that are otherwise glossed over (62), he also finds 
fault with their aestheticization of loss, ruins and poverty. He both cherishes the nostalgic 
longings of these authors for a long-lost city, and gets “irritated” by this “intense 
nostalgia [that] almost blinds them to the dark and evil undercurrents of [the past].” In 
particular, Pamuk is critical of these authors’ zealous literary attempts at appropriating 
and domesticating the remainders of a multi-ethnic empire as elements of a mono-ethnic, 
homogeneous Turkish national identity—a process which entails at least an active 
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participation in if not an advancement of the forgetting of the past that the modernizing 
elites incited in the process of building a new nation (235). It is indeed against this 
nationalist tendency, against the post-republican will to nationalize/Turkify Istanbul, that 
Pamuk juxtaposes the cosmopolitan silhouette of the city as chronicled by Western 
authors about a century before the establishment of the republic.  
In this context, what eludes the critics of Pamuk, and of Istanbul in particular, who 
merely detect in it the Orientalizing gaze of an outsider narrator, is not only those 
moments of scepticism and ambivalence towards both Orientalist and nativist imaginings 
of the city, but also the very logic of the critical gesture performed by the text. This 
critical gesture, which manifests itself even in the very first pages of the book, albeit in a 
sly and indeterminate manner, rests on a constant movement between seemingly 
incompatible positions (i.e., inside and outside, Orientalist and nativist) that frustrates the 
identification of a secure, substantial, stable point of view. Consequently, when Pamuk 
weaves together multiple perspectives on Istanbul from the early 1800s to 1970s, from 
Melling’s paintings, from memoirs of Nerval, Gautier and Flaubert, from fiction and non-
fiction writings of Tanpınar, Beyatlı, Koçu and Hisar and from his own childhood and 
adolescent memories, what comes out is not a coherent narrative about the city. These 
multiperspectival representations fail to complement each other and/or add up to anything 
resembling a whole. On the contrary, what transpires is a fragmentary text ridden with 
self-contradiction and a cultivated semantic obscurity.  
Actually, Istanbul is not the only text of Pamuk’s where contradiction and 
ambiguity are writ large. In her analysis of Pamuk’s Beyaz Kale (1985 [The White Castle, 
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1990]) and Benim Adım Kırmızı (1998 [My Name is Red, 2002]), Olcay Akyıldız (2008) 
also draws attention to self-cancelation and obscurity as defining characteristics of 
Pamuk’s narrative style, which “crosses out with the left hand what is written by the 
right.” According to Akyıldız, Pamuk’s texts embrace states of “indecision,” 
“contradiction,” “confusion,” and “in-betweenness” almost as a methodology. Resisting 
the desire to resolve, synthesize or reconcile, Pamuk’s narratives cluster together 
conflicting positions and ideas without establishing a hierarchy between them (228-29, 
my translation). Further theorizing on this pronounced stylistic inclination in an article 
that explores the significance of the use of Ottoman history and themes in Pamuk’s 
novels, Erdağ Göknar (2006) conceptualizes Pamuk’s work in terms of a “post-
Orientalist aesthetic.” In his analysis Göknar demonstrates that such an aesthetic, while 
“[playing] with Orientalist expectations,” also “manipulates the discourses of Orientalism 
in some measure to explode the limits of nationalism” (36-37). Göknar further reads 
specific elements of Pamuk’s narrative style, amongst which he counts the use of 
fragmented points of view and multiplicity of narrators, as strategies that “subvert the 
orientalist-national binary,” leading to the creation of new and interstitial imaginative 
spaces of negotiation where delinking from both Orientalist and nationalist 
representations becomes possible (38). In this sense, I claim that conceiving Istanbul 
ultimately as an Orientalist piece is plausible only on the condition that one reads it 
partially and selectively—that is, by overlooking what the text does on the whole.   
Besides interrupting the discourses of Orientalism and nationalism, I find that there 
is something more to be said about the marked inconsistency, the multivocality and 
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persistent shifting of viewpoints that undercuts narrative stability and coherence in 
Istanbul. Especially considering the text as an example of elegiac literature, I read the 
ambiguities, contradictions and indecisiveness as symptoms of melancholic speech. 
Indeed, what makes Istanbul a compelling piece of elegiac literature is not only and 
simply its content—its relentless circling of themes of loss and longing—but also its 
performance of a particular structure of grieving through its narrative form and voice. 
That is to say, what is intriguing about the text is not only its writing of melancholy but at 
the same time its writing in melancholy and more remarkably, its exploitation of writing 
as sublimation of melancholy.   
For the inconsistencies, uncertainties and contradictions in Pamuk’s memoir are 
ways to express indirectly a melancholy that words themselves cannot express. The 
oscillation between conflicting positions (between Orientalism and nativism, for 
instance); the preference of a multiplicity of narrators and a fragmented point of view 
over a single, stable, unified narrator’s voice; the construction of extremely long 
sentences with dangling modifiers which make it difficult for the reader to locate the 
subject of the act—all of these are creative ways of signifying and communicating the 
crisis of representation that haunts melancholic subject-constitution. They are means 
through which the blockage around symbolization is remedied and the “impossible,” 
“incommunicable” existential experience of the melancholic subject finds expression. 
Throughout the book, Pamuk himself points at this therapeutic capacity of writing 
by referring to how “writing” and at times “drawing” allowed him “to fight off [the] 
nightmare” of being “trapped […] inside this aimless, false and suffering world, which 
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promised me only self-loathing and suffocation” (288). The assuaging powers of creative 
work and the remedial distancing it allows one from his/her own suffering are addressed 
most revealingly right before the chapter on hüzün when Pamuk writes: 
Hüzün [is] like the condensation on a window when a tea-kettle has been 
sprouting steam on a winter’s day [...] I still love getting up and walking over to 
those windows to trace words on them with my finger. As I trace out words and 
figures on the steamy window, the hüzün inside me dissipates, and I can relax. 
After I’m done with all my writing and drawing, I can erase it all with the back of 
my hand and I can see the view outside. But the view itself seems melancholic 
(hüzünlü) in the end (79-80, translation modified).   
Manipulating representations, drawing “words” and “figures,” creates apertures on the 
steamy window through which one can at least partially catch glimpses of the outside 
world that had been previously blocked and rendered inaccessible by the condensation/ 
melancholy. These gaps/perforations that allow an experience of the “outside” as separate 
from the “inside,” are also themselves signifiers of absence introduced by the subject’s 
own act of writing/drawing. They enable a “relaxation” precisely because, in the way 
they rehearse in a “controlled” manner the melancholic’s nightmare of losing loss (“I can 
erase it all with […] my hand”), they loosen the rigidities involved in the melancholic 
relation to loss, such as the resistance to its acknowledgement and relinquishment, and  
the intolerance for change.30 While the passage is densely evocative of what a 
                                                          
30 See Santner, 1990 for a discussion of Freud’s “fort/da game” as the child’s creative attempts, “in 
controlled doses” to “represent absence by means of substitutive figures at a remove from […] their 
‘transcendental signified’” (19-26). 
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sublimation of melancholy might look like, it also is careful not to construct sublimation 
as a permanent “solution.” The representation of the outside view as “melancholic” at the 
end of the passage attests to how temporary this recovery of “the capacity to play” can 
be; how rapidly the self’s opening towards difference can be closed off as the profound 
sense of loss encroaches upon the subject, coloring all experience (Santner 1990: 20). 
Indeed, while Pamuk explores and narrativizes the splitting that fundamentally 
shapes modern Turkish national identity in Istanbul: Memories and the City, he never 
attempts to find solutions for it. Neither does he shy away from pointing at and even 
enacting in his own writing the very contradictions, conflicts and ambivalences that arise 
from this foundational splitting. The absence of a conciliatory attitude—despite the 
longing for a harmonized sense of identity and the debilitating experience of loss—is a 
notable feature of the memoir. In the following chapter on Fatih Akın’s documentary 
Crossing the Bridge: The Sound of Istanbul, I will examine the constitutive role of a 
particular European gaze in this splitting. On the one hand, this European gaze, which 
also structures Akın’s documentary, contributes to constructing and experiencing 
“Turkishness” as taşra, in ways that echo how Pamuk describes such experience in his 
memoir. On the other hand, the gaze in this film advances a very different view of 
Turkish national identity than Pamuk, one that tries to efface tension, ambivalence and 
contradiction. The analysis of the terms and conditions as well as the political 
implications of imagining Turkish identity in this manner, i.e., along a liberal model of 
hybridity, will guide my discussions of Crossing the Bridge in the next chapter.     
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CHAPTER III 
TAŞRA AND THE FAILURE OF LIBERAL HYBRDITY IN  
FATİH AKIN’S CROSSING THE BRIDGE 
German-Turkish director Fatih Akın’s feature debut Kurz und schmerzlos (Short 
Sharp Shock) came out in 1998, but it was not until after his fourth movie Gegen die 
Wand (Head-on) that his films achieved transnational acclaim. This film, which folds 
cross-cultural and intergenerational tensions of Turkish immigrants in Germany into a 
tragic love story, won the prestigious Golden Bear at the Berlin International Film 
Festival in 2004. In 2005 he released the much-lauded documentary Crossing the Bridge: 
The Sound of Istanbul. A musical offshoot of his breakout film Gegen die Wand, the 
documentary explored the diverse music scene of the city through the eyes of the German 
musician Alexander Hacke. Two years later, with his Auf der anderen Seite (The Edge of 
Heaven), Akın won both Best Screenplay at Cannes and European Parliament’s Lux 
Prize, an award granted to productions which highlight European integration and support 
cultural diversity. The film, which went back and forth between Turkey and Germany 
and interwove the stories of German and Turkish-immigrant characters, further 
reinforced a perception of Akın’s work as insightful, sincere and provocative in capturing 
cross-cultural and intergenerational dilemmas.  
On the one hand, Akın is now regarded as a skillful auteur in Germany with a 
creative potential to rejuvenate the New German Cinema.31 On the other hand, his oeuvre 
                                                          
31 Such a perception materialized particularly after Akın won the Golden Bear in Berlin with Gegen 
die Wand—the first German film in eighteen years to win the prestigious prize. Yet, in the preceding years 
there had already emerged a critical interest in “Young Turkish Cinema” in Germany, represented by 
directors such as Fatih Akın, Yüksel Yavuz, Ayşe Polat, Thomas Arslan among others. As Berghahn 
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is frequently described through categories that connote a surpassing of national 
boundaries. “Cinema of intersections,” “accented cinema,” “diasporic cinema,” 
“transnational cinema” and “cinema of hybridity” are all formulations that film scholars 
call upon to define Akın’s work and highlight its recurring themes of border-crossing and 
cross-fertilization (Berghahn, 2006; 2009; Burns, 2007; Isenberg, 2011; Mennel, 2002). 
His films are praised as embodiments of a new kind of cinema that moves away from a 
“cinema of duty” 32 towards “a cinema that negotiates transnationality in a playful way” 
(Mennel, 2002: 136; Berghahn 2009). This latter is appreciated for breaking down 
predictable binaries, rendering visible the “pleasures of hybridity” and “open[ing] up a 
‘third space’ between the celebration and the denial of otherness” (Burns, 2007: 7; 2009; 
Berghahn 2009; Kosta 2010; Göktürk, 2010b).  
The conceptual framework of hybridity has largely informed the celebratory 
reception of Akın’s documentary Crossing the Bridge: The Sound of Istanbul—the focus 
of the current chapter. Indeed, what I would call a liberal-pluralist interpretation of 
hybridity that conceives it primarily in terms of “fusion,” “connection,” “mosaic,” 
                                                                                                                                                                             
indicates, these filmmakers were regarded as “the next wave of auteurs whose films are anticipated to win 
the international acclaim that was hitherto reserved for the auteurs of New German Cinema in the 1970s 
and early 80s” (2009: 6).  
32 This is a term originally used by the film critic Cameron Bailey to refer to those films which are 
“social issue in content, documentary-realist in style, firmly responsible in intention” and which “position 
[their] subjects in direct relation to social crisis and attempt to articulate ‘problems’ and ‘solutions to 
problems’ within a framework of center and margin, white and non-white communities” (Bailey qtd. in 
Malik, 1996: 204). In the particular context of European cinema, “cinema of duty” corresponds to a 
subgenre in the 1970s and 1980s which concerned itself with exposing the plight of the immigrant/ethnic 
other. While aiming to raise political consciousness, these films usually reproduced cultural stereotypes, 
maintained binary oppositions and constructed marginal subjectivity mainly as one of victimhood. In 
Germany, examples of “cinema of duty” include works by German filmmakers—such as Fassbinder’s 
Angst essen Seele auf/Ali: Fear Eats the Soul (1974), Sander-Brahms’ Shirins Hochzeit/Shirin’s Wedding 
(1976), Bohm’s Yasemin (1988)—as well as works by German-Turkish directors, such as Başer’s 40 m2  
Deutschland/Forty Square Meters of Germany (1986) and Abschied vom falschen / Farewell to a False 
Paradise (1989) (Berghahn 2009; Burns 2007).     
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“mélange,” “peaceful coexistence” and “polyphony” has come to dominate the way the 
film has been talked and thought about (Burns 2009; Berghahn 2006; Göktürk, 2010a; 
2010b; Gueneli, 2014; Jafaar, 2006; Kosta 2010). Through this lens, Crossing the Bridge 
is celebrated for both underscoring “the multicultural heritage of Turkey” and for 
demonstrating how “hyphenated and minoritarian literatures, films and other cultural 
formations negotiate ‘multiple and simultaneous affiliations and disaffiliations’” and thus 
disrupt fixed and totalized conceptualizations of identity and belonging (Berghahn, 2009: 
4).  
In particular, Kosta sees the documentary as offering “a multi-dimensional image of 
Istanbul that resists the ‘German’ optic of Turkishness. […T]he images in Crossing the 
Bridge collide with binary configurations and a mono-dimensional understanding of 
culture that have entrenched themselves in earlier representations of Turks in Germany” 
(2010: 343). She further argues that the documentary, through “the symbol of the bridge 
as the space of dynamic traversal and connection [,] challenges the long-held, yet worn-
out expression of living ‘between two worlds’ or living in a state of in-betweenness and 
crisis” which dominated the “cinema of duty” that reduced Turkish migrants to victims 
devoid of agency (347).33 For Kosta, the bridge in Akın’s documentary signifies “active 
multidirectional exchange and engagement […It] symbolizes the emotional connection to 
two or more places simultaneously; it stands for the transfers of knowledge and 
                                                          
33 While I take Kosta to be making a formal argument here about the bridge metaphor in general, she 
seems to conflate the experience of immigrants from Turkey in Germany with the experience of people 
living in Turkey as their homeland. Her argument about how Crossing the Bridge challenges the 
conceptualizations of living in-between as a debilitating condition, then, is based on the sweeping and 
rather untenable assumption that these latter have also been constructed as “living between two worlds” and 
“devoid of political power” since the documentary is about the music produced by people who live and 
work in Turkey and identify it as their homeland.   
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subjectivities that are the effect of global networks” (347). Similarly, Göktürk contends 
that Crossing the Bridge as a “localised celebration of sonic hybridity emphatically 
transcends binaries of an enlightened, civilized West versus a pre-modern East” (2010b: 
229). Reiterating the idea that “transnational artists complicate the rhetoric of being 
trapped or lost ‘between two cultures,’” she asserts that the bridge in Akın’s documentary 
must be read not as a site of precarious suspension but one of dynamic encounter that 
emphasizes “mobility and flux across borders” (231).       
Admittedly, the music of the city that the documentary presents is quite captivating 
in its heterogeneity, hybridized forms and varied sources of influence and inspiration. In 
this sense, Crossing the Bridge effortlessly appeals to a liberal sentiment that values and 
endorses recognition of difference, plurality and diversity. Yet, as Ang argues, the 
discourse of “fusion,” “connection” and/or “synthesis,” which habitually accompanies 
such liberal sentiment, risks “absorb[ing] difference and diversity into a new consensual 
culture.” It also occasions a depoliticized conceptualization of hybridity that downplays, 
if not domesticates, its antagonistic aspects. In this model, hybridity, stripped of “friction 
and tension,” “ambivalence and incommensurability” gets reduced to a “congenial 
amalgamation” and quite paradoxically loses the very substance to make a difference 
(2001: 197-198).  
Besides abetting depoliticization of difference this liberal model, to which both the 
documentary and its dominant readings subscribe, also remains blind to how the 
rehabilitated metaphor of the bridge—now celebrated for its dynamic capacity to connect 
and blend multidirectional flows—actually contributes as a discursive device to such 
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depoliticization. Furthermore, in their ardent attachment to revealing the emancipatory 
potentials of hybridity over the crippling aspects of “living in-between,” the celebratory 
readings lose sight of the ways in which Crossing the Bridge corrodes the very assertions 
(of multidirectional influence, for example) it ostensibly sets out to defend. Consequently, 
they fail to notice the Orientalizing undercurrents of the documentary.    
This blind spot is precisely where I begin my analysis. In the first part of the 
chapter, I illustrate how Crossing the Bridge tries to disengage from and challenge the 
Manichean, essentializing/Orientalizing constructions of “the East” and “the West” while 
at the same time reinscribing the binary through its structure and narrator’s voice. This 
contradiction is particularly detectable in the first half, where the documentary 
undermines its own premises by repeatedly subsuming hybridity into a model/copy 
(originator West/imitator East) framework. The narrative structure implies a journey from 
this “compromised authenticity” of the modern hybrid towards one presumed to be pure 
and untouched by modernity, which in the documentary, gets attributed to “ethnic” 
others. A latent Orientalizing tendency manifests itself also in the closing segment where 
a long-standing Orientalist will takes over the narrative and, without any evident need for 
justification or explication, ascribes an ineradicable melancholy to “the East.” Utterly out 
of touch, indeed irreconcilable, with the preceding accounts of the participants and how 
they describe their own experiences of Istanbul, this peculiar conclusion conveys a desire 
to attach affects of loss, longing and grief to the city. 
On the one hand, my analysis of the documentary lays bare the limitations of the 
liberal-pluralist elaborations of the bridge metaphor. On the other hand, it renders visible 
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the structural affinities between Turkey’s relationship to Europe and to its own taşra and 
the place of the bridge in this symmetry. That is to say, insofar as taşra stands for that 
constitutive periphery, which repels and enchants the center it is made subordinate to, I 
claim that the bridge functions as a discursive device that enables Turkey’s 
peripheralization—a device which renders it Europe’s taşra. 
As I discussed in the previous chapters, the center-taşra dynamic in Turkey is very 
much shaped by the particularities of this relationship to Europe. “The original vs. 
inadequate copy” structure as well as the time-lag that Turkish modernization posited 
between local center(s) and taşra(s) are the projections of a much broader, national 
inadequacy induced by the encounter with what is taken to be “the original” center 
Europe (Ahıska, 2010: 8). Cultural critic Argın (2005) cogently expounds on this point: 
when the Turkish modernizer goes to taşra, he writes, “s/he is ‘embarrassed’ by what 
s/he sees twice over: in his/her name and in the name of the West [...] S/he feels 
embarrassed by what s/he sees because this ‘seeing’ simultaneously reveals to her/him 
how s/he is seen [by the West].” Center and taşra, he continues, “can never really directly 
catch each other’s eyes because their meeting always takes place under the surveillance 
of a third gaze.” Put differently, the center-taşra encounter always entails the mediation/ 
intervention of a putative Western gaze (289-290, my translation).    
But if the bridge is a part of the process of Turkey’s peripheralization and the 
ensuing development of self-doubt and beratement, how does one make sense of the fact 
that it has been so enthusiastically embraced and cited (to the point of cliché) for decades 
as a metaphor for national identity and culture? Such unmitigated popularity, I argue, has 
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something to do with the ambivalence embodied by the bridge itself as a structure, with 
its ability to intimate both inclusion and exclusion, proximity and distance, commonality 
and singularity. For it is such ambivalence, in turn, that allows nationalist discourse to re-
appropriate the bridge as something that bestows upon Turkish identity a quality of 
“uniqueness” and “exceptionality,” especially in the face of perpetual self-doubts about 
authenticity. Indeed, the bridge as a structure that both connects and separates proves to 
be a perfect metaphor for a nationalism which, at least in its official Kemalist vein, has 
construed its “mission” as “synthesis”, as one about “bridging the gap between the 
idealized [West] and the experienced [authentic local life]” and building “an essential 
national culture harmonized with Western civilization” (Ahıska, 2010: 19; 10-11, my 
emphasis). 
When I return to the documentary again in the last part of the chapter, it is to 
illustrate how appropriations of the bridge as an instrument of synthesis, connection 
and/or peaceful co-existence get questioned by particular participants. Even though 
mostly omitted from the existing readings of the documentary, these subjects—namely, 
the Kurdish buskers and the “Father” of the disparaged arabesk music, Orhan 
Gencebay—unravel how not only the nationalist but also the liberal-pluralist investments 
in the bridge metaphor draw from exclusionary, Orientalizing discourses.   
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III.1. From Hybridity to “Authenticity” 
German musician, Alexander Hacke, the bass player of the industrial, experimental 
band Einstürzende Neubauten, is the narrator of Crossing the Bridge: The Sound of 
Istanbul. Interviews with the local musicians, artists and producers, who provide 
commentary on their music and its diverse sources and inspirations, supplement Hacke’s 
musical explorations in the city. Besides the hybrid sounds of Istanbul, the documentary 
also pursues, in Akın’s words, “the question of whether Turkey is really European 
enough for the EU” (Dürr and Wellershoff, 2005). Indeed, one can easily make the 
argument that music is used as one engaging vehicle in the documentary to tackle the 
vexed question of where Turkey belongs. Instead of providing a direct and definite 
answer, the visual narration and dialogue in the documentary draw attention to Turkey’s 
“exceptional” location, which endows it with a particular capacity to connect and 
synthesize the East and the West. Thus, the bridge between Europe and Asia, whose 
majestic aerial shots open the documentary, gets much invoked as a favorable metaphor, 
especially in the first half. 
In this context, it is important to note that the documentary’s highlighting of 
Turkey’s “unique” position is neither new nor particularly insightful. Since the late 
Ottoman era the bridge has been imagined as “an ideal space” that brings together Asia 
and Europe, the East and the West, Islam and the West/Christianity, this latter 
formulation gaining more currency especially in the post-9/11 global order (Ahıska, 
2010). More recently, Turkey’s role as a bridge was emphasized in the debates about its 
accession to the European Union, particularly in the framework of liberal multicultural 
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projects (such as the now-sidelined “Alliance of Civilizations Initiative”) that advocate 
cultural diversity, protection of difference, and “tolerance” for other cultures. The release 
of the documentary coincided with a moment when such projects still had considerable 
political purchase on official and public discourses in Europe and when the long-awaited 
negotiations for Turkey’s official membership to the European Union had finally begun 
(in 2005). At the same time, Istanbul was also gearing up to be the Cultural Capital of 
Europe in 2010, which signaled the intentness of the negotiations. The Master Plan for 
the events entailed a heavy emphasis on the bridge metaphor as an “image of elegant 
synthesis” and staged Istanbul as “a cosmopolitan model of coexistence” (Göktürk, 
2010a: 182). In Europe, while there was a mixed response to Turkey’s candidacy for full 
membership, a liberal, “inclusive” discourse that emphasized Turkey’s “unique” position 
as a bridge between the East and the West, between Islam and Europe, and perceived 
Turkey’s integration as a way to facilitate “cultural dialogue” was as audible as an 
“exclusive” one, which imagined Turkey more in terms of a “border” than a “bridge” 
(Küçük, 2009: 98-99).34     
The laudatory reception of the film and the endorsement of the bridge as a 
facilitator of encounters and engagements with difference must be considered also in light 
of these specific political conditions. The crucial issue to be examined here, though, is 
not so much that the documentary emphasizes and tries to valorize difference, diversity 
and hybridity, but the particular manner in which it does these, the way it imagines 
                                                          
34 See Bülent Küçük (2009) also for an insightful analysis of how the European liberal multicultural 
discourse, which deploys the bridge metaphor to promote “cultural dialogue,” “alliance of civilizations,” 
integration and so on, is ridden with Orientalizing assumptions. 
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difference and how it sets up the encounters and engagements with it. Hacke’s position as 
narrator/“protagonist” is key in this respect.    
When Crossing the Bridge first came out, Ali Jafaar from Sight and Sound referred 
to it in his review, favorably, as “Eastern Vista Social Club” (2006: 5). The invocation of 
Wim Wenders’ Buena Vista Social Club (1999), a documentary where American 
musician Ry Cooder goes to Havana, resurrects the careers of long-forgotten traditional 
Cuban musicians and produces an album for them that subsequently becomes a major 
international hit, has since been criticized. The objections to the comparison seem to 
emanate especially from a vigilance against the Eurocentric and colonial entanglements 
of Buena Vista Social Club.35 Göktürk, for instance, asserts that compared to Cooder, 
“who positions himself center stage and foregrounds his own importance in […] ‘making 
[Cuban musicians] heard,’” Hacke represents “a more casual and subdued spirit of 
collaboration” (2010a: 187). Similarly, Kosta sees Hacke as a mediator who “enters the 
‘foreign’ space somewhat seamlessly.” Even though she acknowledges that at times his 
“voice-over evokes a stereotype of the Western traveler who has entered an exotic 
oriental space only to be left mesmerized,” she upholds that his “chameleon-like 
existence” complicates this image (2010: 349). Kosta takes issue with the comparison 
also on the grounds that “Wenders nostalgically territorializes and petrifies Cuban 
culture” whereas “Akın explores Istanbul as a space of confluence and change” (346). I 
will return to questioning this latter point about nostalgia and petrification later on when I 
discuss the concluding segment of the documentary. For now, I want to lay out how 
                                                          
35 For a perceptive analysis of Buena Vista Social Club which connects the documentary’s colonial 
and Eurocentric inclinations to the political economy of the genre of “world music,” see Oberacker, 2008.   
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Hacke’s presence in the documentary is neither as unobtrusive nor as benign as these 
scholars maintain, but rife with familiar colonial and Orientalist tropes.  
When we first see Hacke riding in a cab that takes him to his hotel, his voice-over 
informs us about both the motivation and the purpose of his trip to Istanbul: 
For me Istanbul [...] is a mystery. I decided to capture the sounds of this city in 
order to figure them out. I prepared myself well: I’m traveling with a dozen 
microphones, computer software, hard disk drives… Everything I might need. 
These first self-explanations tally with how Akın initially envisioned Hacke in the streets 
of Istanbul, as a “detective” whose defining trait is, of course, solving mysteries in a 
methodical manner (Bax, 2005). In the same interview, Akın continues to disclose other 
inspirational figures which helped him visualize Hacke in Istanbul as a “guide”: “The 
way he wanders through the streets he looks like a Viking sometimes, or a cowboy. I 
liked the image of a giant walking through a foreign city.” While I do not want to reduce 
the meanings of the documentary solely to the director’s intentions, the specific ways in 
which Akın envisioned Hacke’s involvement seem to have largely determined both the 
latter’s performance and the overall framing of the documentary. What brings together 
the figures of the detective, the cowboy and the Viking is not only their heroic quality, 
but also their association with a dominating hypermasculinity. In the case of the latter 
two, this hypermasculinity is also indelibly bound up with colonial ideals of conquest, 
discovery, expansion, and mastery. In this sense, Hacke is not merely a “guide” or a 
“narrator;” he is the white Western male hero—on a mission to penetrate into and master 
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the (feminine) Orient and reveal her secrets to the West—with whom the target audience 
is invited to identify.  
This analysis is borne out by the short synopsis of the documentary at the website of 
German Films Service and Marketing (“the national information and advisory center for 
the promotion of German films worldwide”):     
[Crossing the Bridge] describes a Western point of view, a view from the 
distance, in a foreign, tense, erotic, dangerous, tempting city. [...] These days 
plenty of DJ’s, musicians, and artists from all over the world come to Istanbul. 
They are looking for inspiration, driven to lift the veil of the graceful beauty’s 
secret.  
It is difficult not to be taken aback by the text’s almost verbatim repetition of the 
nineteenth-century Orientalists’ representation of the East in terms of a dubious 
femininity and as a land of “secrecy and sexual promise” despite the existence, for 
decades now, of copious criticism of such conceits (Said, 1994: 222). Even the metaphor 
of the veil, deployed for centuries in Orientalist accounts to convey the so-called 
inscrutability and hidden essence of the Orient is sustained together with all the 
phallocentric implications of the desire to “lift the veil.”36  
Then again, one need not resort to any outside material to recognize the 
Orientalizing, colonial gaze of the documentary. Hacke’s opening voice-over about 
                                                          
36 See Yeğenoğlu’s Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism (1998), 
especially the second chapter “Veiled Fantasies: Cultural and Sexual Difference in the Discourse of 
Orientalism,” where, through close readings of nineteenth century Orientalist travel literature, she argues 
that the veil signifies more than a piece of clothing for the Orientalist. With illustrative examples, she 
demonstrates how the Orientalist will to know what is behind the veil is intricately linked to the voyeuristic 
pleasures of a male gaze and saturated with the sexual desire to penetrate.   
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solving mysteries, about “capturing” and “figuring out” the city’s sounds, juxtaposed 
over images of him unloading miscellaneous hi-tech sound and recording equipment at 
his hotel Grand Hotel de Londres—a popular residence among Western travelers in late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—evokes Said’s depiction of the Orientalist 
subject as an “interpreter” (1994: 166). This is a subject who systematically records, 
observes and studies the Orient to “translate its foreignness,” and “decode its meanings” 
for the West (103); a subject whose aim is to “make available to his compatriots a 
considerable range of unusual experience” by “filtering [the Orient] through regulatory 
codes, classifications, specimen cases [...] all of which together formed a simulacrum of 
the Orient [...] for the West” (166). The task of the interpreter is indispensable for he is 
supposed to be the mediator who finds a hook for the “uninitiated Western [audience]” 
which would otherwise, it is assumed, “resist the assault of untreated strangeness” (67). 
In Crossing the Bridge, Hacke, as the primary figure of identification, fulfills the role of 
the interpreter whose judgment the spectator is expected to trust. Not given the 
opportunity to explore and pore over the sounds themselves, the spectators are asked to 
rely on Hacke’s ability to discover, select and present for them the most interesting and 
valuable pieces—i.e., put together “a series of representative fragments”—from these 
unfamiliar sounds (128).  
In the interview that I quoted from earlier, Akın also explicitly addresses this issue 
of acclimatizing an unversed Western audience and explains how they tried to 
accomplish this through the structure of the documentary. They started the film with 
relatively familiar, hybridized sounds and “progressed gradually to the roots of this 
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mixture, from globalised Istanbul to the people's identity” (Bax, 2005). Here, he seems to 
suggest, the accessibility of the first half, devoted to Istanbul’s experimental, electronic, 
rock and hip-hop scenes, helps render the second half, comprised of pieces from arabesk, 
mystic fusion, Romani, Kurdish and classical Turkish music, more digestible and 
“likeable” for the viewer. There are a few troubling assumptions in this formulation 
which also find their way into the documentary and keep compromising the claims it tries 
to assert. One concerns assimilating hybridity into the categories of accessibility and 
familiarity, which entails conversion of alterity into the self’s own terms, transforming 
difference into identity (Yeğenoğlu, 1998). As I will shortly illustrate, the original/copy 
model that the documentary latently but consistently installs in the first half is an 
extension of this particular approach to hybridity. Another dubious implication of Akın’s 
statements concerns the editing which, as he intimates, structures the narrative in a way to 
indicate a progression towards the authentic, from hybridity—the imitation, the 
superficial mixture, etc. which in Akın’s formulation, all seem to lack “identity”—and 
towards the “roots,” which, according to the logic of the statement, signify “pure” 
difference. Thus, it is the ethnicized locals of the second half, the Roma, the Kurd, the 
Turk, who embody authenticity and represent “people’s identity” as opposed to the 
ungrounded hybrids of “globalised Istanbul.” While too foreign to be directly 
metabolized, once engaged, the supposedly unsullied music of the ethnic other holds the 
promise for a “real” experience of originality and cultural authenticity. Let me now turn 
to an analysis of some particular details to clarify how all this plays out in the 
documentary.      
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The first group interviewed in Crossing the Bridge is Baba Zula, an experimental-
psychedelic rock band, who are filmed performing on a boat that sails across the 
Bosphorus (the strait that connects Europe and Asia) so as to delineate their hybridized 
sound. The members indicate how living in a “unique” location like Istanbul informs the 
kind of music they make. They explain, for instance, how they use traditional Turkish 
instruments, such as the darbuka (goblet drum) incorporated into the classical Western 
drum set and the electro-saz (the long-necked Anatolian lute) borrowed from Arabesk 
music, to produce a distinct psychedelic sound with unique beats.  
In the next scene, the documentary raises implicit questions about how Baba Zula 
members had defined and claimed affiliation for their work by shifting into a 
disagreement between the managers of the independent record label DoubleMoon.37 As 
one manager starts the interview with the customary preamble, “Istanbul is Asia and 
Europe. It’s East and West. But this is an advantage. We try to be European, but at the 
same time we are open to the East,” he gets interrupted by his partner’s cynical comment: 
“if you’re trying to be European that means you aren’t European.” The figure of the 
imposter and the divisions between authenticity/inauthenticity, original/imitation that 
punctuate the film’s first half get introduced in this manner through the mouths of the 
local music producers. What becomes noticeable as the segment unfolds, however, are 
the ways in which the bands and musicians featured in this half resist constituting 
themselves and their work within the constrictive parameters of this original/copy model. 
While they try and shift the terms of the debate by describing their creative process more 
                                                          
37 DoubleMoon is the producer and distributor of most of the bands and musicians featured in the 
documentary. The soundtrack of the documentary was also released under this label.  
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as a form of organic collage that invents something new (as Baba Zula in the opening 
sequence demonstrate), the voice-over and editing try to roll back these attempts and 
contain them yet again within an original/copy structure.    
For instance, Hacke introduces hip-hop artist Ceza as one of the representatives of 
the “black music of Istanbul.” The exact meaning of this phrase is not very clear, but the 
formulation itself is already suggestive of a comparison with an origin/original (i.e., black 
American rap). The decision to retain this description in the introduction without any 
revisions is puzzling since Ceza and his friends spend considerable time in the following 
sequence explaining how their music differs from black rap, which gets collapsed into the 
category of “gangsta style” in the participants’ broad-stroke account. While his friend 
asserts that their rapping is political and speaks to issues of their particular milieu (it 
refers to “us, just as we are”) as opposed to the “gangsta stuff that does not exist in 
Turkey,” Ceza maintains that although his sound is similar to some American rap, he has 
“never even considered ‘doing gangsta’—all that girls and money talk.” Instead, his 
lyrics are about “serious subjects that concern everyone.”38 In effect, Ceza and his friend 
are drawing attention here to the embeddedness of their music in local realities. They 
appropriate a global cultural form and “make [its] expressive resources relevant to their 
own [lived] experiences and concerns” (Solomon, 2005: 17). The result is a new, hybrid 
form that integrates the local and the global at the same time as it gives voice to an 
authentic experience/existence firmly grounded in a specific place.    
                                                          
38 The participants in this sequence make rather sweeping claims about “the American rap scene” 
and do not at all consider that what they refer as “gangsta” is not a uniform and homogeneous style.  
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From here the documentary cuts immediately into a rather bizarre sequence where a 
young man who calls himself CJ poses next to a flashy car and tells the camera in 
English: “check out my wheels. Fifty million… I’m Turkish and all, but I lived in the 
States for a while […] just trying to keep it real. I’m out!” The scene is confusing because 
the audience is given no clues as to who this person is. Is he another rapper? Someone 
from Ceza’s circle? Or just a random guy on the street? The insertion of this sequence, 
especially in the absence of any explanation, invites doubts about what Ceza and his 
friends had just claimed about local experiences and calls into question their credibility 
and authority. It undercuts a more complex understanding of hybridity precisely at the 
moment of its articulation by interjecting a crude “imitation” model that bears no relation 
to what Ceza had said.   
This is almost a compulsive tendency in the documentary. At the beginning of the 
sequence on the rock scene in Istanbul, Hacke’s voice-over first resolutely informs the 
viewer that “Istanbul is a rock city.” This assertion is immediately supplemented, 
however, with the statement “there are a lot of bars that cover Western music” as if to 
amend the temerity of the initial claim (my emphasis). In this way, just as the 
documentary reduced Istanbul’s hip-hop scene to a simple case of derivation from a 
Western original, it now truncates the city’s decades-long, complex and quite diverse 
experimentations with rock music into a matter of “covering” Western “originals.”39  
                                                          
39 The documentary includes a brief interview with Erkin Koray, one of the pioneers of psychedelic 
folk/rock in Turkey since the early 1960s, whose experimentations with traditional Turkish instruments and 
Anatolian folk songs have influenced contemporary rock bands in Turkey, including some that are featured 
in Crossing the Bridge. Koray’s inclusion in the documentary does indicate some awareness of the long 
history of rock in Turkey. However, the content of the interview is rather dismissive of this history and its 
multiple actors in the way it depicts Koray as a solitary figure who managed to survive in a hostile cultural                                         
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To avert any misunderstandings, I want to note here that I do not think of this urge 
to mark origins/originals in terms of an intentional, calculated attempt to denigrate the 
city, its music and/or the participants. Rather, I see it as a symptom of an anxiety around 
the potential dissolution of established borders which help constitute and secure the 
European/Western subject. Insofar as Orientalism constitutes a discursive edifice through 
which the European/Western subject procures his unity and coherence by projecting 
internal conflict, fragmentation and otherness onto an external site, i.e., the East, the 
unequivocal difference of the East must be ensured. That is to say, this process of 
exteriorizing otherness demands that the East be made into and remain a constant 
supplier of contrasting images. For it is these images that not only help shape and define 
the European subject but also deflect the latter from facing his own repressed internal 
conflicts and inconsistencies.40    
From this perspective, when the East gets less distinguishable from the West—as 
happens with the hybridized subjects and forms in the documentary—its otherness must 
be reinscribed in some way to re-affirm and secure identity. This is similar to a gesture 
that Said (1994) points out in the specific context of Orientalist scholarship. When the 
Orient seemed to resemble the West too closely in these texts or when its “virtues,” so to 
speak, were accounted for, such praise was immediately cancelled out by a reference to 
some deficiency. In this way the East is produced as both familiar, “because [it] pretends 
                                                                                                                                                                             
environment that singled him out as “excessive” and eccentric and consistently tried to hamper his career. 
While a lot of avant-garde artists were subjected to different forms of marginalization at the time, there also 
existed a counterculture niche that sustained and supported these artists.  
40 See Grosrichard (1998) for the elaboration of this psychoanalytically-informed understanding of 
the workings of Orientalism. Grosrichard’s sophisticated study is particularly important in the way it fills a 
curious gap in Said’s Orientalism, that is, the absence of an engagement with Orientalist literature on the 
Ottoman Empire.  
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to be like the West,” and alien, “because although in some ways [it] is ‘like’ [the West,] it 
is after all not like [it]” (72). This “vascillation,” characteristic of Orientalist imaginary, 
also lurks in Akın’s documentary. In this fluctuation hybridity is invoked not only to 
indicate familiarity, but also to signify distance and alienness. In Hacke’s introductions of 
the local artists, the seemingly casual references to points of origin41 mark the hybrid 
from the first as something that is spatially and temporally distanced from the original. 
Along with the narrative structure of a journey toward authentic roots, this in turn incites 
an understanding of the hybrid primarily as a derivation, as a lesser, second-rate, and, in 
one way or another, a lacking form—something “symmetrical to, and yet diametrically 
inferior to, a [Western] equivalent” (Said, 1994: 72).  
The gesture of indicating points of origin would not be so striking if the 
documentary applied this frame equally to all the participants. However, there is no 
mention of roots, origins or even influences when the direction of the cultural 
flow/influence is reversed from a West-East to an East-West axis. In these cases, the 
lurking concern with the question of whether or not hybrid subjects/forms are imitations 
is suspended. Instead, these sequences are framed such that the subject’s seamless 
integration into a foreign culture is foregrounded in mystifying ways; that is, without 
providing any insight into the details of this process. This is the case with Brenna 
MacCrimmon, a Canadian musician who compiles and sings little-known Turkish and 
                                                          
41 I already mentioned the reference to black music for hip-hop. For rock, first “the West” is 
generally mentioned as a “place” of origin. Later on, Hacke refers specifically to Seattle while introducing 
the Turkish grunge band Duman.  
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Balkan folk songs.42 As soon as MacCrimmon begins to speak, it is very hard not to be 
mesmerized by the ease with which she expresses herself in a language other than her 
own. While she continues to talk and sing in perfect Turkish, the viewer is left 
completely in the dark about the crucial and perhaps most intriguing aspects of her 
experience: How did MacCrimmon come to sing and speak in Turkish so fluently, with 
an almost impeccable awareness to the rhythm of the language let alone the music? What 
motivated her interest in Turkish and Balkan music? What effect has this encounter with 
a different musical tradition had on her sense of being, professionally and otherwise? 
What does it mean to embody a subjectivity that seems so effortlessly at home and 
affectively present in a foreign language and in a culture commonly coded as “alien” to 
her own? Pursuing answers to such questions could have led the documentary in a path 
which would warrant its critical acclamation, for then it would have perhaps addressed, in 
much more complicated and critical ways, the issues that scholars and commentators 
have precipitously aligned the documentary with—issues that concern cultural exchange 
and confluence, reciprocity and/or multidirectionality of cultural flows, diverse 
modalities of hybridity, etc. Rather than avoiding, neglecting or indeed unintentionally 
reproducing them, the documentary might have then become more attuned to the 
“specific power relations and historical conditions that [configure] the interactions and 
encounters which induce […] processes of hybridization” (Ang, 2001: 197).43   
                                                          
42 This information is not provided in the documentary. Indeed, neither Hacke nor any other 
participant introduces MacCrimmon. The audience is expected to deduce from her short interview who she 
is and what she does or else conduct a little research of their own to figure out this information.  
43 To avoid belaboring this point any further, I refrained from including an analysis of the sequence 
with Mira Hunter—a Sufi whirler who performs in the documentary with Mercan Dede, a Turkish DJ and 
composer who fuses ambient electronic sounds with traditional mystic/Sufi music. As with Brenna 
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It is quite remarkable how the notions of exchange, confluence, interrelation, 
hybridity, fluidity, etc. that get affiliated with the bridge in the film’s first half get 
dropped as the documentary progresses. Particularly in the second half, the bridge gets 
completely disassociated from such metaphorical elaborations and transforms into 
something akin to a border that the Western subject crosses to access an “undiluted” 
cultural difference that inhabits a distant time and place.  
One indication of this shift is the evident alteration in Hacke’s manner and conduct 
in his encounter with the sounds of Romani, Kurdish and classical Turkish music. The 
figure who had been moving around the city with ease and confidence, leisurely 
recording, dancing, drinking and playing with Istanbul’s hybridized musicians and bands, 
now becomes a distant and careful observer. This transformation is particularly 
discernible in a scene where he meticulously sets up his hi-tech equipment in a small 
beerhouse outside Istanbul, in the taşra town of Keşan, to record the local Roma 
musicians. Given the undisputed presence of the Roma in Istanbul’s urban culture 
especially in the entertainment industry, it is not clear why Hacke is made to take a bus 
out of the city to “find” and record Romani music, except that the travel over space from 
the center to the periphery, to taşra, also surreptitiously implies a travel in time, from the 
present to the past, from the modern to the pre-modern.44 Inside the beerhouse, between 
Hacke’s spectatorial presence and the exoticizing gaze of the camera, what is supposed to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
MacCrimmon in this case, too, the audience is not provided with any information about Hunter or how, as a 
North American woman, she came to practice whirling—a traditionally male practice in Sufism.  
44 Until recently Sulukule, a district in the historic old city of Istanbul, was home to one of the oldest 
Roma communities in Turkey. Under the sweeping wave of urban renewal projects which has ravaged the 
city since mid-2000s, the Roma were forced out of the historic settlement and relocated to housing projects 
built miles away, in the outskirts of Istanbul. At the time of the filming of the documentary, the 
gentrification project was at its very initial stages and the Roma had not yet been dislocated. 
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be a casual improv takes on the quality of a full spectacle. If the mobility of the camera 
which restlessly navigates the room appeals to a desire to see and observe more of the 
other, the extreme close-ups of the musicians and half-drunken Romani men raising their 
glasses to the film’s spectator titillates the desire to see this other more closely.  
The reverence with which Hacke approaches the participants—not only the Romani 
musicians but all the ethnicized bodies of the second half—is animated by this sense of 
discovery, of having finally penetrated into the hard-to-reach “root,” i.e., the “purely 
authentic other.” Here, the (presumed) inaccessibility of the other, on the one hand, 
renders it rare and precious, hence soliciting the need for scrupulous recording, archiving 
and preservation. On the other hand, the inaccessibility itself must first be fabricated to 
enable the act of transcending it. To put it more plainly, a “mystique of inaccessibility” is 
constructed around the other in order to play out the fantasy of its discovery and 
preservation/protection (Huggan, 2001: 178).   
In the documentary such mystique is generated by the particular ways in which the 
“authentic other” is filmed in staged settings, unlike the musicians and bands of the first 
half. To be more specific, what the documentary marks as hybrid sounds/subjects are 
shown to be embedded in contemporary, modern, urban space. The shots of the bustling 
city streets, which are intercut with the interviews as well as the inclusion of public 
performances by these participants, convey their symbiotic relationship with the city and 
urban populations. In contrast, the documentary severs the tie of the “authentic (ethnic) 
other” with the city and, by extension, with modernity, by placing these participants in 
spaces that detach them not only from their own respective audiences but also from the 
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time and place of the present. For instance, Müzeyyen Senar, the diva of Turkish classical 
music, and Sezen Aksu, “the queen” of Turkish pop, are both filmed under highly-staged 
circumstances, in rooms that are decorated in ways that insulate them spatially and 
temporally from the city that, in actuality, is a fundamental force that fosters the genres of 
music they perform.45 In this way, their performances are not simply decontextualized, 
but almost museumized in the way they are estranged from contemporary everyday life 
and displayed as objects that belong to some other time and place.  
Such decontextualization and exhibitionistic display of the other becomes most 
evident, however, in the filming of Aynur, who is asked to perform a Kurdish elegy 
(astonishingly) in an eighteenth-century Ottoman hammam (Turkish bathhouse).46 The 
filming of a gendered and ethnicized body in one of the most notorious sites of 
Orientalist imagery in part re-enacts the associated male fantasy about accessing a space 
coded, alongside the Ottoman harem (the seraglio), as a forbidden domain of female 
sexuality. At the same time, just as in the other cases with Senar, Aksu and the Romani 
musicians, Aynur’s particular location detaches her and Kurdish music from the 
contemporary city. The mise-en-scène thus works in a way that “denies [the other] a 
                                                          
45 Senar, in an ornate stage costume and with full make-up, is filmed in a room adorned with a red 
carpet, dark velvet curtains and old-fashioned wallpapers. The orchestra behind her is made up of elderly 
men (Senar, who died recently in 2015, was 86 years old during the filming). The overall effect of the 
setting is an uncanny one generated by the sense that a long-gone era has been brought back to life for 
purposes of display. Senar also evokes the temporality of a mythical past as she starts her interview by 
saying: “Once upon a time there was a Müzeyyen Senar. That’s me.” Aksu, dressed in a much more 
conservative outfit than her usual stage costumes, is also filmed in a similar room with the silhouette of the 
city only vaguely discernable from the windows behind. The lighting in the room, accentuating tones of 
yellow and light brown, creates the nostalgic sepia effect. Her singing is intercut with black-and-white 
images of the city from the past, which fortifies the temporal dislocation.  
46 Hacke explains the choice of setting for Aynur’s performance by referring to the “incredible 
acoustics” of the space. However, this reasoning is not very satisfactory given that acoustics had not been a 
priority before and that he had recorded other musicians in less than favorable aural circumstances.  
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living culture” and produces it as outside the present (Fee qtd. in Huggan, 2001: 159). 
Once transposed elsewhere, encapsulated in another time and place, this other is also 
prevented from “crossing those fictional but ideologically essential boundaries between 
[…] the Exotic and the Familiar, the Past and the Future, the Dying and the Living” since 
its presumed purity derives from isolation, from its externality to modernity (Fee qtd. in 
Huggan, 2001: 159). The documentary determines the appropriate mode of engagement 
with such exquisite difference to be the removed relationality of observation and 
recording rather than the sociable one of participation and collaboration.  
The Orientalizing vein that I have been mining gets picked up once again in the 
concluding section of the documentary where, amongst her countless songs about 
Istanbul, Sezen Aksu performs one of the most somber and nostalgic: “İstanbul Hatırası” 
(Memory of Istanbul). While the lyrics themselves register nostalgic reminiscings of the 
city’s past, her performance is interspersed with black-and-white images of Istanbul. The 
song’s orientation towards the past and the affects of gloom and longing that it invokes 
are difficult to reconcile with the participants’ narratives of their experiences of the city. 
If anything these narratives suggest that the present is more gratifying compared to the 
past. This is true not only for what the documentary marks as “hybrid” subjects, but also 
for the ones it reifies as ethnicized, authentic, “unblended” identities. Members of the 
rock band Replikas, for instance, talk about how their sense of dislocation and alienation 
in the past was transformed into one of empowerment in the present when they were 
finally able to see beyond an internalized system of value biased towards the West and 
stake their creative claims to local sounds which they had previously been accustomed to 
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spurn. Similarly, Aynur, while underlining the historical, political and cultural 
marginalization and injuries that Kurds in Turkey have perpetually been subjected to, still 
expresses in unresentful ways her desire for a more just future. Thus when the 
participants, even the ones who are most afflicted in the present, do not profess a 
yearning for the past, a conclusion that attaches an obscure sense of loss to the city and to 
its inhabitants feels out of place if not disrespectful. It exudes Orientalist associations, 
especially those that attribute to the East an abiding sorrow and grief, imagined to be 
ceaselessly flowing from a transhistorical, innate and insurmountable lack. 
 
III.2. The Metaphor of the Bridge and Its Discontents   
I have so far offered a reading that brings to the fore moments of contradiction and 
incoherence which are evaded in the centered, celebratory accounts of the documentary. 
Indeed, the claims about the film’s promotion of “a new cultural imagination” and 
border-transcending potentials of hybridity can be sustained only through the repression 
of these moments that reinscribe borders (Kosta, 2010: 343). Similarly, the bridge can be 
construed as a metaphor of connection, mutual and/or multidirectional exchange by 
ignoring the terms and conditions—specific relations and asymmetries of power—that 
enable and organize these practices. As the documentary itself also demonstrates, in the 
absence of such critical attention a liberal-pluralist perspective easily slides into a 
conservative one which “patronizes as it promotes respect, ghettoizes even as it fosters 
inclusion” (Huggan, 2001: 153). The bridge, within such a framework, becomes a 
regulatory device that spatially and temporally differentiates Europe from Turkey (from 
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non-Europe) and delimits it either as an inadequate copy or as a reservoir of authenticity 
untainted/not-yet-tainted by modernity. In both cases, a developmentalist understanding 
which defines Turkey’s relationship to modernity as peripheral and belated is centrally at 
issue.  
A similar thing happens at the national level—in terms not of Turkey’s relationship 
to “Europe,” but of its centers in relation to its peripheries. In fact, to some extent, one 
can read the documentary’s use of the trope of the bridge as re-enacting globally a long-
standing metaphor of national identity, particularly in the way it imagines a 
spatiotemporal journey over that bridge (and backward in time) to the roots. It is such 
national implications of the metaphor that I want to consider now. I will subsequently 
examine how specific participants in the documentary reveal the limits of this 
foundational metaphor.  
In her book on early Turkish radio broadcasting which traces the influence of 
Occidentalism on Turkish nationalism and its conceptualization of modernity during the 
first decades of the republic, Sociologist Meltem Ahıska remarks that the bridge is 
perhaps the “most stable identity” that Turkey sustained, both inside and outside the 
country, “since at least the nineteenth century” (2010: 15). Nationally, the appeal of the 
metaphor stems partly from its discursive capacity to screen deep fissures and conflicts 
that upset hegemonic Turkish identity. As I discussed at length in the previous chapter, 
Turkish national identity is constructed on a fundamental splitting between the East and 
the West that reproduced itself in the dichotomies of native/foreign, traditional/modern, 
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religious/secular, taşra/urban. While official Kemalist nationalist discourse47 reproduced 
these binaries internally,48 it also simultaneously promised a cure for the split: 
harmonious synthesis (Ahıska, 2010).  
It is important to note here the double task that official Kemalist nationalism takes 
on. One of these tasks entails an ‘external bridging’ which aims at conjoining Turkish 
identity—an identity that is historically identified with “the East” in the European 
imagination—with “the West.” Here, being a bridge enables “access to both the essential 
identity of the nation and Western modernity” (2010: 17). The bridge, in its capacity to 
connect and separate, at once allows for the possibility of merging (becoming one with 
the West) and licenses a distinctive national identity. As such it also grants Turkish 
national identity a quality of singularity and “exceptionality.” Ahıska (2010) identifies 
the construction of “exceptionality” around national identity, wherein the bridge 
metaphor is operationalized as one constituent in a defensive gesture. In its attempt to 
forestall comparisons, the gesture can be construed as a “displaced reaction against the 
colonization of the West” (8). In this sense, to the extent that it is used as a trope to 
suggest exceptionality, the bridge metaphor is a symptom—a symptom of “the fear that 
                                                          
47 Following Bora, I use the term “official Kemalist nationalism” to refer to “Atatürk milliyetçiliği” 
(Atatürk nationalism), which has a “strong modernist-Westernizing vein,” to differentiate it from  
“ulusçuluk”/ “ulusalcılık,” which Bora translates as “left-wing Kemalist nationalism” (2003: 438-439). 
This latter has become influential since the 1990s as a secularist response to the rise of Islamism. While 
“ulusalcılık” appropriates the left-wing discourses of Kemalist nationalism from the 1960s and 1970s, it is 
defined by an anti-Westernism that postures as anti-imperialism. For an insightful discussion of different 
types of nationalism in Turkey and their relationship to the official one see Bora, 2003. 
48 The internal reproduction of the East/West binary was inescapable within the Eurocentric 
conceptualization of modernity amongst the Kemalist elites where modernization was “equated with” 
Westernization (Gülalp, 2003: 388). As Sayyid explains, “to modernize, the Kemalists had to Westernize, 
but the very nature of Westernization implied the necessity of Orientalization since you can only 
Westernize what is not Western […] One had to represent the oriental before one could postulate 
westernization as an antidote” (1997: 67). 
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‘our’ modern national identity is in fact a mere imitation” (8). On the flipside of 
exceptionality resides a profound anxiety about the authenticity of national identity. 
Alongside the external one, official Kemalist nationalism also aims at an “internal 
bridging” between metropolitan, urbanized, modernized, Westernized segments of the 
society and those of the rural and taşra. While in theory this bridging suggests a 
congenial encounter between the West and the “authentic roots,” or at least a peaceful 
coexistence of the native and what was generally conceived as “foreign,” in practice it 
has mostly amounted to the expectation that taşra gradually “advance” towards the 
center. A dominant assumption has been that with economic development and 
modernization, taşra would along the way shed its excesses (such as the influences of 
tradition, of Islam, Arabic, Kurdish, Persian and other “Eastern” cultures), domesticate its 
difference, and come to embody a palatable authenticity paired with a Western at-
homeness. Its denizens would “dress in Western garb, develop a taste for Western music, 
adopt Western architectural styles, read and write in Western alphabet and so on” 
(Gülalp, 2003: 388). To be “bridgeable” and included as a desirable national subject, 
then, one needed to fulfil certain predetermined expectations. Despite its inclusory 
aspirations, internal bridging was therefore conditional and entailed an unfeasible attempt 
to contain the highly unpredictable process of hybridization.  
In Crossing the Bridge, Orhan Gencebay, one of the pioneers of the music genre 
arabesk, reveals the limits of this attempt, and by extension, those of the bridge as a 
metaphor for national identity and culture. He appropriates the basic assumptions of the 
dominant discourse of modernization in a way that valorizes the hybrid genre that has 
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been degraded by the same discourse as a malformation wrought by insufficient 
modernization. To appreciate fully Gencebay’s critical gesture, it is necessary to explain 
briefly what arabesk is and what it signifies within the imaginary of Turkish 
modernization.  
In her detailed study of the genre, Özbek describes arabesk as “a hybrid genre 
mixing Turkish classical and folk elements with those of the West and Egypt”; the genre 
gained popularity at the end of 1960s, especially in the urban squatter settlements 
populated by migrants from taşra (1997: 211). The composers and performers, including 
Gencebay, were more often than not migrants themselves. The lyrics primarily gave 
voice to the migrant’s feelings of displacement, desolation and frustration and, especially 
during the initial period of arabesk’s emergence, articulated new desires and demands in 
the encounter with the urban landscape.49 For the established, Westernized urban classes, 
state bureaucrats and intelligentsia, however, arabesk was a “deviation.” It “revealed an 
inner Orient” that impeded Westernization and epitomized “insufficiently suppressed 
‘Arab’ influences and traditional elements” (Stokes, 2010: 74). It was not just that its 
sound, deemed “too Arabic” or “too Oriental,” did not fit into the sanctioned forms of 
hybridity, but as an “illegitimate” hybrid, so to speak, it also “contaminated” the “pure,” 
authentic sounds of Turkish folk and classical music that it was drawing from. In terms of 
content, arabesk’s submission to fate and valorization of inexorable suffering were 
framed exclusively as signs of a resistance to agency, to progress, development and 
                                                          
49 As Özbek emphasizes, while arabesk retained its hybrid form over the years, its “content, 
production, reception patterns and social significance have changed markedly since the 1960s.” This 
transformation, she continues, can be traced along the transformation of capitalism in Turkey—“from 
nationalist developmentalism to […] transnational market orientation after 1980s” (1997: 212).  
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change. As such, arabesk signified a threat to modernity within the dominant official 
model of modernization. What was initially a hostile reaction to a particular hybrid genre 
of music, has gradually become a way of expressing discontent with divergence from this 
model. Arabesk has come to 
[…] describe virtually anything in Turkish social life [that was] considered 
degenerate: arabesk democracy, economy, people, tastes, sentiments, and ways of 
thinking and living. It was as if the term had finally provided a name for the 
problem of Turkish identity (Özbek, 1997: 224).50  
With this framework in mind, let me now turn to a close reading of Gencebay’s 
account of arabesk as he elaborates it in Crossing the Bridge, as this account “undoes” 
the “authoritative discourse” of modernization through a paradoxical move: by using the 
same discourse to reinscribe within it what it had excluded (Young, 1995: 21-22). 
Gencebay starts the interview by drawing attention to the implications of disparaging 
arabesk, which “have always disturbed [him].” “Arabesk means Arab-influenced,” he 
explains, to imply that denigrating arabesk actually entails “insulting other cultures, 
cultures outside of our own.” In this way, he first distances himself from the racist 
presumptions of the modernization discourse. Thus, when he subsequently speaks from 
within the same dominant discourse to align arabesk with some of the most foundational 
ideals of modernity, his speech remains untainted by vestiges of racism. To demonstrate 
                                                          
50 Arabesk has been embraced by conservative populist political movements of post-1980s and by 
influential political figures in this period. However, its depreciatory perception still endures amongst 
Kemalist-modernist, secularist urban classes. For an extensive overview of the history of the genre and 
shifts in its reception see Özbek, 1997; Stokes, 1992; 2010.    
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in detail how the rest of this disruptive re-appropriation takes place, it is worth 
reproducing Gencebay’s account in detail: 
What we wanted to undertake were some technical studies, which we had seen to 
be previously done in Egypt—a place similar to ours. I mean, technically…, 
Egypt had already integrated Western technique [into its music.] Turkish music 
did not quite yet have such practices. We were engaging in these practices to 
enhance our own music. We were undertaking research. Conservatives objected 
to this because they were working towards preservation; there were only few 
attempts at progress [in music]. When we did that [work towards progress], we 
did not damage our cultural heritage, which still stands today as it has always 
been, like a monument. I mean, working towards preservation…All of us, 
everybody, already does that anyways (translation and emphasis are mine).   
Here, Gencebay makes a few critical moves that in the end help produce arabesk as both 
modern and authentic. First, he frames arabesk as a genre that performs an officially 
sanctioned form of hybridization: something that combines a Western superstructure 
(technique) with a native, “authentic” base. In his reference to Egypt as a source of 
inspiration, he reveals a misconstrued assumption of the dominant narrative which 
supposes, rather rigidly, that Western influence follows a direct line from “the West.” In 
this sense, the account he offers is a more sophisticated version that recognizes the 
decentralized nature of cultural flows. Yet, it is an account that still appeals to the 
occidentalism of the dominant modernization discourse. Through such an appeal, i.e., by 
pointing out arabesk’s connections to Western techniques, it seeks to authorize arabesk as 
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a legitimate genre within the dominant paradigm. Next, Gencebay resorts to a language 
of development, progress and science to describe the musical experimentations he 
engaged in while composing arabesk. In the way it associates the genre with an 
innovative modernity, this gesture does not only discredit the prevalent perception about 
arabesk’s essential animosity to the modern. It also makes the bolder claim that arabesk, 
in effect, represents a much more authentic and progressive spirit of modernity than the 
kind of “conservative” modernity that its critics have espoused. The discourse of these 
latter, which has served to identify arabesk as a regressive and reactionary hodge-podge 
that corrupts pure cultural traditions, is thus reversed. In other words, the dominant 
discourse is turned against itself and undermined not by referencing some external 
principle, but by insisting on its chief assumptions and standards to render visible how 
this discourse itself fails to meet them, and indeed violates them. Arabesk is then claimed 
as a truly modern cultural product, befitting of modern, inventive national subjects who 
are not content with doing merely what is their duty as citizens, i.e., preserve cultural 
heritage, but go above and beyond it and build upon and “enhance” this heritage.51  
I spent some time elaborating on the example of arabesk, through Gencebay’s 
interpretation, in order to illustrate the limits of the bridge metaphor for Turkish national 
culture and identity. As the case of arabesk elucidates, not all kinds of synthesis are 
included or desirable under the metaphor in its dominant form, where it has come to 
function as a ruse of power that masks the subjugation and marginalization of those who 
do not fit or refuse to fit into the prescribed regimen of hybridization. Arabesk constitutes 
                                                          
51 There is, of course, a lot of variation within arabesk in terms of techniques, sounds, themes, etc 
and not all performers/composers define and practice the genre in the particular way that Gencebay does.  
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a particularly suspect hybrid in this context, given its close affiliation with taşra and the 
chain of uneasy and conflicting associations that this concept evokes in national identity-
formation in Turkey. I focused on Gencebay’s case at length also because this is one of 
the few moments in the documentary where hybridity emerges as a voice not just of 
reconciliation, but also of contestation, as a voice that undermines dominant structures of 
thinking as it speaks through them.52  
A second moment of contestation transpires during the filming of a group of 
buskers, Siya Siyabend, a band whose improvisational performances bring together the 
art of storytelling with a range of genres such as Turkish folk, jazz, protest and industrial 
rock music. Here, the members’ narratives implicitly call into question elaborations of the 
bridge not so much as a national metaphor for synthesis but for peaceful coexistence. 
During this sequence one member, whose Kurdish descent becomes apparent in the 
course of the interview, recounts a visit to his hometown in the Eastern part of Turkey in 
mid-1990s:  
We could not move along the road because there were checkpoints every 50-60 
kilometers. Each time, we were taken off the vehicle and searched. There was a 
huge sign on one side of the road: “Love for forests means love for the country.” I 
turned my head to the other side. I saw a forest ablaze. That’s how they burned 
down and destroyed our homes (my translation).    
                                                          
52 I find it important to note here that a contestatory hybridity does not necessarily always translate 
into progressive political practice. Gencebay’s disruption of dominant modernization discourses or his 
radical musical interventions have never materialized in his involvement in progressive politics. On the 
contrary, Gencebay’s political commitments have always lied with those of the conservative and neo-
liberal political parties.  
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There is something uncanny about this scene, about the particular image of a sign, on one 
side of the road, whose meaning does not just get voided but perversely derided right 
across, on the other side. It is as if the scene embodies the monstrous double of the bridge 
whose spectacular image the documentary presented to the viewers over and over again: 
the majestic bridge that brings together two disparate places, connects one side to 
another; the bridge which stands for perpetual flow and mobility in liberal discourses, and 
for unison in those around national identity. For this to be sustained and reproduced, the 
other image—the one marked by technologies of division and border-control, 
checkpoints and body searches—the image of interruption and destruction, must be 
repressed. Indeed, what enables the first image, what makes possible its construction, 
durability and stability, is the disavowal of the second one and of what takes place there. 
The inclusion of the band member’s narrative in the documentary is poignant in this 
respect. It disrupts the dynamics of disavowal which are necessary to be able to adopt and 
appreciate the bridge either as the liberal-pluralist metaphor for peaceful coexistence or 
as the nationalist one for a harmonious and inclusive identity.  
*** 
In this chapter, I have offered a reading of Akın’s critically-acclaimed documentary 
Crossing the Bridge: The Sound of Istanbul which diverges significantly from and 
challenges its dominant interpretations. My objections to these interpretations entail their 
oversight of the latent ways in which the documentary repeats and reproduces the 
structures and power dynamics of Orientalism. I have further claimed that inattention to 
power relations, which is endemic to both the documentary and its dominant readings, 
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occasions a hasty and uncritical embrace of the bridge as a metaphor for connecting with 
the other, for a conciliatory hybridity as harmonious amalgamation, and/or for peaceful 
coexistence of difference. In the first part of the chapter I illustrated how the 
documentary undermines the metaphorical elaborations of the bridge that it purportedly 
endorses in the specific ways it reinscribes Orientalizing binaries into the narrative by 
containing hybridity within a model/copy structure; by constructing and reifying 
difference in a primitivist manner; and by attributing an inexplicable and eternal sorrow 
to “the East.” I argued that within such a configuration, the bridge no longer signifies a 
blurring of borders but slides into being a border itself. In the second half of the chapter, I 
shifted my focus from a global utilization of the bridge as a discursive device to connote 
liberal-pluralist ideals of syncretism and peaceful coexistence, towards a national one 
where the bridge has provided a foundational metaphor for national identity and culture. 
Here, I pointed at the highly conditional and exclusionary underpinnings of the official 
discourse of modernization and nationalism in Turkey which, on the one hand, calls upon 
the idea of synthesis to constitute and authorize authentic identity, and tries to regulate 
that synthesis by defining acceptable and unacceptable forms of hybridity, on the other. 
The last two cases I discussed from the documentary, the examples of Orhan Gencebay 
and Siya Siyabend, are pertinent in this context. The narratives of these participants 
disrupt dominant discourses of modernization and nationalism and expose in their own 
distinct ways how the metaphor of the bridge fails internally/nationally, too.   
The concept of taşra might have seemed “peripheral” to these analyses, but this is 
so only in the specific way that I have been conceptualizing “peripherality” in this 
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dissertation—in the sense that despite the semblance of exteriority, the concept has been 
fundamental for the shaping of the central arguments. This is particularly true for my 
discussions of the Orientalizing Western gaze of the documentary, which, as it constitutes 
Turkey as Europe’s taşra, also deeply informs how taşra gets produced and represented 
internally. My next chapter explores these questions in detail through close readings of 
the films of Nuri Bilge Ceylan.  
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CHAPTER IV 
PROVINCIALIZING THE METROPOLITAN CENTER: 
TAŞRA IN THE LATE WORK OF NURİ BİLGE CEYLAN 
In the last decade a new genre has emerged in the cinema of Turkey—a genre that 
takes life in taşra as its main focus. This new orientation finds expression in the works of 
renowned filmmakers such as Nuri Bilge Ceylan and Semih Kaplanoğlu but also in the 
internationally lesser-known yet equally significant works of Ümit Ünal, Özcan Alper, 
Yağmur and Durul Taylan, and Reha Erdem. These films not only make taşra central but 
do so by way of formal techniques that have the effect of aestheticizing their subject. The 
long takes, slow tracking shots, color palettes of yellows and greens, frugal dialogue and 
use of natural sounds all work to create a pastoral vision of taşra that significantly 
diverges from its more common, more disparaging representations. The shift points to a 
new imagining of taşra; even though it is not always “beautiful,” this taşra is highly 
stylized in ways that often invest it with positive value, suggesting that the positive 
element in the double-construction described in my Introduction has recently become 
visible in new ways. 
The film scholar Tül Akbal Süalp (2010a; 2010b) explains the emergence of this 
taşra-affirmative cinema as an artistic expression of the depoliticization of the post-
1980s. According to Süalp, the defeat of organized oppositional movements following 
the 1980 military coup has created an atmosphere of political blockage and pessimism 
about the future. The coup not only clamped down on existing institutions of political 
critique, but also heavy-handedly discouraged serious critical analysis, cultivating instead 
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a culture of amnesia and anti-intellectualism. One significant motivation behind the 
ruthless mutilation of dissent and critical thinking was to introduce with relative ease the 
new structural adjustment programs that aimed at integrating Turkey into the global 
capitalist system. By the mid-90s, Turkey was incorporated into the world markets but 
with all the destabilizing and disorienting effects of rapid capitalist transformation. Süalp 
contends that in the face of such sweeping waves of transformation and the uprootedness 
they install, taşra emerged as a space of refuge. The designation of taşra as an “artificial 
paradise” was further reinforced by the economic and cultural hegemony of the new 
taşra-embedded bourgeoisie, which has in a related development produced and circulated 
glorified representations of taşra (Süalp, 2010a: 65, my translation).  
In this context, Süalp (2010b) makes two separate but interrelated arguments about 
the new taşra films. First, she remarks that they delineate a romanticized image of taşra, 
defined by qualities such as the relative slowness of time, harmony with nature, intimate 
social ties, and a life not yet fragmented by modernity. In this respect, taşra is presented 
in these films as possessing the cure for the disillusionment and alienation of urban 
characters, who, in their search for meaning, travel to (romanticized versions of) taşra. 
Her critique of the new taşra films is not limited, however, to their idealization of this 
space. In a second move, she contends that such idealization is frequently accompanied 
by an indifference to political analysis of the conditions that stifle the characters in urban 
settings. In other words, the characters are just shown to be depressed, desensitized, 
bored and exhausted in the city, but the films offer no insight into why and how such 
discontent and dejection are produced in the first place. It is in this sense that Süalp refers 
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to these films as depoliticized and “without a problematic,” for they “avoid analysis” and 
refrain from identifying the real causes of the problem they are depicting (2010b: 111-
112, my translation). As she elaborates, these films “do not provide us the filmic material 
that would enable us to perceive the sources of the individual’s unhappiness, of his/her 
existential crisis, the things that force the individual to search for alternatives. We are 
deprived of the material that would suggest to us that the director has actually thought 
about such issues” (2010b: 103, my translation).  
In a similar interpretation the film critic Cüneyt Cebenoyan (2010) likens the new 
taşra films to the “Heimatfilm” of post-war Germany. This latter was a cinematic 
response to the trauma of the Second World War, which made it difficult for many 
Germans to imagine a viable future. In their inability to project a different future from the 
ruins of the present, these films invested in constructions of an idyllic time and space—
typically in rural settings imagined to be uncontaminated by the disasters of war and 
modernity in general. According to Cebenoyan, the 1980 coup has had a similar effect on 
the political imagination in Turkey, in the sense that it has radically undermined the 
hopes and dreams of a better future. The post-1980 cinema, particularly the taşra films of 
the last decade, are for him expressions of this loss of belief in futurity. As he further 
explains, in contradistinction to the pre-1980s films where the city still signified 
advancement, opportunity and the promise of a more prosperous life, in the post-1980 
films the city appears as the locus of frustration and unfulfillment. The individual, rather 
than heading for the city, is now looking for ways to escape from it. In this new 
configuration, taşra assumes an analogous role to Heimat as the imaginary space of 
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security and salvation. For Cebenoyan, the recent (re)turn to taşra in Turkish cinema 
signifies a “regressive” attitude not only in terms of the kind of conservative politics it 
implies but also in terms of the backward movement towards a fantasized originary 
wholeness. In other words, Cebenoyan reads this (re)turn as indicative of a desire to re-
experience primary narcissism. These films are about the desire to recapture childhood 
bliss, and hence they position taşra as either a caring, enveloping Mother or a protective 
and non-punitive Father.53 
Both Süalp’s and Cebenoyan’s approach to the new taşra films is guided by a 
concern to locate and make sense of these films within the broader trajectory of the 
political history of Turkey and Turkish cinema. This concern enables some of their most 
illuminating claims, but comes at the cost of a tendency toward over-generalization. Even 
though they occasionally refer to some specific films in their discussions, the absence of 
close and detailed readings of particular films yields an analysis that does not do justice 
to the complexity and ambivalence that some of these films display in their articulations 
of taşra.54 This is particularly the case with the films by Nuri Bilge Ceylan that constitute 
                                                          
53 There are points of convergence between the Süalp’s and Cebenoyan’s analyses of taşra films with 
that of Suner’s (2005; 2010), which I sketched out in the first chapter. However, Suner makes a distinction 
between what she calls “popular nostalgia films” and the films of Nuri Bilge Ceylan in her discussion of 
taşra’s contemporary cinematic representations. As I indicate in the following pages, I find making such a 
distinction pertinent to avoid making vague and untenable generalizations.  
Furthermore, while both Süalp’s and Cebenoyan’s analyses contain important insights to make sense 
of the recent proliferation of taşra films, I discern in their understanding of taşra a presumption that marks 
taşra as a site of the primitive, the premature. That is to say, return to taşra can be conceptualized as 
“regression”—as in Cebenoyan’s articulation—only if it is defined from the start in a pejorative way; only 
if it is postulated as a lower stage in development.         
 
54 Amongst the films Cebenoyan and Süalp refer as “regressive” and/or “depoliticized” taşra films 
are Özcan Alper’s Sonbahar (2008 [Autumn]); Semih Kaplanoğlu’s trilogy Yumurta (2007 [Egg]), Süt 
(2008 [Milk]), and Bal (2010 [Honey]); Reha Erdem’s Kosmos (2010); Yeşim Ustaoğlu’s Pandora’nın 
Kutusu (2008 [Pandora’s Box]) and Çağan Irmak’s Babam ve Oğlum (2005 [My Father and My Son]). 
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the main focus of the current chapter. While Ceylan’s cinema, as Süalp maintains, has by 
and large determined the style and aesthetic principles of the new taşra films—
influencing and inspiring the work of many directors with his particular mis-en-scène, 
characteristic camera angles and movements, colors, etc.—his films cannot be neatly 
subsumed by the critical categories and aesthetic strictures that Süalp and Cebenoyan put 
forward.  
Strangely enough Süalp’s (2010b) article surreptitiously demonstrates the difficulty 
of comprehending Ceylan’s work within the parameters of her analysis. The few times 
that she mentions Ceylan’s films, her discussion swiftly slides into the discussions of 
other films and directors without adequate clarification of how exactly the films of 
Ceylan exhibit the depoliticizing tendencies she describes. A certain ambiguity 
accompanies, moreover, Süalp’s treatment of Ceylan’s cinema. On the one hand, she 
seems to differentiate the director’s early work, namely Cocoon (Koza) (1995), Small 
Town (Kasaba) (1998) and Clouds of May (Mayıs Sıkıntısı) (2000), from both his later 
work and other examples of the genre on the grounds that these films depicted taşra from 
an insider’s perspective. Put differently, rather than constructing idealized images of 
taşra from the perspective of a distant onlooker, as most contemporary taşra films do in 
Süalp’s reading, she suggests that Ceylan’s earlier films reflected life in taşra 
“realistically.” On the other hand, Süalp indicates that Ceylan’s later work, specifically 
Distant (Uzak) (2002), Climates (İklimler) (2006) and Three Monkeys (Üç Maymun) 
(2008), moves away from the realism of his earlier films towards a more formalist and 
abstract filmmaking. Süalp’s analysis frames this shift as unfortunate and stifling for 
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Ceylan’s cinema. However, her observations about Ceylan’s change of style do not fit 
smoothly with her argument about the politically-suspect production of taşra in 
contemporary Turkish cinema. Neither does she explicate if (or how) Ceylan’s later films 
relate to taşra, given their focus on stories that take place in urban settings, more 
specifically in Istanbul.  
The distinction Süalp makes between Ceylan’s early and late films has in fact been 
commonly posited in various readings of his oeuvre (Daldal, 2003-2004; 2006; 
Gülbudak, 2008; Şimşek, 2009). These readings share a tendency to celebrate Ceylan’s 
plain, “sincere,” “naive,” “intimate,” and “tender” approach to taşra in his earlier films. 
Daldal (2003-2004; 2006), for instance, argues that up until Distant, Ceylan’s cinema 
evinces the principles of what Kracauer referred to as “slight narrative.” Avoiding 
“dramatic tensions,” and refusing to exploit the technical capabilities that define most 
mainstream fictional film, Ceylan’s earlier works aspire to reflect the “raw reality” and 
daily routine of taşra in a similar manner to cinéma vérité (2003-2004: 259-60, my 
translation). Minimalist in terms of their content, these early low-budget and artisanal 
films recruited his relatives (non-professional actors) to “play” the main characters, 
which, according to the critics, further contributed to the spontaneity, “sincerity” and 
“naturalness” of his filmmaking. Furthermore, the taşra that Ceylan portrayed in these 
films was the taşra that he grew up in. In this sense, too, the critics claim—echoing 
Süalp’s remarks—that the taşra which emerged in these films was real and convincing 
both for its stylistic features and for the way it issued from biographically formative 
experiences.  
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It is precisely in this mode of filmmaking that Gülbudak (2008) and Daldal (2003-
2004) locate the political significance of Ceylan’s early work. While in terms of content 
they could not be regarded as examples of politically-engaged cinema, in their form they 
signified a resistance to the dominant, “excessively commercialized” manner of 
filmmaking. Gülbudak asserts that these films “were political in their naturalness” (2008, 
my translation). In their renunciation of expensive and extravagant techniques in favour 
of a non-commercial filmmaking founded on slow-paced montage (lingering long takes, 
slow tracking shots, and so forth), they withstood the ideological appropriation of 
cinema, an appropriation which worked to reproduce and sustain the hegemonic culture 
of consumption. These films, in which nothing seemed to happen, also frustrated the 
habitual expectations of the audience “to be entertained.” Hence, the critics claimed them 
as powerful examples of non-conformist, anti-consumerist cinema.  
With Distant, the critical consensus began to shift. Here Ceylan for the first time 
left taşra as a setting and shot the film almost entirely in Istanbul. Although the film is 
regarded as the final part of his taşra trilogy (along with Small Town and Clouds of May), 
critics identified it as heralding an elemental shift in his filmmaking. The main figures in 
Distant were still played by non-professional actors—Ceylan’s cousins, who played 
similar characters in Clouds of May—but the antagonism between them now became the 
central element that drove the story. This is what Daldal (2003-2004) points out when she 
writes that with this film Ceylan moves away from “slight narrative” by introducing 
“sharp dramatic tensions” into the story (267, my translation). Besides exploring the 
taşra-center relationship through the awkward and agitated relationship between the two 
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characters, this film also delved into issues concerning gender relations and urban 
alienation. These shifts towards more conventionally dramatic narratives and exploration 
of issues other than taşra seem to have disturbed critics, though it is interesting to note 
that it was only after the release of his next film Climates that they retroactively framed 
Distant as the beginning of a “decline,” a harbinger of some sort of “degeneration” in 
Ceylan’s cinema (Daldal, 2006; Gülbudak, 2008; Süalp, 2010).  
Climates focused on the disintegrating relationship of an urban, professional, 
middle-class couple played by Nuri Bilge Ceylan himself and his wife Ebru Ceylan. 
Except for the relatively short sequences at the beginning and the end, the film was once 
again shot entirely in Istanbul. Daldal (2006) and Gülbudak (2008) referred to the film as 
“postmodern,” “nihilistic,” “superficial,” and “rambling,” qualities which signified a 
radical departure from Ceylan’s realist/naturalist style. His following film, Three 
Monkeys, for the first time featured professional actors and was again set in Istanbul, 
narrating the survival story of an underclass family who live on the social margins of the 
city. One of the most influential mainstream film critics in Turkey, Alin Taşçıyan (2008), 
wrote that the movie was “the most insincere” of all Ceylan films in its content although 
it constituted one of “the most impressive” in its style and form. She further stated that 
Three Monkeys testified to Ceylan “leaving [...] behind” the “amateur spirit” which had 
so far rescued his films from the pretensions of highbrow, art-house cinema. She 
concluded that with Three Monkeys, Ceylan’s films “lost their innocence.”   
What is striking about these criticisms is their covert correlation of the so-called 
“decline” of Ceylan’s cinema with his apparent departure from taşra as the main setting 
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of his films. Put differently, the severity of the criticisms intensifies as the city becomes 
Ceylan’s central locale. In the critics’ eyes, his stories become less convincing (less 
“real”), at once shallower and more conformist, as they move into the city. There is, in 
this sense, a resemblance between the positive responses to Ceylan’s early works and one 
dominant and celebratory conception of taşra as the seat of authenticity, innocence, 
intimacy and simplicity. It is as if these qualities, which cannot be readily located in 
Ceylan’s films, are projected onto Ceylan’s style of filmmaking (i.e., realist/naturalist, 
minimalist, sincere, non-commercial/amateur, etc.) and get reincarnated in the critics’ 
perception of his early work, which was primarily about taşra.55 Similarly, when Ceylan 
leaves taşra as a geographical location, critics’ responses to his films repeat the dominant 
discursive terms used by some established urban elites in discussing recent migrants from 
taşra: such people lose their innocence and authenticity, are overcome by pretension, and 
embody a deracinated existence in the city.  
Such readings also inadvertently reduce the political significance of Ceylan’s 
cinema to a matter of representational accuracy. What the critics emphasize in their praise 
for Ceylan’s early work is the “sincerity” and “naturalness” with which they depict taşra. 
Latent in the critics’ admiration of these films is an investment in the idea that the taşra 
                                                          
55 Ceylan’s treatment of taşra has been complex in the sense that it resists the binary frameworks 
through which taşra has been predominantly produced. In the following section of this chapter, I elaborate 
on the ways in which Ceylan’s films complicate the received conceptualizations of taşra. Suner (2005, 
2010), whose work I build on in my analysis of Ceylan’s cinema, also argues in her reading of Ceylan’s 
trilogy that in these films taşra-as-home is shown to be familiar, intimate and caring at the same time as it is 
confining and boring: “it is everything we wish to leave behind, and a place that we always long for” 
(2010: 110). According to Suner, these films acknowledge but do not attempt to resolve the “paradox of 
belonging.” Instead, they “[invite] us to live with the paradox” (111).  
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they reveal is “real” as opposed to its distorted, fantasmatic representations (Algan, 
2010). Such investment is partly informed by a perception of Ceylan as a “native 
informant”—a presumption that his familiarity with taşra enables him to tell it “like it 
is.” Thus, when Ceylan’s cinema shifts towards the city, it is as if, the critics imply, he 
ventures into a territory he is inadequately familiar with. His stories then lose their 
credibility; they “ramble on” and/or become politically indifferent if not conservative in 
their inability to comprehend and articulate the sources of urban malaise.  
In what follows I offer a reading of Climates (2006), Three Monkeys (2008) and 
Once upon a Time in Anatolia (Bir Zamanlar Anadolu’da) (2011) that diverges from and 
challenges the criticisms I outlined above. My analysis proceeds from the idea that upon 
a close and detailed cross-reading, Ceylan’s so-called “later works,” whose plots often 
unfold in the city, are still fundamentally “about” taşra. These films reveal a much more 
nuanced understanding of taşra than one finds either in Ceylan’s earlier work or in the 
critics’ accounts, one that neither extols it as a place of refuge from the maladies of 
modernity nor vilifies it as a site of the non-/anti-modern. This new figuration emerges 
from the way the films divorce it from being only and simply a concrete geography. In 
my analysis of Climates, I argue that taşra assumes the characteristics of a psychic state, 
describing an internal alterity that dwells within the subject and within the experiences of 
intersubjective relationships. In the section on Three Monkeys, I discuss how it comes to 
stand for the migrant’s sense of deprivation, isolation, constriction inside the city and the 
yearning for a more gratifying life. In this regard, the taşra which emerges in these films 
seems to me to exceed the limits of interpretations which are concerned with uncovering 
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and solidifying what taşra really is. Without giving it a permanent and definite shape, 
Climates and Three Monkeys circle around taşra as a once-projected fantasy of otherness 
that now haunts from the inside, haunts indeed precisely because what was once outside 
is now “inside” (Gürbilek, 1995; Suner, 2010).  
Finally, as Ceylan returns to the quintessential taşra in the Anatolian heartlands 
with his Once upon a Time in Anatolia, it emerges as a space that has gone through the 
transformations wrought by the two films that precede it. Here, the relationship between 
modernity and taşra, which lingers in the background of Ceylan’s earlier work, becomes 
thoroughly visible. With its explicit references, both through its content and formal 
elements, to modernity’s foundational ideas and institutions—such as reason, rationality, 
scepticism, legal and scientific procedure, progress, bureaucracy—I interpret Once upon 
a Time in Anatolia as a film that reveals how these ideas and institutions fail in their 
attempts at grasping taşra. Their failure, however, is not framed in the film as an effect of 
taşra’s innate resistance to modernity or its inherent inability to reproduce modern ideas 
and institutions. Rather, taşra does not quite fit into the knowledge systems and 
conceptual maps that modernity draws on to master and comprehend it. Taşra not only 
exceeds what modern science and law can know but in its capacity to do so it also reveals 
the limits of modern knowledge. While on an individual level the film figures taşra as a 
space in which different characters are compelled to encounter what they have previously 
repressed—a space where they gain access to a knowledge that they were not able to 
access before—on a broader level it also presents it as a site that discloses what 
modernity has to exclude, marginalize or repress to constitute its internal consistency. 
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Essentially, in my engagement with Ceylan’s films I seek to shift the terms of 
debate on his work in particular and on the cinematic representations of taşra in general. I 
maintain that such a shift is necessary not only to discern the complexity and thickness of 
the meanings taşra acquires in these films but also to appreciate adequately the far-
reaching political implications of Ceylan’s work. Ceylan’s taşra(s) blurs the neat 
boundaries between the inside and outside, self and other, intimate and foreign. As these 
films associate otherness (of/as taşra) less with the outside and the external than with the 
inside and the internal, they articulate in cinematic form what remains opaque in the 
particular theoretical formulations of taşra in this dissertation. Insofar as these films 
approach taşra as an intimate/internal exteriority that unsettles and destabilizes the 
center—whether this center stands for the unified subject, the grand metropolis or 
historicist narratives of Modernity—they also urge us to think critically about the 
contemporary modes through which such otherness is engaged and managed.  
 
IV.1. Climates: Taşra within the Subject   
At first sight, interrogating the meanings of taşra in Climates may seem like an odd 
pursuit. Not only does the film take place mostly in Istanbul, but the main characters are 
professional urbanites who do not have any immediate connections to taşra. The story the 
film tells concerns the protracted break-up between İsa, a professor of architecture 
approaching middle age, and Bahar, who works as an art director for TV productions. 
The fact that the couple lives in Istanbul suggests that Climates might best be read as 
exploring how urban professionals face the challenge of recognizing and negotiating 
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difference in amorous relationships. However, what are surely two of the most decisive 
moments in any film, the beginning and the end, take place in taşra. I deem that such 
insertions of taşra (especially at such key moments) into an urban film about coupledom 
are not incidental and that taşra carries a much more decisive function in the film than as 
an ancillary setting. As a concrete location, as a place of peripherality and marginality, 
taşra is mobilized figuratively, too, to allude to the couple’s exhausted relationship as 
well as to İsa’s depleted affective state.  
From one perspective, then, the film draws from taşra’s received codifications as a 
space of destitution and stagnation to convey affective circumstances. However, it 
diverges from these understandings in one significant way: it tackles taşra as a descriptor 
of the intimate/internal world of the urban characters rather than as a distant, external 
place of deprivation outside the city. Put differently, Climates interiorizes taşra, and in so 
doing complicates and alters the conventional understandings of its spatial dimension as 
an “outside.”  
Nowhere is this interiorization more striking than in the way that Climates tampers 
with notions of immutability and repetition that are commonly associated with the 
temporality of taşra. In the film “empty repetition” (repetition of the same) is cast as 
something that pertains not to the actual place of taşra, but primarily to the psychic 
landscape of an urban character who is ensnared in a loop of destitution and discontent. 
At the same time, whenever taşra appears as a concrete place, it appears as the only place 
where any real movement and meaningful transformation occurs. The temporal meaning 
of taşra is thus recast and even scrambled: an urban character is caught in the loop of the 
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empty repetition conventionally marking this non-urban location, while the geographical 
location itself becomes infused with the possibility of change. In light of such emphases, 
the title of the film gains a complex meaning. While “Climates” may at first seem ill-
suited for a film that follows the seasonal cycle—a film where narrative development is 
aligned with the passing of seasons—as the story unfolds, it becomes clearer that the title 
is not adopted simply as a more poetic reference to cyclic weather conditions. It alludes 
instead to long-standing pressures and hard-to-change patterns that organize the 
characters’ internal worlds—a kind of return within the urban subject of what that subject 
has historically projected and abjected as external-taşra. 
Climates starts in the summer when the couple is on vacation together in Kaş, a 
small, tourist taşra town on the Mediterranean. In these opening scenes at an 
archaeological site, the camera primarily follows Bahar. A long, close-up shot of her 
face, as she pensively observes İsa from a distance, is the first image on the screen. 
Shortly afterwards, as we watch Bahar watch İsa from afar, while he is taking pictures of 
the ruins, she quietly becomes unhinged: she first nervously smiles, then suddenly grows 
serious, somewhat bitter and angry until finally tears start to run down her cheeks. The 
image of her teary eyes juxtaposed against the background of the ruins is an initial 
suggestion of the impending end of the relationship. The juxtaposition itself, meanwhile, 
signals that shift in meaning I have described, in which taşra becomes a space less of 
stagnation than of the only movement in the film—a movement indicated by the tears that 
presage the dissolution of the couple’s relationship. 
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The extent of the couple’s romantic strife is revealed, first subtly, in the tense 
silence that fills their hotel room, which contains two separate beds, and then more 
forcefully through a cringingly uncomfortable scene in which İsa and Bahar engage in 
mutual tongue-lashing at a dinner with their friends in Kaş. To dissipate the tension that 
hangs over the dinner table, İsa engages in a conversation that at the time sounds like 
small talk, but that, in my reading of the film, acquires more substance in retrospect. He 
asks his friend who lives in Kaş if life is “interesting” there. The friend complains that 
“it’s boring,” and “besides the favourable climate, there’s nothing else. If only we had 
more people—friends like you, why don’t you visit more often?” Such a reply might 
seem at first glance to confirm the conventional association of taşra with boredom and 
stasis. 
Yet rather than merely confirming that association, this first summer section also 
establishes how boredom and dullness are afflictions that consume the main couple’s 
relationship. Throughout this sequence, the couple is framed in ways that evoke the 
distance between them—rather than lovers on vacation they look and act as if they are 
two strangers who were coerced into spending time together. They hardly ever talk to 
each other and when they do, their conversation gravely lacks in vivacity and genuine 
interest in the other. In this context, I find it important to note that in contradistinction to 
the recent cinematic depictions of taşra as a haven that offers comfort and restoration of 
harmony to distraught urban characters—depictions that have been problematized, as I 
mentioned, by film scholars and critics—the taşra of this first segment of the film is 
where distress, discontentment and discord surge up and explode. It is, at last, in taşra 
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that the languid relationship obtains energy and movement even though such movement 
brings about its dissolution.  
The lead-up to the dramatic break-up scene takes place on a deserted beach and is 
composed of two segments which correspond respectively to Bahar’s and İsa’s points of 
view on the relationship. The first segment starts with a close-up shot of Bahar’s face, 
covered in sweat. Her sweating, as is soon revealed, has less to do with the heat than with 
the dream she is having. In the dream, İsa first tells Bahar that he loves her and then 
buries her face under the sand. Terrified, Bahar wakes up, only to recall the equally 
chilling reality of a partner who, in complete disregard of her evident distress, scolds her 
for falling asleep under the sun. Disconcertedly, she walks towards the shore and stares at 
the sea, which, in contrast to the claustrophobic sensation of the previous scene with İsa 
(transmitted to the audience through the tight angles and close-up shots of the characters’ 
faces, the sweating and the heat that flood the diegetic space), expands boundlessly 
before her eyes. Indeed, in this whole segment, the insistent juxtapositions of wide-angle 
shots of the landscape and the sea with the close-up shots of the characters accentuate 
their entrapment in a failing relationship but also the looming possibility of breaking out 
of it. 
The second segment begins with a close-up of İsa talking, expressing his wish to 
end the relationship. The editing of this segment interlaces his “real” break-up talk with 
his “rehearsal” of it, making it impossible to distinguish between the two.56 In both cases 
                                                          
56 İsa is shown talking to himself while Bahar is swimming. The camera focuses on his face as he is 
trying to figure out his lines for the break-up speech. Yet, when the camera moves out from İsa’s face, 
while he is still talking, we see Bahar sitting next to him and hence cannot tell which parts of İsa’s speech 
Bahar actually heard.  
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İsa’s speech is equally contrived and armored. One thing viewers know for sure is that İsa 
ends up telling Bahar, in one form or another, that he wants a separation. Although the 
conversation between them is terse, it still exposes how the couple had been caught in 
repeated quarrels that they were unable to resolve, particularly over İsa’s infidelity, which 
he refers to as an “insignificant event.” Bahar’s initial response to all that İsa says is one 
of agitated-calm. Her subdued anger and resentment towards his patronizing cruelty and 
her resistance to letting go of the relationship (despite her own suffocation in it, as the 
previous dream scene illustrates) are revealed in the next scene, when Bahar tries to cause 
an accident as they are riding back from the beach on a motorbike. On a deserted 
mountain road, with barren lands on one side, and the open sea on the other, İsa and 
Bahar jostle one another after they recover from the initial shock of the accident. In a 
sobbing fit, Bahar leaves on foot as İsa screams after her in rage.  
I have spent some time on the plot elements of these opening scenes in order to 
stress two things. First, while the scenes are enormously disturbing in their chronicling of 
the relationship’s dissolution, they also point paradoxically to the possibility of that 
relationship becoming “unstuck”—moving beyond compulsive repetition and reprisal. 
This is a point to which I return. Second, in situating this moment of crisis as well as the 
lead-up to it in taşra, the film draws a connection between the place of taşra and the 
characters’ stuckness in a stagnant relationship. By way of its dominant, pre-1980s 
figuration as a domain of insipidity and barrenness, taşra indeed resonates with the 
conditions of the couple’s lifeless and vacuous relationship, arrested in chronic disputes 
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that do not get resolved—even as it also becomes the site where a kind of “resolution” 
becomes possible. 
For the marginal conditions of taşra, its distance from the center, precipitate in İsa 
a recognition that his own life is marginal and peripheral and spurs his decision to end the 
relationship. The film invites such a reading by sequencing the break-up after the dinner 
scene with friends. The friend’s description of taşra life as “boring” and empty disquiets 
İsa. This is a moment of realization that the life he leads in what is considered a bustling 
metropolis uncannily resembles his friend’s in taşra. Inhabiting taşra, even temporarily, 
exposes the fragility of the border between inside (city) and outside (taşra), rendering his 
current circumstances intolerable. In this regard, ending the relationship appears to him as 
one immediate way out of dissatisfaction, out of the “stuckness” and emptiness that have 
come to be his life. As he later on suggests to a different friend, İsa believes that being 
single and independent will deliver the fulfilling life that he has always desired. 
Yet, the break-up does not change much in İsa’s life. Neither his work nor his 
personal life appear to provide him with the contentment he seeks. Just as before, he is 
unable to make headway on his research for an associate professorship. He is not only 
stuck in the project, but he seems to have lost interest in and motivation for it. The project 
has become a burden that he wishes “to rid [himself] of.” In his personal life, too, he 
suffers from an inability to imagine change and difference. Upon returning to Istanbul he 
undermines the possibility of a “new beginning” after the break-up by moving 
“backward” instead, into an affair with Serap, the fiancée of one of his friends with 
whom he had already had a fling while with Bahar. The affair is not only futureless—as 
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neither İsa nor Serap indicate interest in a long-term relationship with each other—but it 
is also driven mainly by a toxic power struggle. Yet, perhaps it is precisely the absence of 
future prospects that surreptitiously appeals to İsa about the relationship. Not having to 
think about a beyond releases a person from his/her obligations to the other while 
quelling the anxiety around uncertainty, the fear of disappointment, injury and failure. 
İsa’s relationship with Serap is safe in this particular sense and facilitates the pleasures of 
instant gratification in its exclusion of future-orientation.  
The affair with Serap is one symptom of the peculiarity of İsa’s relationship to 
others. That mode of relation is perhaps best described as a refusal of connection and a 
commitment to isolation. İsa is rarely shown interacting with others. Except for the few 
secretive meetings with Serap, casual exchanges he has with his colleague at school (with 
whom he shares an office and occasionally plays tennis), the visit to the friend in taşra 
(whom he has not seen in years) and the afflicted relationship with Bahar, he lives a life 
of solitude. Furthermore, his mode in these relatively “close” engagements as well as in 
the sporadic, more quotidian ones is one of detachment, cynicism and indifference. His 
conversations are marked by a quality of sarcasm, boredom and disgruntlement. He 
repeatedly teases his colleague (who is about to get married) either about the tedium and 
petty bickering that await him in married life or about how he will crush him in the next 
tennis match. His “connection” to others thus evinces a kind of antipathy to connection, 
an aggressive competitiveness and disparagement that confirms rather than alleviating his 
isolation. 
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The extent of İsa’s self-involvement and misanthropy is most vividly exposed 
towards the end of the film, through his treatment of a cab driver who takes him around 
the historical sites in Ağrı, a taşra city in eastern Turkey. While taking pictures of the 
sites for his research project, İsa asks the driver to pose for him, with rather firm and 
crass orders, because he wants a “figure” to complement his composition of the shot. The 
driver then asks if he could have a copy of the picture. Bothered by such a request, İsa 
suggests he go to a local photographer if he wants a picture of himself. When the driver 
refuses to be deterred, İsa takes the piece of paper with the driver’s address on it, only to 
throw it away in the next scene when he is alone. Others seem to be for İsa not people 
with their own feelings, thoughts, needs and expectations but more like hollow figures 
with functions—functions that they ought to perform submissively, without delay, 
inquiry or challenge, to satisfy his immediate needs.     
İsa is not the first of such characters in Ceylan’s cinema. Muzaffer in Clouds of 
May (1999), Mahmut in Distant (2002) and to a certain extent Doctor Cemal in Once 
Upon a Time in Anatolia (2011) are all embodiments of a particular modern, urban, 
educated, middle-/upper-middle class male subject of post-1980 Turkey whose principal 
relational mode to the world is one of exploitative cynicism and detachment. One way to 
make sense of this new male subjectivity is to think of it as an effect of the loss of 
grounding that the military coup occasioned; of the integration into global capitalism that 
took place in this period; and of the unravelling of a particular fantasy of masculine 
power constructed on notions of mastery, authority, self-sufficiency, and invulnerability.  
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In an essay on the cultural and political climate of post-1980 Turkey, Nurdan 
Gürbilek describes the situation as the “bankruptcy” of the ideology of (collective) 
promise. As she elaborates: “However crude or hypocritical, authoritarian Kemalism has 
always included within itself a promise of modernization and civilization [for the 
people]” (2007: 107, my translation). That is to say that, despite repressive practices, the 
Kemalist project of modernization managed to sustain legitimacy in the eyes of the 
people partly through the promise of prosperity and welfare for all—even though this was 
a promise whose realization was constantly deferred to some future time. In this sense, 
satisfaction of collective desires—like social justice, economic equality, equal access to 
basic services, etc.—was deemed possible and only a matter of time and perseverance. As 
Gürbilek implies, this was partly why Kemalism’s elitist paternalism and suppression, as 
well as the forms of privation that particularly affected the lower classes and those 
outside the centers, were more or less tolerated; for individual sacrifice was regarded as 
necessary until the collective dream, so to speak, was realized.  
With the 1980 coup, however, a shift took place in this ideological configuration. 
Prior to the coup, not only were the state and its institutions—the deliverers of the 
promise—in crisis, but political instability, large scale unemployment, steep inflation and 
failure in the implementation of necessary social and economic reforms created massive 
social unrest. This in turn fueled violent encounters between right-wing and left-wing 
political groups and organizations. Patently, the paradigm of “deferred promises” was 
exhausted. What replaced it was, first, the draconian military rule—unfettered and 
unaccountable state violence—and then, as the structural adjustment policies came into 
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effect, the rule of the market. While the violence of the latter was less easily discernible 
than the former, its psychic effects were more diffuse and extensive, affecting peoples of 
all political affiliation, class identification, ethnicity, and religious attachments.  
What Gürbilek identifies as the bankruptcy of the ideology of promise in the 
particular context of Turkey is evocative of what Todd McGowan (2004) conceptualizes, 
within a broader framework, as the transition from “a society of prohibition of 
enjoyment” to “a society of commanded enjoyment” in the age of global capitalism. I 
want to elaborate a bit on McGowan’s deliberations for they help us understand the 
connections between the kind of affective crisis that İsa embodies in the film and the 
transformations of global capitalism. These discussions will also be pertinent as I explain 
how the narcissism that global capitalism cultivates and encourages leads to the 
metropolitan subject’s unsettling experience of himself inhabited by the taşra he seeks to 
expel.   
According to McGowan, the society of prohibition, which includes traditional as 
well as modern societies organized under earlier forms of capitalism, 
[…] required subjects to renounce their private enjoyment in the name of social 
duty, [whereas] today [in the society of commanded enjoyment] the only duty 
seems to consist in enjoying oneself as much as possible. […] This marks a 
dramatic change in the way the social order is constituted: rather than being tied 
together through a shared sacrifice, subjects exist side by side in their isolated 
enclaves of enjoyment (2004: 2).  
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Through a Lacanian theoretical framework, McGowan explains that a society of 
prohibition does not aim at eradicating enjoyment altogether, but at regulating it through 
the Law of sacrifice. Subjects in this society are asked to give up something—total, 
private, individual enjoyment—for the sake of the whole. In return, they not only gain 
access to the symbolic order, but at the same time acquire recognition from it: “one gains 
recognition to the extent that one obeys [the Law of sacrifice…] In this sense, recognition 
signifies repression: the more recognition one receives, the more one has to give up to 
repression” (26). As such, the society of prohibition steers the subject towards the Other, 
the larger social order, in his/her search for recognition.  
This is not the only way that the subject is oriented towards an engagement with 
the Other. Besides recognition from the Other, desire is “what one gets in exchange for 
the sacrifice of one’s enjoyment” (16). Insofar as desire is an effect of “sustained 
dissatisfaction,” or of enjoying oneself only partially, the society of prohibition, through 
the Law of sacrifice, produces desiring subjects who “experience themselves as lacking 
[and] they look to the Other for what they are missing […] It is the subjects’ inability to 
enjoy completely that directs them to the Other, that creates a desire for what the social 
order seems to have hidden within its recesses” (16-17). In this regard, prohibition, in a 
paradoxical manner, carries the unintended potential of producing an “incipiently 
political subject” since “dissatisfaction carries the seeds of political dissent and of a 
desire to change the structure of social order” (137).  
In contradistinction to the society of prohibition, the society of enjoyment 
commands that subjects enjoy themselves to the full. Put differently, the law of sacrifice 
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is downplayed or obscured to the extent that the social order purportedly promises direct 
access to full enjoyment. Immediate and fully satisfactory (yet always imaginary) private 
enjoyment is primary. This new economy of enjoyment has a series of effects on subject-
constitution as well as on the subject’s relationship to the Other. As McGowan explains, 
because the sacrifice that one has to make to (“really”) enjoy remains inconspicuous to 
the subject, it creates the semblance that one can enjoy without having to sacrifice. In this 
sense, the society of enjoyment provides “imaginary enjoyment” (imaginary because it 
obscures the impossibility of total enjoyment) and an “illusory” sense of satisfaction and 
completeness.57 When “subjects become increasingly incapable of experiencing 
dissatisfaction as constitutive for social existence,” engagement with the larger social 
order diminishes (138, my emphasis). The personal and the private attain more and more 
significance as the subject recoils from the realm of the Other. Consequently, the idea 
                                                          
57 The concept of “imaginary enjoyment” in McGowan’s usage draws from the Lacanian register 
of the Imaginary as the domain of specular images and the ego. Similar to the way the Imaginary provides 
the subject with an image of a unified, centered, complete self that s/he otherwise lacks, it also acts as a site 
that “allows the subject to visualize the enjoyment it lacks” (McGowan, 2004: 18). McGowan sees a 
complementary relationship between the dominance of the image (over the word) in the age of global 
capitalism and the increasing power of the Imaginary over the Symbolic in the society of enjoyment.  
Imaginary enjoyment also takes place in the society of prohibition. Indeed, it is one of the ways in 
which a social order founded on prohibition sustains itself. It is through imaginary enjoyment that subjects 
find a “safe outlet for enjoyment” that is denied in the symbolic (18). What distinguishes society of 
prohibition from that of enjoyment, however, is the shift in the status of imaginary enjoyment. While in the 
former, it functions as a supplement/aid to the social order, in the latter imaginary enjoyment does not only 
gain dominance but is “actively promoted” (21). As McGowan further elaborates: 
[in a society of enjoyment] we no longer experience the symbolic order taking its “bite” of 
enjoyment out of us, the extraction of its “entry fee.” Nonetheless, the symbolic order continues in 
its constitutive role in our lives, though we become increasingly unable to experience it. This 
change in our experience allows us to imagine ourselves enjoying—not bound by the symbolic 
strictures that once deprived people of enjoyment. This enjoyment that we experience, however, is 
only the image of enjoyment, an imagined enjoyment […] the society of enjoyment thrives on 
imaginary enjoyment (40).   
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that change ensues from making adjustments and modifications on the private/personal 
level becomes dominant. 
As McGowan demonstrates in his comprehensive study, the results of all this on 
individual experience are narcissism, a certain kind of cynical posturing and political 
detachment. From within this theoretical framework, İsa’s narcissistic and desensitized 
demeanour does not seem as inexplicable as some critics (such as Süalp) have argued, as 
it is a symptom of the shift in the enjoyment economy that transpires with Turkey’s 
integration into global capitalism. Climates is insightful precisely in this regard: it renders 
visible, on the subjective level, the predicaments of the new social arrangements of 
enjoyment. As I explain below, taşra functions as a central, imaginative motif in the film 
that conjures these psychic effects of capitalist integration in post-1980s Turkey.   
İsa’s attempts ultimately fail at generating a substantial change in his life. They fail 
because these attempts have little if any bearing on the structure of his relation to others. 
Involving mainly modifications in the personal, private sphere and requiring minimal 
engagement with the outside social world, they continue to support and sustain the 
narcissistic isolation he is wrapped up in. Although these efforts seem to provide him 
with some immediate, imaginary enjoyment, he keeps returning to a state of non-
fulfilment. Hence he is caught in a repetitious cycle. His narcissism and cynicism which 
on the one hand prevent him from forming close, responsive, caring relationships with 
others, are on the other sources of imaginary enjoyment. Indeed, cynicism, through the 
claim of mastery (or, disavowal of non-knowledge and lack) can feed into narcissism in 
the way it recalls the image of a self-sufficient and independent subject. In the particular 
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case of Turkey, where integration into global capitalism coincided with a tyrannical 
military rule that exacerbated the sense of emasculation, cynicism has also become an 
indirect means to claim the tenets of a baleful masculinity, especially amongst the 
urbanized, educated, middle/upper-middle class men. 
The concluding winter section of Climates lays bare the workings of this cynical, 
narcissistic male subjectivity that İsa embodies, as well as the structure of compulsive 
repetition that he is trapped in. The section shows how even the inversion by which taşra 
becomes the site of potential movement fails to facilitate such movement, and does so 
because the urban male embodies subjective, degraded versions of the qualities formerly 
associated with taşra. In this last segment, İsa flies to Ağrı, a small, impoverished taşra 
city in eastern Turkey, in the hopes of reconciling with Bahar, who has been working on 
a film set there. Two scenes are significant in gauging the motivation behind this sudden 
decision. The first one involves a conversation he has with Serap in which he learns that 
Bahar is out of town. İsa is visibly disturbed when, after a barrage of questions to Serap, 
he finds out that everyone except him knows where Bahar is and what she is doing. Not 
knowing puts him out of his element, but also entails a bruising of his self-image. As 
Serap rubs his face in his “ignorance”—“you really didn’t know? How come you don’t 
know?”—his masculine confidence slowly dissolves. This is partly why he ends up in 
Ağrı: to replenish his tarnished sense of self, to regain mastery. This is also why he spies 
on Bahar for a long time in Ağrı before talking to her. He watches her all day from a 
distance as if to make sure no potential secret of hers remains uncovered; he wants to 
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have a total grasp of her current existence (to know and see all) so as to forestall any 
surprises that may divulge his vulnerability.             
The second scene, which follows immediately after the one with Serap, entails 
another conversation; this time with his colleague at work. As İsa is looking through a 
travel guide for beach resorts, he expresses his intentions to travel alone to a faraway, 
warm place for the upcoming term-break. His friend questions the pleasures of travelling 
alone, suggesting that when he is on his own he experiences such places as “vacuous and 
kind of empty;” he gets “bored” and is “overcome by a sense of meaninglessness.” This 
conversation echoes the one at the beginning of the film where another friend of İsa’s 
described his experience of taşra as a “boring” and empty place unless there are friends 
around to share life with. Once again, words like “vacuous,” “empty,” 
“meaninglessness,” and “boredom” seem to unsettle İsa. Just as the first encounter with 
these signifiers disturbed him (because they were much too evocative of the conditions of 
his own life) and incited his decision to break up with Bahar so as to introduce movement 
into his life, this second encounter also disconcerts him. Thus, instead of going on his 
“dream vacation” on some Caribbean beach, he lands in the taşra city of Ağrı in the 
middle of a snow storm.  
While such a move whets the viewer’s appetite for a happy ending—i.e., a 
regretful İsa decides to change, finds his estranged partner to demonstrate how he can 
become a loving, caring partner and the couple re-unites—the film does not humor such 
illusions about what constitutes change. Instead, it remains committed to the notion that 
unless subjects recognize their vital attachment to others—which is played down in the 
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society of enjoyment/global capitalism where subjects come to believe and act like they 
are independent, self-sufficient individuals—no real transformation of their existing 
conditions is possible. In this sense, the political efficacy of Climates also lies in its 
refraining from offering facile solutions to structural, systemic problems. Its ingenuity 
resides in showing (as opposed to resolving) the workings as well as the strictures of a 
particular subjectivity that the changing circumstances of post-1980s Turkey have 
produced. This subjectivity, as I have intimated, “contains” within itself what the 
metropolitan subject has hitherto disparaged as desolate, barren, boring and inert and 
projected onto taşra.  
Climates ends in a way that draws attention to İsa’s inability to change, to his 
entrapment in a compulsive repetition that erodes transformation. In Ağrı, he asks Bahar 
for a “second chance.” He tells her how much he has changed, that he is now ready to 
settle down and bring up a family with her, make sacrifices, and “give up on all worldly 
pleasures.” “I swear there’s nothing I want for me in this life,” he declares, “I know I’ll 
succeed in making you happy […] I’m ready to leave Istanbul if necessary and move to 
another place with you […] What do you say? Just leave this job and come back with 
me.” What I find striking in these implorations is İsa’s inability to see their 
contradictions. His understanding of reconciliation ultimately requires Bahar’s 
submission to his terms and conditions. While on the one hand he is promising to 
accommodate her wishes and desires, on the other hand he does not show any interest in 
hearing what these wishes and desires might be. Instead, he assumes he knows what she 
wants and demands (more than once) that she suspend her life so that he can give her 
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what he presumes to know she desires. From the start, he also covertly associates having 
the kind of relationship Bahar wants with a life devoid of pleasure for him. In such a 
staging, while İsa gets the starring role—either as the master or the martyr—Bahar 
appears only as an extra through whom İsa feeds his narcissism. Put differently, despite 
him claiming the opposite, what İsa says and how he frames it actually revolves around 
himself. The idea that amorous relationships involve two people escapes him. Indeed, it is 
quite revealing that in his whole “spiel” towards recuperating his relationship with Bahar, 
İsa does not once enunciate the phrase “I love you” which, besides indicating a 
commitment, on a very basic level is a recognition of the separate being of the other. 
Engrossed in himself, İsa appropriates and treats his relationship with Bahar mainly as a 
source of narcissistic supply. As such he is unable to fathom a relationship through which 
two people construct a new life together, “from the point of view of Two, and not One.”58 
Beyond one that perpetuates the affirmation of the self-same, he cannot envision the 
                                                          
58 See Badiou, 2012. Climates can indeed be read as a complex gloss on Badiou’s conceptualization 
of love as harboring a potential to “[re-invent] life […] from the perspective of difference [rather than] 
identity” (Badiou, 22, 33). According to Badiou, love is a “process” that “takes place over time” and 
through which a new world is “constructed” from “a decentered point of view other than of my mere 
impulse to survive or re-affirm my own identity” (25): 
Love isn’t simply about two people meeting and their inward-looking relationship: it is a 
construction, a life that is being made, no longer from the perspective of One but from the 
perspective of Two (29). 
Rather than understanding love as a “fusion of two souls into one” (“the romantic interpretation” which 
remains committed to the idea of One), Badiou develops an understanding of love that retains the 
difference of the subjectivities of the parties involved (30-31). In this sense he insists on the idea that love 
“involves a disjunction between two people” and not a fusion or a synthesis. Indeed, it is the creative ways 
in which the challenge by difference is handled by two people that lend love its transforming potential. 
Evidently, such transformation is possible only through “[going] beyond the narcissistic,” through an 
openness to the other’s difference as well as to the risks, uncertainties and contingencies that “re-
fashioning” a new life from the perspective of difference entails (19; 28).  
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possibility of a new, fulfilling, pleasurable yet necessarily altered life (for both of them), 
one that is created and nourished through difference. 
As the following scene illustrates more clearly, there is no room in İsa’s proposal 
for negotiation either. He is equally intolerant of delay or waiting. Therefore, when, after 
initially rejecting him, Bahar visits İsa in his hotel room at night, perhaps with a snippet 
of hope that this time they can work things out, it is already too late. This segment of 
silent images of blurry, fragmented body parts—close-up images of İsa’s hand stroking 
Bahar’s hair, her eye, a pair of hands, and arms—while suggesting some intimacy also 
portends a brokenness that cannot be pieced together. In the morning when Bahar wakes 
up and joyfully shares with İsa her “very beautiful dream,” in which she is flying over 
green meadows on a sunny day, blissfully waving at her long-dead mother, İsa remains 
unresponsive and wooden, repeating the same affect he projected after Bahar woke up 
from her dream of suffocation at the beginning of the film. On the one hand, the sequence 
is remarkably somber in its depiction of İsa’s “stuckness” in impudent indifference, in an 
abiding incapacity to share or participate in the other’s experience. On the other hand, it 
is also strangely elated in the way it implies that Bahar—whose flight distinguishes her 
both from the dead mother in this dream and from her own “deadened” self, as signified 
in the first dream through her burial—now has the aptitude to liberate herself from a 
stifling relationship.  
What at first sight might seem like a bewildering volte-face in İsa’s behaviour is 
actually consistent with the structure of narcissistic subjectivity I have described. To the 
extent that Bahar retreats from being a readily and immediately available object for İsa’s 
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narcissistic appropriation, she loses her appeal for him. İsa is put off by Bahar’s having a 
life of her own with joys, commitments and responsibilities that she is unwilling, or at 
least reluctant, simply to give up for him without deliberation. The curt and barbed 
remark he makes in response to Bahar’s telling of her dream, about how she should not 
be late for work, is suggestive of his resentment for the basic fact that Bahar has a 
separate life. İsa reverts back to his accustomed ways of indifference and withdraws into 
the comforts of narcissistic reclusion, when he encounters the challenge of difference and 
the impediments or delays obstructing his need of instant gratification. Despite the claims 
he made the day before about how much he had changed, how he now felt determined to 
accommodate her wishes and make her happy, these last scenes in Ağrı make it evident 
that he has not changed much at all. 
The film ends with a long, close-up shot of Bahar. This image of her, with a sad 
look as a tear runs down her cheek, is almost identical to the opening shot. Taking into 
account the second dream sequence in particular, I suggest that for Bahar this repeated 
tear no longer signifies anger, frustration, and the resistance to letting go that the tears in 
opening shot of the film implied, but instead expresses a mournful acceptance of 
separation. In this sense, she seems to have gone through a transformation, the details of 
which the film, perhaps to its detriment, omits. For İsa’s story, however, which is central 
to the film, the repeated image of Bahar’s dejected face takes on a different meaning. 
Through an ending that repeats the beginning, I see the film to be enacting İsa’s stuckness 
in repetition. The sense of stagnation evoked by the reiterated image is reinforced also 
through the film’s return to taşra at the end. This is not to suggest that the film associates 
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the literal, geographical space of taşra with repetition and immutability. Insofar as taşra 
connotes notions of isolation, detachment, vacuity, lack of vigor and desire, the film 
suggests that in the age of global capitalism one’s actual location ceases to be the sole 
determinant of feeling/experiencing taşra. In approximating the experience of the 
metropolis (or the five-star beach resort) to that of taşra, Climates implies that the term 
no longer stands for only the distant and impoverished small town, but also for a detached 
and destitute self. A subject mired in cloistered narcissism—retreated inwards, confined 
to the private realm and disconnected from others; a subject shrunk and stunted by apathy 
and indifference, whose desire is suspended on account of an inability to let go of 
imaginary plenitude and the fantasy of self-sufficiency and invulnerability—such a 
subject is at heart a subject reimagined as taşra-incarnate.  
 
IV.2. Three Monkeys: Taşra within the City 
Ceylan’s next film Three Monkeys, which was released two years after Climates in 
2008, diverged in two significant ways from his earlier work. As Suner notes, prior to 
Three Monkeys Ceylan’s oeuvre has always had a distinctive “autobiographical aspect” to 
it (2011: 16). Whether in terms of their setting (taşra towns Ceylan grew up in, or his 
own apartment in Istanbul), their cast (his family, friends, wife and himself) or the larger 
socio-economic and cultural world they depicted (bourgeois, professional), Ceylan’s 
earlier films drew from and built upon material that was familiar to him. In Three 
Monkeys, however, Ceylan forgoes all such autobiographical reference points. Not only 
are the leading characters portrayed by professional actors, but more significantly, they 
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belong to a different class than and have a thoroughly different habitus from that of 
Ceylan and his archetypal characters. The main figures in Three Monkeys are not the 
educated, middle/upper-middle class urbanites whose stifling lives constituted the focus 
of most of Ceylan’s films heretofore, but members of an underclass, immigrant family 
who try to survive and invent a new life for themselves at the fringes of the big city.   
The second major novelty of Three Monkeys is the absence of a literal taşra in the 
film. While with Distant and especially with Climates Ceylan’s cinema had already 
moved into the city, taşra still appeared in these films visually, even if primarily as a 
reference point to enable the conjuration of its metaphorical elaborations and invoke  
affective circumstances. The disappearance of taşra in Three Monkeys from ocular view, 
however, does not mean that the concept of taşra drops out of Ceylan’s work. Indeed, I 
argue that taşra is embodied in the immigrant family within the city. The mark of taşra is 
inscribed onto their existence in Istanbul through their physical, socio-economic and 
cultural positioning in the city. To elaborate this point, a revisiting of some of the ideas I 
put forward in the first chapter concerning the configuration of taşra-center relations in 
post-1980s Turkey is necessary.  
As discussed in that chapter, the domestic migration from the peripheries into the 
cities that started in the 1950s has accelerated immensely since 1980s, mostly because of 
structural adjustment policies that caused unemployment rates in the peripheries to soar. 
Elimination of agricultural subsidies, introduction of the competition of transnational 
agribusiness, and downsizing of public sectors are some of the reasons behind large-scale 
unemployment. The civil war conditions in the eastern regions have also forced massive 
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numbers of people (predominantly Kurdish) to move into the large cities in the western 
part of the country. Economic growth in the centers, on the other hand, lagged far behind 
the population growth, unable to equably accommodate (in both senses of the word) the 
labor surplus under the existing system. The result, as we have witnessed in urban spaces 
all around the world under the conditions of global capitalism, was “the development of 
massive class inequalities in employment, education, security, housing, and ‘the right to 
the city’” (Balibar, 2007: 57).59  
What concerns me most for my purposes here, however, are the implications of 
these developments on the already existing tension between taşra and center. What 
happens, for instance, when a spatially, temporally, culturally distanced other “becomes 
unidentifiable as a result of transgressing borders, which otherwise are essential in 
maintaining social order”? (Yeğenoğlu, 2012: 36) What happens when what has so long 
been cast out and marginalized is dislodged from its assigned place on the outside and 
arrives on the inside?  
Such destabilization of boundaries found one immediate, material expression in the 
re-organization of urban space—in the reinscription of “borders,” in new and different 
ways, within the city. The expansion of gecekondu districts (squatter settlements) and the 
formation of new inner city neighbourhoods represent the new face of demarcation within 
the city. As sites of ethnic exclusion and economic marginality, these areas have become 
what Balibar, in the context of French banlieues, describes as “a frontier, a border-area, 
a frontline” in the way they “form a periphery at the very center of the great metropolitan 
                                                          
59 Also see Davis, 2006.  
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areas. [They materialize] the displacement of frontiers toward the center” (2007: 48).60 In 
this context, writing about the changing faces of taşra in post-1980s Turkey, Bora states 
that while taşra as small town might have started to decline in this period, the cities have 
become provincialized (taşralaşmak): 
We see the face of taşra no longer only in the remote towns of the Anatolian 
steppes, but in the most modern and ‘worldly-wise’ locations […] This is the 
eternal ordeal of Turkish modernization: the urban culture lacks the power and 
‘quality’ to absorb a large population that flows, at a great speed, from taşra. The 
result is the spilling over of taşra into the city. To put it in ordinary language, 
Istanbul now contains a Sivas [a provincial city in central Turkey] bigger than Sivas 
itself (2005: 40, my translation).  
The problem, however, does not consist simply in an inability to “absorb” the surplus 
population, but in how the city deals with—what it does with—these bodies who already 
bear the mark of undesirability by virtue of their taşra origins. Subjected to the double 
discrimination of classism and cultural racism, and relegated to the gecekondu and inner 
city neighborhoods, these bodies are neither fully outside nor inside the city (Balibar, 
2007). They are “not outside” not simply because they reside within the city, but also 
because they cannot be totally excluded from its self-understanding, as they contribute to 
the economy of the city often as precarious labor (in both formal and informal sectors) 
                                                          
60 The colonial history of France has much to do with the formation of the contemporary banlieues 
that Balibar talks about as their occupants are mostly postcolonial immigrants from former colonies. In this 
sense, Turkish gecekondus and French banlieues have their own particular historical conditions of 
existence. However, structurally, they can be perceived as the local symptoms/projections of shared global 
phenomena such as “the accelerated deterioration of urban environment and public services, massive long-
term unemployment, ethnic and geographic stigmatization” (Balibar, 2007: 50) 
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and as consumers. They are neither inside, however, because they are denied full rights of 
a citizen to the city, at the very least on the basic level of access to public services. 
Indeed, access to even fundamental necessities—such as electricity and water—is 
difficult and often requires the use of illegitimate means in some of these peripheral 
neighborhoods within the city. What these circumstances engender, in turn, is a new and 
egregious social category of the “internally excluded.” In Balibar’s description this 
category corresponds to those groups who are constituted as “eternally displaced (out of 
place).” They are: 
‘pariahs,’ not in the sense the term had in its original context (a ‘caste’ outside the 
system of legitimate castes) but that it acquired in modern Western society […]: 
groups that find themselves denied, in principle or in fact, the right to have rights 
(that of having them or having the use of them, and above all that of claiming 
them) (2007: 57).         
In this respect, I maintain that the taşra that figures in Three Monkeys is one that tallies 
with the category of “internally-excluded.” What the film brings to view is this new 
incarnation of taşra—embodied in the immigrant family—as a frontier within the urban 
space in post-1980s Turkey.  
One of the first key pointers of the family’s condition of internal-exclusion lies in 
the location of their apartment. Situated by the old city walls, in a low-income 
neighbourhood of Yedikule, the apartment is on the top floor of an extremely narrow 
building, which looks like it is on the verge of immanent collapse. Train tracks that run 
right in front of the building, separating it from a major artery which connects the city to 
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the main airport, draw attention to the banlieue status of the location. Inside, the space is 
claustrophobic: crammed with old furniture under very low ceilings, the rooms spread 
over onto each other which hardly ever permits privacy. Ceylan’s use of interior light and 
color (what Suner (2011) refers as “sickly” tones of green and yellow) further establishes 
the sense of isolation and deprivation that envelops the family.  
Intriguingly, this apartment with a dark and depressing interior has an unrestricted, 
wide and beautiful view of the open sea from the living room and the terrace. I read this 
rather curious juxtaposition of restriction and expansion to be indicative of the 
paradoxical logic of internal exclusion—of the way in which the family, while 
structurally integral to the functioning of the city life (particularly through labor and 
consumption), cannot partake in that life as a shareholder. Even though they are not 
“formally” excluded from the city, they occupy a place of mere onlookers. All they can 
do is to watch from a distance the breathtaking view of the sea, the passing of trains, cars 
and planes as this luring, energetic and dynamic life unfolds before their eyes in oblivion 
to their existence.61 The film’s particular positioning of the family within the city, in 
close proximity to technologies of mobility, to which they have limited or no access, also 
highlights more palpably their (socio-economic) immobility.     
 It is the desire to move from this state of immobility and “partial” inclusion to 
mobility and full inclusion that propels Eyüp, the father, to assume a crime he did not 
commit. When his boss Servet sleeps at the wheel one night, killing a pedestrian and 
                                                          
61 This echoes Gürbilek’s idea that living in taşra means living a life in the shadow of “the 
promising lights that flicker in the distance. There is a world out there that waits and beckons [one].” The 
lights invoke hope at the same time as they indicate a life that one is withheld from yet some others are 
believed to enjoy (1995: 56, my translation). 
161 
 
fleeing the scene in panic, he pleads with his private chauffeur Eyüp to take the rap for 
him. In Servet’s entrepreneurially-geared rationality, this is a situation that can be 
resolved through a basic cost-benefit calculation: Given the upcoming elections in which 
Servet is running for office, his political career would be over even before it began if his 
involvement in the fatal accident became public, whereas Eyüp does not really have 
anything to lose except for “six months or a year at worst” in prison. In fact, Servet 
implies that this would really be a beneficial deal for Eyüp since he would not only 
continue to pay his salary regularly when he is in prison, but also give him a lump sum at 
the end of his sentence so that he could follow his ambitions once he comes out.  
The offensive and discriminatory presumptions that enable Servet to make such an 
offer in the first place are discernable despite his sugar-coating of the deal. The gesture 
encapsulates the basic tenets of class and cultural racism which constitute the poor 
migrants from taşra as less human to the extent that their time—indeed, their lives—is 
always-already empty, insignificant, unproductive and hence disposable in comparison to 
the valuable, productive and meaningful time/life of the more affluent urbanites. For 
Servet to even raise the issue with Eyüp, he must have already formed an opinion about 
Eyüp’s existence as so abject that prison is no more a “waste” of his time than the life he 
is already living.  
Eyüp, on the other hand, finds himself on the horns of a dilemma. Accepting the 
offer would mean becoming an accomplice in a crime. Yet in declining it, he would let 
slip away perhaps the only shot he has to free himself and his family out of the life that 
they are caged. To put it in different terms, he must either choose complicity for the sake 
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of socio-economic mobility and potential inclusion (and ironically, he has to first submit 
to another form of exclusion by going to prison) or continue to remain indefinitely in the 
category of internal exclusion.  
The bargain is instructive on another level, too. While the modernization project 
failed to deliver its promise of development and welfare for all, and its institutions along 
with the ideal of “common” or “collective” good have been corroded by neoliberal 
policies and their belief in a self-actualizing, competitive individual, those (like Eyüp) 
who are most aggrieved by such transformations, have turned towards other, informal and 
often illicit means for immediate relief from their conditions. In this sense, the bargain 
between Eyüp and Servet represents one such short-term solution—a fundamentally 
economic one—to a long-standing predicament of modernization and also testifies to the 
forced submission of the urban poor to the entrepreneurial logic of neoliberal self-
making. Thus when Eyüp agrees to take on a crime he did not commit, he thinks that 
when he comes out he would at least be able to fashion a new and improved life for 
himself and his family. Yet, even this sliver of promise turns out to fail as by the time he 
is out, the only remaining institution of support, the family, is also incinerated. To see 
how the symbolic death of the family ensues, we have to look at what happens to the 
other two members in Eyüp’s absence.  
Problems start when the mother, Hacer, is left alone to deal with the unruly and 
rather despondent teenage son, İsmail. While working full-time in an industrial kitchen, 
Hacer has little time to keep an eye on İsmail, who, having failed the national university 
entrance exam, has now joined the ranks of the unemployed. Interested neither in 
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continuing his education nor in working at the dead-end jobs that Hacer tries to get him 
through her limited contacts, İsmail spends his life adrift, wandering around aimlessly, 
staring off into space and sleeping for hours on end. For him, the way to break out of 
(internal-)exclusion and escape the fate of his parents lies in “becoming his own boss.” 
Thus, İsmail seems to have already internalized the ideology of the entrepreneurial 
individual who is supposed to shape, control and manage his/her own welfare. However, 
starting his own private business carrying school children requires start-up capital to buy 
a car. Hacer resists İsmail’s pressures at getting her to ask Servet for an advance payment 
on the money the latter owes to Eyüp for taking the blame, until one night İsmail comes 
home late, bruised and battered. Concerned about her son’s delinquent behaviour, which 
she is unable quell by herself alone, she makes a bargain with İsmail. She agrees to 
meeting with Servet to ask for the money, but asks her son not to tell Eyüp about it. It is 
as if, the film suggests, the first clandestine bargain between Eyüp and Servet leads to, or 
reproduces itself in, other forms of secretive acts amongst the family members. I am not 
referring here only to the criminal nature of the first bargain, but also to Eyüp’s handling 
of it in relation to his family. His refusal to include his wife and his son in a decision that 
impinges upon the lives of them all acts like a precedent, warranting other kinds of 
clandestinity within the family unit. The film continues to show how the initial deal, 
which marks the beginning of the family’s re-organization along neoliberal logic and 
principles, sets off an interconnected series of furtive acts, and, slowly yet steadily, 
contaminates the idea of commonality on which the institution of family rests. 
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Hacer’s meeting with Servet, for instance, held in secret from Eyüp, prompts the 
beginning of an affair between the two, which, in turn has to be kept secret from the 
public eye, and especially from Eyüp, İsmail and Servet’s family. Her visit comes at a 
time when Servet is in the middle of a tantrum about his recent election defeat. He treats 
Hacer contemptuously at first as if she is a nuisance and tells off his secretary in front of 
her for “sending in every visitor.” The shame and humiliation Servet inflicts on Hacer, 
who was already bashful about asking for the money, are exacerbated when she cannot 
find her cellphone, which loudly rings from her bag, filling the silent room with the 
melancholy tunes and maudlin lyrics of a song (“E mi” by Yıldız Tilbe). In its expression 
of pain, resentment and spite in the face of unrequited love, the song is a classic example 
of the arabesk genre—a genre that has been popular since the 1960s among migrants in 
the big cities and abhorred by secular, Western-oriented, educated, urban elites on the 
basis of its “impure” structure (influenced by Arabic, especially Egyptian music), its 
embodiment of an undesired, hybridized urban-rural/urban-taşra culture, and its 
endorsement of self-pity, disconsolation and fatalism.  
The arabesk song which abruptly interrupts the encounter between Servet and 
Hacer and then appears again later in the film at several occasions has some special 
significance. In the first place, it constitutes a key indicator of the objectionable, highly 
censured, taşra-based difference that the family embodies. Prior to the deal, the 
professional relationship between Servet and Eyüp has rendered such difference mute and 
innocuous, hence “tolerable,” insofar as the latter did his job. In other words, the cloak of 
professionalism has made it possible for Servet to keep his distance from the otherness 
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that Eyüp (and his family) epitomizes. The deal, however, has compromised such safe 
distance as the scene with Hacer demonstrates. Servet is irritated by Hacer’s presence not 
only because it reminds him of the crime he wants to forget, but also because he 
experiences it, in bad faith, as an intrusion. The arabesk song is a summation of 
unwelcomed taşra-difference (of which Hacer is the embodiment) which suddenly 
becomes overly-proximate in its eruption into Servet’s office. There is a parallel here 
between the way Servet responds to Hacer and the way urban elites respond to the influx 
of migrants, especially since the 1990s when Turkey’s integration into global capitalism 
intensified domestic migration to the centers. Just as Servet feels bothered and imposed 
upon by Hacer, urban elites, in their unquestioned assumption of privilege and 
entitlement to the city, have perceived the migrants as sources of annoyance and as 
“invaders” whom they now, grudgingly, have to “tolerate.” Common to both is a 
forgetting—a disavowal—of the fact that the prosperity, convenience, and functionality 
of the (city)life that they perceive to be “invaded” largely depends on their complicity, if 
not direct involvement, in the exploitation of the despair of the so-called invaders.  
Before I go on to discuss the second significance that the recurrent arabesk song 
bears in the film, I want to elucidate one other point about the affair between Hacer and 
Servet. Despite what one might wishfully (yet precipitately) assume, this affair signals 
neither the end of exploitation nor the deferential acknowledgement of difference. Rather, 
it exemplifies an instance when exploitation disseminates into the sexual economy. For 
Servet, the relationship is mainly sexual and its appeal lies in its provision of an 
immediate remedy for the rebuilding of his shattered male confidence after the election 
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defeat. The absence of scenes that would convey a sense of romance, affection, or care 
also attests to the primarily carnal nature of the affair—at least for Servet. For Hacer, 
though, the relationship offers both an opportunity to explore her dampened sexual 
desires and a promise to free herself from the unfulfilling, insignificant life that she feels 
trapped in. In this sense, her individual investment in the affair is so intense in its 
multidimensionality that even after her son discovers the affair and Eyüp gets out of 
prison, she does not desist from following her desires. This poses a significant threat to 
Servet who is apprehensive about losing his family, his status and even his life if the 
affair gets discovered. Echoing the way he dealt with the car crash, he tries to resolve this 
situation, too, by evading his responsibility in it. At the end, it becomes clear that Hacer 
is as disposable an object for him as Eyüp was when his interests are at stake. In the 
scene where Hacer gets unhinged upon hearing Servet’s decision to end the relationship, 
there is nothing left of the latter’s self-declared “sensitivity” and “altruism”—qualities he 
boasted of when he was trying to seduce her. The scene depicts male violence and 
misogyny with harrowing detail, while rendering visible the readiness with which such 
socially-sustained violations around gender get grafted onto cultural and class racism: 
Servet’s threats and insults at Hacer rapidly coalesce into a metropolitan hostility towards 
taşra. Echoing the prevalent, discriminatory constitution of migrants as parasites or 
viruses who feed off of resources on which they, allegedly, have no right, Servet calls 
Hacer, and her “whole family,” “leeches” that he does not want “near” him.  
Besides functioning like a shorthand for the family’s abjected difference, the 
replaying of the arabesk song is significant on a meta-level, too. More specifically, I read 
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the enigmatic interjections of the song into the narrative—always through Hacer’s 
cellphone—as a subtle salutation to the genre of arabesk films of the 1980s and 90s. 
Indeed, the story in Three Monkeys itself repeats in a revisionary manner the familiar 
narrative of the big city melodrama that was the focus of the genre.62 One strand of these 
arabesk films centered on migrant characters who came to the big cities from taşra in 
search of a better life. However, as these films invariably portray, in the corrupt 
metropolis, the ill-equipped naïve migrants get easily lured into dirty business and their 
innocence chips away. The characters, incapable of resisting the inexorable forces that 
incrementally induce pain and suffering, resign themselves to fate. In these highly 
conservative, patriarchal narratives, injury (particularly male injury) is eulogized at the 
same time as its sublimation is stunted by a latent investment in the idea that changing 
life’s conditions is simply beyond one’s control. As family ties disintegrate, this brings 
on the irredeemable destruction if not the deaths of the main characters.   
Ceylan’s film repeats the basic tenets of this story-line while revising them towards 
a conclusion that diverges significantly from those of the conventional arabesk movies. In 
Three Monkeys, too, migration proves harmful, and things go from bad to worse for the 
main characters, as they are wont to do in an arabesk film. After Eyüp’s nine-month 
sentence is over and Servet leaves Hacer, the family is faced with yet another trial: 
İsmail, who prior to the break-up discovered his mother’s affair, kills Servet later on. Yet, 
rather than giving in to fate, the family strives to “manage” the mess that has become 
their life. This, as it turns out, comes at a high price. Eyüp, devastated by the revelation of 
                                                          
62 Similar to their musical counterparts, despite their popular reception, arabesk films have been 
objects of ridicule and disdain amongst urban elites and high-art film circles. 
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his wife’s affair and broken down by his son’s murderous act of revenge, seeks a solution 
by striking a deal with Bayram, the errand boy in the local coffeehouse. Bayram, also a 
migrant, works for peanuts at the coffeehouse where, having no family or income to rely 
on, he is also forced to live and sleep. As Eyüp tries to convince him to take the blame for 
his son in return for a lump sum of money, he repeats to Bayram the words he himself 
had heard from Servet at the beginning of the film—only in a much more straightforward 
manner that intuits how, for the very poor, the brutal experience of immiseration can 
render prison preferable to the precarity of life outside:  
What’s the difference between you sleeping here or over there [in prison]? Winter 
is coming, Bayram. The coffeehouse is freezing at night. There you’ll have heating. 
It’s nice and warm. Three meals a day. You’re still young. When you come out, 
you’ll at least have a lump sum of money. You can set up your own business, open 
your own coffeehouse. What do you say?  
The deal with Bayram, on the one hand, attests to the film’s refusal to constitute the 
migrant family from within the submissive economy of arabesk movies. Eyüp is neither 
the naïve, passive victim nor the quintessential, self-sacrificing male hero of the arabesk 
genre, who is almost always, at least latently, glorified. Even though Hacer is the 
character who comes closest to an arabesk cliché (as femme fatale, especially in her 
stalking of Servet and melodramatic appeals to fate), she also defies this role in the end as 
she eludes death—the inevitable punishment allotted to such figures in the genre. What is 
remarkable is the way in which the film, twice, solicits the viewers’ expectations about 
this only to explicitly undermine them: once, when a scene that shows Hacer climbing 
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over the terrace railings to commit suicide, turns out to be a fantasy of the distraught 
Eyüp; and a second time, when faced with the reality of his wife’s suicide attempt, Eyüp 
concernedly commands her: “come down, don’t be silly!” The film steers clear of both 
the fatalism and misogyny that arabesk movies cultivate.  
On the other hand, the deal that concludes Three Monkeys also prevents one from 
leaving the film with a sappy optimism. It affirms a will for survival in the face of ever-
growing setbacks, and yet by this time the family, which used to be the essential 
institution for survival, is destroyed by secrets, lies and betrayals that lead to the last deal 
between Eyüp and Bayram. None of these misdeeds are portrayed as consequences of 
fate, but follow instead from an economic and cultural system that endorses the myth of 
self-reliance for prosperity and prescribes an aggressive individualism as a solution for 
the inequalities that it has only deepened and diffused by dismantling the institutions of 
support (however dysfunctional or inadequate these might have been).  
By emphasizing the gravity involved in the destruction of the family at the end of 
the film, I am not trying to make a moral point about the universal sanctity of this 
institution. Rather, I find its disintegration distressing because it is one of the last vestiges 
of vital support for the urban poor—something that provides a sense of solidarity that 
renders the conditions of internal-exclusion bearable.63 The deal that Eyüp tries to strike 
with Bayram is significant in this context, too, for it draws attention to the erosion of 
class solidarity—an erosion that makes the family all the more indispensable as a source 
                                                          
63 The significance of family solidarity is concretely expressed in the film through Eyüp’s repeated 
appeals to İsmail from prison: “Do we have anybody else to rely on, son, but each other?”  
 
170 
 
of care, cooperation and support. It also shows, more grimly, how the (internally-) 
excluded themselves reproduce the oppressive and exploitative language/logic of 
neoliberal salvation, in an effort to survive or be properly included in the city. Yet still 
the film makes clear that there really are no heroes or winners in a system which breeds 
injustice. Even Servet, who seems to reap the most benefits by virtue of his higher 
positioning on the socio-economic hierarchy, ends up paying (literally) for the covering 
up of his own murder—the money Servet pays Eyüp to avoid prison, goes to Bayram to 
hide the truth about Servet’s killing.   
 
IV.3. Once Upon a Time in Anatolia: Taşra and Modernity 
Ceylan’s film Once Upon a Time in Anatolia (2011) signifies a return in his oeuvre 
to the literal taşra. The vast, uninhabited steppes of inland Turkey are the setting for the 
story, which traces the 12-hour investigation of a murder. The all-male main characters, 
played by professional actors, are an assortment of figures from both taşra and center: 
Comissar Naci, Driver (Arap) Ali, murder suspect Kenan and the mukhtar (village 
administrator) are from taşra, whereas Doctor Cemal, Prosecutor Nusret and the 
Gendarmerie Sergeant Önder are from and/or representatives of the center. Indeed, more 
than the murder plot itself, it is this encounter between the figures of taşra and center that 
is pivotal to the film. The encounter entails moments through which the film suspends 
homogeneous and totalized conceptualizations of taşra as pre-modern and the 
metropolitan center as modern. “Pre-modern” and “modern”—commonly thought in 
terms of disjointed, sequential and internally homogeneous categories on the linear 
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progression of time—are shown not only to inhabit the same present, but also to be 
heterogeneous, containing within themselves elements that would ordinarily be deemed 
incompatible with their respective ethos. The taşra-center encounter is thus instrumental 
to the film’s incisive critique of modernity. Through this encounter the film brings into 
sharp relief the limits of a modern will to translate and subjugate the diversity of human 
experience into the monolithic epistemological categories of rational, scientific thought.  
Once Upon a Time in Anatolia differs markedly from the two Ceylan films I have 
discussed so far in that it brings to the fore and problematizes much more explicitly the 
supposedly technological and epistemological superiority of the center over taşra, 
imagined as “irrational,” “superstitious,” and “incompetent.” The center, embodied 
particularly in the characters of Doctor Cemal and Prosecutor Nusret, comes to taşra to 
shine the light of reason on it—to dissect its workings and illuminate its recesses—in 
order to find the missing body of the murder victim and solve the crime. However, as the 
film demonstrates, this project that counts on the distant, disinterested and piercing vision 
of modern science and law to master and “enlighten” taşra fails. Not only is scientific 
vision—the worldview of the metropolitan subject in the film—shown to be inadequate 
to the task, but also the Prosecutor, the embodiment of modern law, scientific skepticism 
and analysis, turns out to be deeply beholden to the “irrational” thinking that is 
commonly associated with taşra. Conversely, taşra characters evince a commitment to 
science and technology, which they regard as enabling the survival of their life-worlds.  
Having said that, the film is not content simply with facile reversals of established 
binaries in attempts to revalue the devalued. Rather, such reversals are part of a 
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scrambling of preconceptions attached to taşra and center, which ultimately throws into 
crisis the borders between them. The Doctor is the focal figure in this process. Starting 
out as the dispassionate eye of skeptical scientism, the de-mythologizing metropolitan 
voice of reason and rationality, Doctor Cemal, by the end of the film, finds himself 
defying his own scientific findings with regards to the murder victim’s cause of death. In 
doing so he can no longer sustain his position above the fray, but gets smeared—quite 
literally—with the blood and guts of human experience.  
*** 
The camera, through a murky window, slowly zooms from the outside into a shabby 
room where three men are chatting over drinks. This image, structured by a manifestly 
voyeuristic gaze—a gaze, while irresistibly curious and intrusive is at the same time 
safely distanced from its object—is the opening image of Once upon a Time in Anatolia. 
From here Ceylan cuts to a panoramic, stable crane shot of the dark, uninhabited, hilly 
steppes divided by a dusty, curvy road. Illuminated by nothing but the dimming sunset 
and the headlights of what turns out to be the cars of the investigation team, this image of 
taşra is a familiar one. Desolate, gloomy and sinister, this taşra indeed resonates with, if 
not affirms, one of its dominant representations in the modern Turkish imaginary. Even 
though this latter image is thematically very different from the former, they are connected 
formally through the anonymous gaze that looks in on them. From the very beginning, 
then, the film reveals how the inherited images of taşra, its most accustomed, 
“normative” representations, are informed by the power dynamics, fantasies, pleasures 
and revulsions of a kind of voyeurism.  
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What is remarkable about the film is how it starts with one unquestioningly-
imbibed image of taşra only to modify it, subtly and unhurriedly, in its progression. What 
is even more remarkable, however, is how it does this not by trying to extricate more 
accurate, authentic or ideal images of taşra untainted by the voyeuristic gaze of the 
(modern) center, but by continuing to solicit such a gaze only to divulge its limits.64 I will 
return to this point and, within a framework that considers the centrality of vision to 
modernity, discuss at some length the film’s relationship to sight. But first I want to focus 
on the ways in which the film complicates the familiar image of taşra with which it 
opens. 
In as much as the film depicts taşra as a dreary, destitute and ontologically barren 
place, it disconnects these spatial properties from their temporal and civilizational 
associations. In dominant conceptualizations of taşra, while absence (of wealth, 
resources, dynamism, etc.) gets readily articulated to a condition of pre- or anti-
modernity, such a connection also occasions culturalist formulations about taşra’s 
inherent “primitiveness,” its resistance to modernity and hostility to change. The film 
intervenes into this easy slippage by giving voice to taşra characters who are not only 
                                                          
64 In this respect, the film urges one to meditate on cultural critic Şükrü Argın’s potent question: “Is 
it possible to look at taşra from the inside?” In his article with the same title, Argın argues that this is 
indeed an impossible endeavor for, by definition, taşra is the name of that place which is excluded, a place 
that is outside. The conditions of its very existence are bound up with a center that excludes it. Therefore, 
even the way it looks at itself always-already includes the look of the center: “The shadow of the center’s 
gaze falls upon taşra’s gaze at itself” (2005: 289-92, my translation). There is no “pure” vantage point from 
the inside one can take to see what taşra really is.   
Once upon a Time in Anatolia seems to me to be a film that recognizes this impossibility. This is 
why, instead of focusing on a task of making visible the object (taşra) in its most “authentic” form, it turns 
our attention to and makes visible the center’s gaze that shapes the object.  
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open to change but also express an explicit desire for modern technology that would 
improve their existing conditions.  
There are two particular scenes that drive this point home. In one, the Mukhtar—
representative of the local government elected by the villagers—appeals to the Prosecutor 
to get the necessary funding he was unable to get from the district governor for the 
building of a modern morgue. According to the Mukhtar this is an “essential” need for 
the village, for they do not know what to do with their dead, especially in the heat of the 
summer. Immediate burial is not an option since the relatives of the dead, having long 
migrated to and settled in the centers, demand delaying the burial until they can arrange 
their return to taşra to bid their final farewells. All in all, such details suggest that the 
village has to modify its burial practices, “modernize” them so to speak, in response to 
the changing conditions of taşra which are themselves shaped by the forces of modernity. 
“There’s only old folk left,” the Mukhtar continues and “it takes someone to die before 
they [the relatives in the centers] think of the village.” In this particular sense, too, the 
modern institution of the morgue is “essential” to the village because its very survival 
depends on it. Insofar as death constitutes one of the few remaining occasions that gets 
taşra on the center’s map again—something that saves it from lethal neglect and 
abandonment—the building of a morgue, quite ironically, signifies the extension and 
vitalization of life for taşra.     
Similarly, in one of the final scenes of the film, there is an exchange between the 
medical technician Şakir, a taşra dweller, and the doctor, which attests to taşra’s 
receptivity towards modern technology. Just before commencing the autopsy on the 
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murder victim, Şakir expresses to the doctor his discontent about the “lousy” state of their 
equipment, particularly in comparison to the “first-rate” kits he saw in the city hospital. 
Yet, akin to the Mukhtar’s experience with the district governor, his attempts at 
convincing the representatives of the central government to replace the existing out-of-
date, manual tools with the more current, power-operated ones have come to no avail. In 
Şakir’s grievance, one can sense both a desire to participate in the modern and a 
frustration at being withheld from it. In this respect, if we are to talk of any resistance, I 
think it is more apt to talk of and scrutinize the center’s resistance in responding to 
taşra’s drive to modernize rather than that of the latter’s to modernity.  
While these two instances indicate how (the desire for) the modern already inhabits 
the so-called “pre-modern” taşra, the film also illustrates how the “pre-modern” subsists 
in the modern center. The distinctions that separate the “pre-modern” from the modern, 
taşra from center, become undone at the scene during which the body of the murder 
victim is finally recovered. Commissar Naci, upon seeing that the body is buried hogtied, 
loses his temper and attacks the suspect. “Is that human, Mr. Prosecutor?” he bursts out. 
As he ventilates his sheer horror and disgust at what he is witnessing—“You killed him 
already, why tie him up like that? What about respect for the dead? […] Are you so 
wicked? Are you not a human being?”—the Prosecutor calls for restraint, reminding him 
that there is still work to do which requires that he restrain his outrage in the name of 
prompt and impartial diligence.  
As the embodiment of modern law, it is not surprising that the Prosecutor responds 
to Naci in a way that invokes professional aptitude, reason, rationality and efficiency. 
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Yet, these principles are utterly trampled upon in the course of the crime scene 
examination, which is marred from the start by sloppiness, inefficacy and incompetence, 
qualities commonly used to define and disparage taşra’s performance of basic tasks. 
Leaving aside the violation of the essential rules of forensic science (wearing gloves, for 
one) there is not even a body bag to transport the body to the hospital since, as it turns 
out, the Prosecutor’s staff “forgot” to bring one. It is no one other than the Prosecutor 
himself who, at this point, proposes that the body be re-hogtied so that it can fit into the 
trunk of one of the cars.65 This is indeed the most time-efficient solution for the 
Prosecutor. Throughout the night he had blamed Naci—by implication taşra 
incompetence—for prematurely summoning him all the way from the capital Ankara, for 
failing to follow through the necessary investigative groundwork into the whereabouts of 
the body, and thus, for wasting his time in an obscure and indefinite endeavour. Now that 
they have the body, he wants to leave as soon as possible even if this means stuffing the 
corpse into a trunk. In this manner the film, on the one hand, obscures the boundaries 
between the criminal and the lawful. On the other hand, through Naci’s earlier reaction to 
the hogtie (“wicked” and “inhuman”), it also links the Prosecutor’s instrumental 
rationality to a beastly, remorseless cruelty, exposing in this way the frailty of the 
distinctions maintained between the civilized, modern center and the brutish, pre-modern 
taşra. 
This is not the only time that the figure of the Prosecutor becomes the locus of 
seemingly incompatible modes of being. In the midst of the unending and frustrating 
                                                          
65 During this scene, we learn that the suspect hog-tied the victim in order to fit him into the trunk of 
his car so as to be able to transport him to the burial site.  
177 
 
search for the body, the Prosecutor strikes up a conversation with the Doctor. He tells the 
Doctor about a past case involving the death of a woman which was so inscrutable that 
“you’d need to be less a prosecutor than an astrologer to find the cause.” The young and 
pregnant wife of one of his friends, “smart, educated and not in the least superstitious,” 
one day told her husband that she was going to die on a specific date. Just as she 
predicted she simply “dropped dead” on that day, a few days after giving birth, for no 
apparent reason. In response to the Doctor’s skeptical questions, which pursue a rational, 
logical explanation, the Prosecutor remains intractably committed to the idea that the 
woman’s death was scientifically inexplicable, as if it was a result of metaphysical forces, 
of the woman’s magical thinking.   
I find it quite striking that the film sets up the encounter between “rational” and 
“irrational” thought, science and superstition, not between an enlightened, analytical, 
skeptical subject of modernity and that of the uneducated, illogical, unsuspecting subject 
of pre-modern taşra, as is usually the case in conventional representations, but between 
two modern subjects who are in fact embodiments of the two most foundational 
institutions of modernity: law and science. Furthermore, one of these modern subjects, 
the Prosecutor, is shown to be holding together in one body two allegedly incompatible 
worldviews. His public identity requires him to abide by the universal principles of 
skeptical and analytical thinking. As he himself acknowledges to the doctor quite sternly 
when the latter intimates self-poisoning as a possible cause of death: “if there’d been 
anything suspicious do you think I’d let it go […] I’m a prosecutor. It’s my job to be 
suspicious.” Yet at the same time, he seems to be strangely at home with an explanation 
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which is nothing short of the irrationality and superstition that his public positioning as a 
man of modern law demands him to denounce, unravel and eradicate.  
I will return to a more in-depth analysis of this encounter between science and 
superstition and discuss at some length the motive behind the Prosecutor’s curious 
behaviour. Yet, such a task first requires us to examine the second larger critical gesture 
the film makes vis-à-vis modernity, which has to do with revealing the limits of a 
detached, dissecting, objective scientific gaze.  
 
IV.3.a. Sight and Smell 
The film’s questioning of the adequacy of scientific method to discover truth, and to 
do so by way of an abstracted, spectatorial, objective gaze, is particularly pronounced in 
its treatment of vision. The ascendancy of vision “as the master sense of the modern era” 
and as source of knowledge is undermined especially in the first half of the film, which 
takes place in the profound dark of the taşra night (Jay, 1988: 3; 1993). The murder 
suspect Kenan, while having confessed to burying the body of the victim, cannot recall 
where exactly he buried it. Throughout the night he guides the search team from one 
place to another based on some visual clues he claims to remember about the site. 
However, the more clues he provides, the less clear it becomes where the body might be. 
First, he claims to have seen an old fountain at the site. Once taken to a site with a 
fountain, he deems this place does not quite “look like” where he buried the body. The 
site, he further claims, was located in a “flat, plowed field” with a “round tree” nearby. 
These are indeed ludicrous clues to begin with for in this particular taşra-geography there 
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are numerous old fountains (all looking alike) located near plowed fields (which are 
virtually everywhere) that contain “round trees.” Yet still, at each site, first the car lights 
and then massive light projectors of the military (provided by the gendarmerie team, i.e., 
the taşra extension of central military power) are mobilized to illuminate the area. 
Despite Kenan’s persistent reluctance and confusion at every single location he takes 
them, diggers are called on to work, but to no avail. At each site, Commissar Naci urges 
Kenan to “look around” carefully, but he loses more of his patience as the night 
advances: “You said tree, where’s the tree?” “Come here, this is a plowed field, is this 
it?” “You show me that tree or your family is fucked!” Kenan becomes the most 
convenient and “legitimate” receptacle of his annoyance, which is partly conditioned by 
the perpetual frustration of the investment in vision and its powers of extracting 
knowledge. Yet, technologies of vision are completely ineffective in this particular case 
since sight is not a reliable criterion for attaining or verifying knowledge in a place where 
qualities such as similarity and difference, diversity and uniqueness cannot be ascertained 
by visual perception. The search, insofar as it banks solely on the distanced yet 
penetrating capability of sight, is doomed to fail; and it unequivocally does.   
This incapacitation of the sense of sight, which the film associates with the center 
and its ocularcentric epistemology, is accompanied by an insistent emphasis on another 
sense: smell. Indeed, the film, in a rather peculiar way, is infatuated with odor. 
Conversations about the smell of buffalo yoghurt (and how this is different from that of 
cheese), the smell of rotting bodies, of lamb and bread come into the narrative at different 
points for no apparent reason. In other words, these random dialogues, always initiated by 
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the taşra characters, do not connect in any way to the main plot nor lead to any insights 
about the search. How are we, then, to make sense of this fixation on smell? A cogent 
engagement with this question, I suggest, requires a theoretical consideration of the 
relationship between sight and smell.   
Herbert Marcuse in his Eros and Civilization categorizes smell as a “proximity 
sense” along with taste which, for the perpetuation of  particular forms of social 
domination, has to be subjected to “surplus-repression” (a historically-specific mode of 
repression besides the “basic repression” necessary for survival). As he elaborates: 
The pleasure of smell and taste is “much more of a bodily, physical one, hence also 
more akin to sexual pleasure, than is the more sublime pleasure aroused by sound 
and the least bodily of all pleasures, the sight of something beautiful.” [Smell and 
taste] relate individuals immediately […] Such immediacy is incompatible with the 
effectiveness of organized domination, with a society which “tends to isolate 
people, to put distance between them […]” Their unrepressed development would 
eroticize the organism to such an extent that it would counteract the desexualization 
of the organism required by its social utilization as an instrument of labor (1962: 
36).      
As Le Guérer (2002) points out, besides its corporeality, its association with the flesh, the 
“animal,” the “primitive,” and the “instinctive,” the denigration of smell, particularly 
after the Enlightenment, also has something to do with the way it violates the 
fundamental terms of scientific investigation. The latter correlates attainment of rational 
knowledge with the practice of observing objects from without. In this regard, vision 
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assumes a privileged position as the “noble and intellectual” sense of scientific inquiry in 
that it necessarily entails detachment and distance of space between subject and object: 
“the externality of sight allows the observer to avoid direct engagement with the object of 
his gaze” (Jay, 1993: 25).  
Smell, on the other hand, involves disintegration of distances and boundaries in its 
“penetrating strength and permeability” (Le Guérer, 2002: 3-5). In contrast to the 
sanitizing distance that vision sustains between object and subject, smell is often about 
leakage and infiltration: “it does violence to the sanctity of the self by opening it, exciting 
it, agitating it, independently of subjective intention” (Forter, 2000: 55).66 In the way it 
breaches the borders separating the subject and the object, smell not only poses a 
hindrance to scientific inquiry, but also threatens its ruination. Indeed, its marginalization 
in the tradition of Enlightenment thought can be seen as a symptom of its perception as 
potential danger. By virtue of “its boundary-transgressing propensities and its emotional 
potency,” smell signifies a threat to “the abstract and impersonal regime of modernity,” 
to its dominant epistemological assumptions, methodologies and biases (Classen et al., 
1994: 4-5).  
Within this framework, I think that the film’s otherwise enigmatic emphasis on 
smell, and in particular its juxtaposition of this denigrated sense with the valorized one of 
sight, reveals its awareness not only of the tension between the two, but also of the 
                                                          
66 Similarly, Horkheimer and Adorno talk of the sense of smell as one that “bears clearest witness to 
the urge to lose oneself in and become the ‘other.’ […] When we see we remain what we are; but when we 
smell we are taken over by otherness. Hence the sense of smell is considered a disgrace to civilization, the 
sign of lower social strata, lesser races and base animals. The civilized individual may only indulge in such 
pleasure if the prohibition is suspended by rationalization in the service of real or apparent practical ends” 
(1987: 184).  
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hierarchical dualisms such as mind-body, analytical-lived/experimental, abstract-concrete 
that modern science and epistemology constitute and operate through. Indeed, revealing 
the limits of these foundational binaries lies at the core of what I see as the film’s astute 
critique of modernity at large.  
Significantly, while advancing this critique, the film also avoids a common pitfall 
encountered in some critical accounts of modernity, which in their attempts to 
deconstruct binaries and articulate modernity’s discontents and dislocations end up 
idealizing the “pre-modern.” In this regard, I want to clarify that the film’s highlighting 
of the olfactory and especially its association of the sense of smell with taşra characters 
do not indicate a primitivist longing, which, as some critics point out, is a palpable 
undercurrent in contemporary taşra films. As I argued earlier, Once Upon a Time in 
Anatolia does not postulate taşra as a site that lies outside of modernity which, on 
account of such externality, enables or reactivates the more “bodily” senses that are 
subdued in the process of becoming modern. Taşra, to put it differently, is not depicted as 
a space unaffected by scientific, rational, abstract thought, and hence, by extension, as a 
space that is conducive to the cultivation of proximal/corporal senses that are presumed 
to be stunted in the modern metropolis. The film averts such a primitivist appeal by 
refraining from establishing smell as the sense that leads to resolution or truth. As I 
expressed before, the references to smell have no bearing on the outcome of the search or 
the resolution of the murder case. In this regard, the film does not get entangled in any 
effort to re-value smell as a more “useful,” “becomingly human” or “non-alienated” 
sense than vision. There is no nostalgic call here for a return to some imaginary, originary 
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wholeness of the “pre-modern” as if to remedy the fragmentation and alienation 
occasioned by modernity. Instead, the preoccupation with smell is one way the film 
draws attention to the co-existence of other ways of knowing and inhabiting the world—
to what Chakrabarty describes as “the plural ways of being human that are contained in 
the very different orientations to the world”—which get colonized, disparaged and 
effaced under the hegemony of a rational, scientific outlook (2000: 241).  
The Doctor is the quintessential embodiment of this outlook. Throughout the film 
he maintains a calm, detached and impartial demeanor. Appointed to the small taşra town 
from the center, he is essentially an outsider, but one who has still garnered a certain 
sense of trust and camaraderie from the locals. He does not, however, reciprocate the 
sociability and fellowship extended to him. As discreet as he is about his personal life, 
the “Doctor”—as the locals call him in a way that underscores the impersonal distance he 
has established—also abstains from participating in small town gossip and limits his 
contact with the locals to a professional rapport with “patients.” It is this scrupulous 
neutrality he maintains together with his unwavering commitment to the power of 
scientific method to uncover the truth that renders the Doctor the epitome of the rational, 
logical, analytical modern subject.    
As such he is immediately drawn to demystifying the Prosecutor’s narrative of the 
young woman’s death, to proving that there is no exception to the rule of reason. In this 
sense, we can read the film as having two parallel plots, as following two unresolved 
mysteries, both of which are subjected to the piercing gaze of scientific inquiry. The first 
one is what ushers the center to taşra. Equipped with modern knowledge and technology, 
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the center penetrates taşra: elucidating it, digging its insides out, surveying, mapping and 
measuring it to unearth the secret that it hides in its recesses. The second one entails the 
Doctor’s unrelenting “interrogation” of the Prosecutor, his will to compose a rational, 
logical explanation to the woman’s death by digging into the Prosecutor’s past. While the 
first of these endeavours fails, the second one succeeds, albeit in a way that leaves the 
Prosecutor with a devastating realization and tarnishes the Doctor’s investment in the 
unshakeable authority of science.67   
“Nobody just dies because they say they will; there’s no such death in medicine,” 
the Doctor declares to the Prosecutor when he hears the story. He proceeds, with surgical 
precision, to cut open the Prosecutor’s narrative, revealing one by one to the audience its 
inconsistencies and contradictions. He starts by probing the official cause of death. While 
initially the Prosecutor insists “there was no cause, it was the most bizarre death,” later 
on he negates this statement in his objection to the Doctor’s insistence that an autopsy 
would have revealed the precise cause of death: “You haven’t been listening. The cause 
of death was clear […] You don’t need an autopsy if the cause of death is clear. Because 
                                                          
67 As I discussed, the will to master taşra, to make it visible and accessible fails. The body is found 
not as a result of the exquisite methods and technologies of modernity—which only divulge their own 
limits in this process—but as an unforeseeable and incalculable effect of a highly contingent event. In the 
Mukhtar’s house, where the search team decides to take a break and eat, the short and silent encounter 
between the suspect and Mukhtar’s young daughter, who enters the dark room of men with a gaslight and a 
tray of tea for all, creates an intense psychic effect on the suspect. In a state of delusion, he sees the victim 
sitting by the window, sipping his tea with the rest of the men, breathing hardly for air. Shortly after, he 
confesses to Commissar Naci—the audience is denied access to the confession—not only the exact location 
of the body, but also the cause of murder: on a drunken night (the one that opened the film) he blurted out 
he was the father of the victim’s son and the ensuing brawl left one of the men dead. 
However, it would be erroneous to simply deduce from this that the film favors fate, the mystical, or 
the chance encounter per se over scientific method. Rather, the unravelling of this plot evinces how a 
pursuit that confines itself to the abilities of a dispassionate, detached eye to uncover the truth gets blinded 
to aspects of human experience that remain less readily assimilable to its logic. 
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it was clear. Heart attack.” The viewer, like the Doctor, can identify in these wavering 
statements a circular logic, whereby the truth of the claim (i.e., the “clarity” of the cause 
of death) is compulsively asserted without any substantive evidence, as if the repetition of 
the word “clear” will suffice and thaumaturgically actualize its meaning.  
Through this exchange, then, the Doctor both exposes the implausibility of the 
Prosecutor’s account, collapsing the logic of superstition/magical thinking that pervades 
it, and gains access to a formerly obscured clue, the heart attack, which provides him an 
opportunity to delve further into the case to bring to light the real cause of death. Certain 
drugs, he hypothesizes, when taken regularly in high doses can bring about a heart attack 
as delayed effect. The idea that the woman was committing slow suicide confounds the 
Prosecutor: “why would the woman suddenly take the drugs for no good reason?” His 
distress as he listens to the Doctor’s deductions oozes from his body, almost literally, 
through the scars on his face, which have now become inflamed into much darker, 
internally-hemorrhaging wounds. From this point on, the conversation gets increasingly 
upsetting to watch, not only because of the pain and suffering it evidently inflicts on the 
Prosecutor, but also because watching the Prosecutor’s inexorable yet discreet descent 
into disintegration suddenly unfurls the invasive nature of the Doctor’s endeavour, 
through which our own voyeuristic pleasures have also so far been vicariously satisfied.  
The Doctor, however, remains oblivious to the Prosecutor’s experience and 
continues to treat him as an object, as a mere dispenser of clues that aid his quest for 
truth. In the following scenes the line between scientific inquiry and invasive prying gets 
even more ambiguous as the Doctor, in his distanced and serenely-analytical way, poses 
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questions about the woman’s personal life—whether or not she was getting along well 
with her husband—and extracts from the Prosecutor the last bit of information that 
dissipates the cloud of mystery which enshrouds the woman’s death. Her husband had a 
fling, “some ridiculous thing […] you couldn’t even call it cheating […] she really 
forgave him. They didn’t even mention it again.” To anyone with a little sense of 
intuition, and especially in the context in which they are uttered, these words indicate the 
self-deceptive rationalizations of a guilty conscience. Yet, what is by now painfully 
obvious to the viewer—that the husband in the story is none other than the Prosecutor—is 
somehow imperceptible or irrelevant to the Doctor. The latent aggression nested in his 
impassive, objective gaze attains a disturbingly poignant quality the closer he gets to 
consummating the task he had set out for himself. First, he wrecks the defensive delusion 
the Prosecutor had constructed by explaining that rather than indicating forgiveness, the 
woman’s silence about the cheating was actually a symptom of her having made the 
decision to kill herself; and then, he unsentimentally implies that her suicide was an 
effect of her husband’s infidelity, whom she wanted to punish with her death.  
It takes a slip of the tongue—the Prosecutor’s impulsive utterance “My wife...”—
for the Doctor to finally recognize the gravity of his actions. This has to do with both 
what his scientific inquiry uncovered—the unsettling reality that the Prosecutor, however 
unintentionally, was culpable in his wife’s death—and with what it has foreclosed from 
the Doctor’s view. In the process of his dogged pursuit to discover the “cause of death,” 
the Doctor’s medical gaze can register neither the Prosecutor’s embeddedness in the story 
that he recounts nor the suffering that his drive to uncover “truth” has caused.  
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The closing sequence of the film depicts the effect of such recognition on the 
Doctor, who ends up abandoning the position of the dispassionate and uninvolved 
observer/investigator that he had thus far staunchly maintained. Pointedly, this shift 
occurs at a moment that calls precisely for a rigorous wielding of the detached and 
dissecting medical gaze—during the autopsy of the murder victim—and yet the Doctor, 
without much demur, betrays its conclusive findings. Despite the irrefutable evidence the 
medical technician finds in the victim’s windpipe and lungs, the Doctor instructs his 
assistant to omit from his official report the actual cause of death, asphyxiation from 
being buried alive. We cannot make sense of this blatant transgression unless we take 
into consideration what had preceded it. The exchange between the Doctor and the 
Prosecutor that I examined before is crucial in this regard. On the one hand, it reveals to 
the former the limits of his epistemological orientation, making visible its instrumentalist, 
mechanistic and dehumanizing aspects. On the other hand, the exchange also discloses 
the messiness that the processes of knowledge acquisition always entail, and how the 
epistemic principles of positivist science—like objectivity (hence a clear subject/object 
distinction), exactitude, non-contradiction, strictly causal explanations, etc.—necessarily 
foreclose the perception of such messiness. Now, I read the Doctor’s transgressive act as 
an effect of the infiltration of this otherwise negated otherness into his vision. It is as if 
his exposure to and involvement in the Prosecutor’s story, in his pain and suffering, has 
left an indelible mark on his gaze, which now cannot subtract the messiness, the lived 
relations, or what Jay drawing from Merleau-Ponty calls “the flesh of the world,” from 
the object of knowledge and analysis (1988: 10).  
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Just before the autopsy, the Doctor witnesses how an enraged crowd of men try to 
lynch the suspect; amongst them is the young son of the victim who, filled with hatred 
and anger, throws a stone at the suspect’s face. He also observes the reserved widow, first 
from a distance, then more closely in the autopsy room as the Prosecutor nonchalantly 
converts the particular bodily signs of her grief—her tears and muted gasps—into the 
impersonal language of medico-bureaucracy for them to count as evidence. The Doctor’s 
omission of the ghastly results of the autopsy, then, signifies a defiant response to the 
violence of such reifying objectivism, of which he himself was guilty in his conversations 
with the Prosecutor. Reporting the victim’s real cause of death would not only produce 
additional suffering for the bereaved (and for the suspect), but also breed more violence. 
To put it differently, it would mean reinstituting the indifference of specular distance and 
detachment.       
The last minutes of the film punctuate the Doctor’s abrogation of such distance in 
an explicit and literal manner. After the medical technician Şakir discovers dirt in the 
victim’s windpipe and suggests that he was buried alive, the Doctor, following a brief 
moment of hesitation, dismisses the clear evidence—“No, it’s nothing like that, 
but…let’s say this: no abnormalities found”—and asks the technician to proceed with 
opening the abdomen. Şakir, disconcerted and unconvinced by the Doctor’s verdict, first 
tries to resist by declining to continue. When the Doctor firmly orders him to do what he 
is told, he forcibly cuts open the abdomen, splattering blood on the Doctor’s face. He 
advises the Doctor “to step back a bit” or he will get “stuff” smeared on him. His 
cautioning is rather moot at this point since the Doctor has already been smeared with 
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this “stuff”—with the messiness of the flesh/lived experience that has infiltrated and 
complicated his distant, disembodied, aseptic gaze and done so at the very moment he 
dismissed the scientific evidence. The ineffaceability of this symbolic stain is implied by 
the last image of the film, which shows the Doctor, from behind a window, watching the 
widow and her son as they leave the hospital, unaware that even after wiping it, a faint 
smudge of blood still remains on his cheek.  
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AFTERWORD 
In this dissertation I have explored different manifestations of taşra in a number of 
critically-acclaimed, contemporary cultural texts about Turkey. Because taşra is a 
concept whose construction as the provincial/peripheral is inextricably linked to the 
particular dynamics of Turkish modernization, I have approached it as a “central” site 
within which the internal fissures, contradictions, and discontinuities of this process are 
inscribed, hence legible. The project of modernity about which the taşras in these works 
are most instructive is the western-oriented Kemalist project, which has been losing its 
hegemonic power since the 1980s and experiencing a real crisis since at least the 2000s. 
In these concluding pages, I want to think some about this crisis and about the “new” 
ways in which modernity is being articulated in Turkey, especially in the very recent 
period while I have been writing this dissertation. Given the particular focus of the 
dissertation, my main objective in this discussion is to pose some questions regarding 
taşra’s place within this currently-developing discursive field and gesture towards the 
ways in which these questions might provide a guide for future research.  
As I discussed in Chapter One, Turkey’s integration into global capitalism has, in 
the words of Taşkın (2008), enabled “the rise of … new economic, political and cultural 
counter-elites.” As the neoliberal restructuring policies “weakened the traditional 
privileges of a state-affiliated bourgeoisie and intelligentsia [they] also opened up new 
opportunities for upward mobility for those societal actors who had long been left outside 
of the dominant power alliance of the national development phase” (56). The Justice and 
Development Party (known in English as AKP) that came into power with a sweeping 
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electoral victory in 2002—and has remained in power since then by winning two 
consecutive elections—is the latest embodiment of this class of “counter-elites.”  
AKP has emphasized heavily their Islamic and peripheral “roots” to differentiate 
themselves from the traditional Kemalist elites, to question this latter’s legitimacy to 
power and to validate AKP’s own “populist claim of the authentic representation of the 
masses” (Taşkın, 2008: 59). In this discourse, while the period of Kemalist hegemony is 
constructed as one of repression and alienation where people were severed from their 
own “authentic cultural roots,” the “new Turkey” under AKP rule is presented as a 
“project” of revival and renewal of authenticity for the people. AKP leaders draw on their 
taşra-embedded identities and religious commitments as proof of their “oneness”/ 
sameness with the “authentic culture” and hence constitute themselves as the rightful 
representatives of the people. This discourse around legitimacy is more often than not 
supplemented by another one of victimhood. Besides the authentic culture, AKP claims 
to share with the people of taşra an experience of pain and suffering, i.e., their 
denigration by the Kemalist elites as “less civilized,” their oppression and exclusion on 
account of the “unalterable” provinciality that they are imagined to embody and because 
of their Islamic beliefs and practices.68 
                                                          
68 Indeed, AKP’s appropriation of the racialized language of the middle classes who started using the 
term “White Turk” in 1990s to differentiate themselves from the “dark masses” can be interpreted in this 
context (Arat-Koç, 2007: 45). As Arat-Koç indicates, “White Turk” was originally coined as a critical term, 
but was later adapted “as a proud label” by the new middle classes who defined themselves as western-
oriented urban professionals and as members of a global class with a particular lifestyle that evinces a 
mastering of the rules of global capitalism (49-50). Bora, in his article on the different types of nationalisms 
in Turkey, identifies the White Turk discourse as “a radical variation of liberal nationalism” that indulges in 
a “neoliberal chauvinism of prosperity” (2003: 441). While conveying a refusal to share wealth with 
underprivileged communities, this discourse also produces lower classes as “backward” and “of no 
breeding” and “brand[s] them as a different race” (442). 
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Strikingly, this discourse of resentment and victimhood is compensated by glorified 
re-writings of the imperial Ottoman past that AKP has reclaimed as another source of 
cultural authenticity. Contrary to the Kemalist will to disconnect from the Ottoman 
Empire, AKP has consistently evoked fantasy reconstructions of the Ottoman past as a 
period of glorious world dominance and peaceful coexistence of difference (i.e., Ottoman 
multiculturalism). This signifies a major shift in the political imaginary of Turkey. It 
involves a re-channeling of the investments in “being/becoming like Europe” which, as I 
have argued, are bound up with the idea of “catching up” and a frustrating experience of 
perpetual “belatedness.” These discourses, which have come to be identified as “neo-
Ottomanism” by scholars and political commentators, do not so much convey a desire to 
be like Europe, but almost the reverse—a desire to influence and inspire Europe by 
providing a model for resolving its current predicaments, while challenging its 
domination in the Middle East by establishing Turkey as a leader in the region that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
A populist re-appropriation of this term can be detected in one of Erdoğan’s speeches where he 
evokes a criticism of the divisive quality of the term “White Turk” at the same time as he maintains the 
division to affiliate with the oppressed/“victim” and express solidarity with them: “In this country there are 
White Turks, as well as Black Turks. Your Brother Tayyip [Erdoğan’s first name] is from the Black Turks” 
(qtd. in Ferguson, 2013). 
More recently, this discourse of victimhood has been mobilized in aggressive and even more 
polarizing ways to delegitimize all kinds of political dissent. During the uprisings in the summer of 2013, 
Erdoğan tried to portray the protestors, who were claiming their basic rights to the city, demanding the 
essential rights of freedom and equality and opposing the growing authoritarianism of the neoliberal AKP 
rule, as arrogant and patronizing racists. In one of the many inflammatory speeches he gave at the time, he 
declared:  
 
According to them we don’t understand politics. According to them we don’t understand art, theatre, 
cinema, poetry. According to them we don’t understand aesthetics, architecture. According to them 
we are uneducated, ignorant, the lower class, who has to be content with what is being given, needy; 
meaning, we are a group of negroes (qtd. in Ferguson, 2013). 
 
The rhetoric here aims at constructing the protestors, regardless of the different class positions and various 
political affiliations that founded the resistance movement, under one category—white colonizers/White 
Turks, who treat AKP and its supporters as “negroes.” The racism ingrained in Erdoğan’s own speech 
against black people, especially the use of the derogatory term “negro,” is discussed at some length in 
Ferguson’s journalistic piece.  
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embodies imperial benevolence as cultural heritage. More broadly, then, as Arat-Koç 
(2012) observes, neo-Ottomanist aspirations entail “a revival of imperial grandeur” and 
“a new claim to supremacy.” They involve “a comprehensive transformation of domestic 
and international politics” as well as “a reconceptualization of Turkish identity, a radical 
rethinking/assessment of modern Turkish history, including the place of Kemalism in 
it.”69  
Internationally the sympathetic and supportive responses to these discourses and 
their practical outcomes did not last very long. Nationally, though, they seem to have 
more enduring effects, for despite a worsening economy, a series of high-profile 
corruption scandals, state-sanctioned abuses of rights and freedoms, a foreign policy that 
has worked to alienate both the West and the Middle East, and a pervasive culture of 
violence and impunity—despite all this, not only has AKP sustained its majority in the 
parliament, but also its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, after a decade of holding office as 
prime minister, became the country’s first directly elected president in 2014. AKP has 
managed, time and again, to garner votes from taşra, from the people who are hurt and 
betrayed most by the neoliberal policies of the very party that they support—such as the 
                                                          
69 Recently, a photograph of the Turkish president Erdoğan and Abbas, the President of Palestinian 
National Authority, caused a stir on social media. Taken inside the new $600 million presidential palace 
that Erdoğan had got built for himself in Ankara, the photograph showed the two leaders shaking hands. In 
the background was a staircase where sixteen men, representing Turkic and Ottoman civilizations, were 
lined up in “warrior” costumes. While the kitschiness of the costumes and the whole mise-en-scène 
immediately generated a multitude of jokes on social media, the photograph was instructive about how far 
this fantasy around “reviving” and embodying imperial power went. It also revealed the intensity of the 
investment in this fantasy as an MP from AKP tweeted a controversial response saying that with Erdoğan’s 
presidency “the ninety-year commercial break [i.e., the Turkish Republic] to the 600-year Empire has 
ended.”   
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peasants, the small tradesmen (esnaf), and the domestic migrants who make up a large 
segment of the urban poor.  
While AKP hegemony is overdetermined by a complex of factors, I want to propose 
a few questions here that might be helpful in figuring out the reasons behind its continued 
support and sustenance in/by taşra. For instance, to what extent do the constitution of 
AKP’s hegemony and its continued support by taşra depend on a discursive shift that 
AKP has accomplished—a shift that involves producing and representing taşra as the 
“essential” site of Turkish identity rather than a peripheral one? We can ask this same 
question in a different form: To what extent does AKP’s mobilization of votes depend on 
cultivating resentment, on an affective appeal to the deep-seated historical grievances 
occasioned by the experience of exclusion, by an induced sense of inadequacy and 
inferiority that has impaired taşra? Does not this politics of resentment, which requires a 
perpetual reproduction of the “wounded attachments” to past injury/exclusion in order to 
be able to continue to practice politics as such, ultimately undermine AKP’s purported 
aim of ameliorating taşra, of restoring it to its rightful unmarred essence (Brown, 1995)? 
How does the deployment of neo-Ottomanist discourses fit in with the affective economy 
that AKP’s politics of resentment thrive on? Are they, in their self-aggrandizing quality, 
meant to compensate for or replace the melancholic structure of national identity-
constitution that the Kemalist modernization process generated? How do these discourses 
relate to the losses that occasioned this melancholic structure in the first place? Do they 
acknowledge and/or aid in working through these losses that produced the melancholic 
structure? Or is the desire for reviving imperial grandeur the reverse side of melancholic 
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self-beratement? Are there ways to imagine national identity in Turkey today which do 
not give in to narcissistic modes of subject-constitution, whether melancholic or self-
inflating; which take the marginal, the oppressed, the disavowed—without fetishizing 
them—as the “center,” the starting point, of ethical political discourse and action? And 
what do the aesthetics of such imagination look like?  
Providing responsible answers to these questions would require the labors of a 
future project.  
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